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 This thesis is an historical examination of the multi-layered processes of 
deindustrialization in Sydney, Nova Scotia. The history of a steel plant formerly located in the 
centre of the city is used as a case study through which the mechanisms of deindustrialization are 
fully explored. In 1967, the provincial government of Nova Scotia nationalized the Sydney 
Works. This marks a significant divergence from previous studies of deindustrialization, which 
have traditionally focused on the wave of industrial closures in the North American heartland 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Framed by oral history accounts of former steelworkers, this 
dissertation reveals the combined impact of Canadian regionalism, political economy, and 
working-class cultures of resistance on local experiences of industrial decline. This represents a 
synthesis between the econo-political historiography of deindustrialization favoured in the 1980s 
and the cultural/representational approaches of the 1990s and 2000s.  
 The title, “Deindustrialization on the Periphery,” speaks to the specific national and 
regional contexts that frame the decline of Sydney Steel. The longue durée of economic change 
on the rural resource frontier has been understudied. In Cape Breton, the devastation wrought by 
the end of industry has roots that stretch back to the early 20th century. Tracing these through the 
use of Harold Innis’ “staples trap,” my thesis reveals how deindustrialization stretches from 
decades before closure to the years after a mine, mill, or factory are shuttered for the last time. 
Workers and other residents in Sydney continue to face the bodily aftermath of workplace injury, 
occupational, and environmental illness long after the structures of the plant have been 
demolished. But so, too, have experiences of working at the mill and living in the 
neighbourhoods that surrounded its gates created particular forms of culture, solidarity, and 
identity. My research is more than a eulogy for a defunct steel town. It seeks to expose the 
tensions between different forms of memory and experience, and to examine how the industrial 
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Situating Sydney Steel 
 
This dissertation traces the political, economic, cultural, environmental, and bodily 
processes of deindustrialization in Sydney, Nova Scotia. The city’s steel mill, founded in 
1899, was at the economic and spatial centre of the community. The circumstances 
surrounding the mill’s closure in 2000 and the corresponding end of the Cape Breton coal 
industry continue to impact the island’s residents. Economic repercussions are often the 
most visible. As of 2014, one-third of Cape Breton children live in poverty.1 The 
unemployment rate fluctuates between 14 and 20 percent. Drug abuse is rife, and has 
claimed the lives of dozens of young people in Sydney and the surrounding towns. This 
became such a problem that a recent documentary by the National Film Board of Canada 
dubbed the former coal town of Glace Bay “Cottonland” for its rates of prescription 
Oxycontin abuse.2 This thesis, however, should not be read as a eulogy for another 
industrial town facing decline and disparity. Rather, it contributes to the study of 
deindustrialization by revealing the different scales at which this process take effect, and 
the ways in which working-class residents have responded to its many pressures. It 
examines deindustrialization “on the periphery;” the rural resource frontier experiences 
these processes in ways that differ significantly from the commonly understood 
experiences of “post-industrial” cities such as Detroit or Youngstown.  
Completed at a moment of great political upheaval, this study explains the multi-
faceted sense of alienation that emerges from deindustrialization in working-class 
neighbourhoods and cities around the world. As a result of these processes, politics have 
grown increasingly polarized. Anti-establishment politicians on the left and the right have 
started to appeal directly to the sense of abandonment wrought by fluctuations of the 
global market and more than 30 years of laissez faire doctrine. The popularity of Jeremy 
Corbyn in the U.K. and Bernie Sanders in the United States indicate that the solutions 
                                                
1 “One third of Cape Breton children living in poverty: report,” Cape Breton Post, 
November 24, 2014.  
 
2 “Cottonland,” directed by Nancy Ackerman (National Film Board of Canada, 2006), 
DVD. 
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offered by so-called ‘Third Way’ politics are quickly becoming untenable and unpopular. 
Margaret Thatcher’s mantra, “there is no alternative,” is finally being exposed as a 
falsehood. Contrastingly, right-wing nationalism is re-emerging through an alternative 
appeal to working-class frustrations. Donald Trump, the Republican nominee running for 
President of the United States, castigates free-trade agreements using rhetoric that is not 
dissimilar from the slogans marshalled by anti-offshoring protesters during the 1980s. His 
promise to “Make America Great Again” is an appeal to an imagined past, albeit one that 
sometimes resounds strongly with those who have been victimized by deindustrialization.  
Focused, as it is, on the relationships and experiences engendered through the 
operation, decline, and closure of the Sydney steel mill, my research owes a philosophical 
debt to response within labour history to the postmodern and post-structural critiques of 
the 1980s and 1990s. As early as 1994, Ira Katznelson called for a renewed focus on the 
institutional and political histories most often associated with the so-called “old labour 
history.”3 While liberal scholars such as John Commons in the United States or Canadian 
Marxist historians such as Stanley Ryerson have traditionally utilized a state/institutional 
focus to explore issues surrounding the labour movement and national politics, their 
materialist analysis has – to a degree – fallen out of fashion.4 This dissertation, 
responding to Katznelson’s prescriptions, brings materialist institutional analysis into 
conversation with the experiential and contingent aspects of class, identity, and place that 
are made visible through oral history and collective memory.  
Judith Stein’s 1998 Running Steel, Running America is an example of this type of 
history within the United States. Stein traces the turn from industrial to financial capital 
during the 1970s and 1980s and discusses U.S. policies on trade and heavy industry. 
                                                
3 Ira Katznelson, “The Bourgeois Dimension: A Provocation about Institutions, Politics, 
and the Future of Labour History,” International Labor and Working Class History 46 
(1994): 7-32. 
 
4 Leon Fink, “Intellectuals versus ‘Workers’: Academic Requirements and the Creation 
of Labour History,” in In Search of the Working Class: Essays in American Labor 
History and Political Culture, ed. Leon Fink (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1994), 210; Gregory S. Kealey, “Stanley Bréhaut Ryerson: Canadian 
Revolutionary Intellectual – Part 1,” Studies in Political Economy 9 (1982): 7-36; Bryan 
Palmer, Marxism and Historical Practice: Interventions and Appreciations, Volume 2 
(Leiden: Brill, 2015), 47. 
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While this broad focus is sustained, she grounds her analysis within the experiences of 
both black and white steelworkers in Birmingham, Alabama. The connections between 
“the local” and “the global” are fully visible as the intersections between the state, market 
fluctuations, and working-class experiences are revealed.5 While Stein describes a near-
hegemonic antipathy towards the nationalization of steel mills by American policymakers, 
this position differs from the circumstances in Sydney where public ownership was 
pursued. The provincial nationalization of the Sydney Works is fertile ground for an 
analysis of the differences in state response to deindustrialization in Canada and the 
United States.6 
Deindustrialization cannot be fully understood without recognizing its human 
costs. Steven High argues that oral history provides an opportunity for historians to 
understand how people define themselves. “What words do they use to describe their 
experiences? Whom do they identify with and against?”7 Their accounts reveal how 
notions of class, place, and identity co-mingle and shift in response to deindustrialization. 
Interviews conducted in Sydney between 2012 and 2016 uncover the need for a holistic 
understanding of these processes, and give those involved an opportunity to reflect upon 
their experiences in the longue-durée. In these narratives, mechanisms of decline are 
rooted in the decades prior to the final closure of a mill, factory, or mine and their 
impacts extend long after the end of the last shift. For some, these impacts will last a 
lifetime.  
 
Documenting Deindustrialization: Scholarly Treatments Since the 1980s 
                                                
5 Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline 
of Liberalism (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
 
6 Throughout this thesis, ‘nationalization’ is used to describe the decision by the 
provincial government of Nova Scotia to purchase and operate the mill as of January 1, 
1968. This term is perhaps ill-fitting, as it refers in this instance to the actions of 
provincial – not federal – agents, but it is commonly understood in reference to either 
form of state action. The Canadian Encyclopedia does not distinguish between provincial 
and federal usages of the term. See, “Nationalization,” The Canadian Encyclopedia 
online. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/nationalization/.  
 
7 Steven High, Oral History at the Crossroads: Sharing Life Stories of Survival and 
Displacement (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014), 20.  
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Scholarship on deindustrialization in North America and Western Europe began with an 
economistic framework informed by social justice. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison 
published The Deindustrialization of America in 1982 as an eloquent and intensely 
researched activist screed. This work was an analysis of unfolding crisis, but also came to 
exist as a powerful condemnation of a global capitalism that prompted off-shoring, the 
marginalization of the American blue-collar workforce, and an open attack on working-
class institutions. The authors’ are clear in their denunciation of the “runaway shop,” 
occurring alongside the movement of capital and production from an area with higher 
wages and benefits to an area of lower wages and benefits.8 These early accounts treat 
deindustrialization as a breakdown of the Pax Americana – the postwar compact between 
capital and labour. Bluestone and Harrison offer public ownership of industrial firms as a 
possible solution to the material impact of a crisis that they perceived as having emerged 
from the political and economic conditions of the 1970s. 
While Bluestone and Harrison’s work has proved prescient in many ways, 
historians and sociologists have since problematized their analysis. Scholars have started 
to consider deindustrialization not as an era, but as a constituent part of the capitalist 
reliance upon market forces. Christopher Johnson challenges the notion that this must 
refer to modern industry, arguing that the same factors that characterize decline in the 
20th century American auto industry might also profitably apply to “Flemish woollens in 
the early fourteenth, diverse North-Italian industries in the mid-seventeenth, Dutch 
papermaking in the later eighteenth, or the dual (pre-machine/post-machine) decline of 
lower Languedoc [France] in the later eighteenth and then mid-nineteenth centuries.”9 
                                                
8 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant 
Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: 
Basic Books, 1982); This movement of capital has also been expertly traced in Jefferson 
Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labour (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
 
9 Christopher Johnson, “Deindustrialization and Globalization,” International Review of 
Social History 47 (November 2002): 9; Christopher Johnson, The Life and Death of 
Industrial Languedoc, 1700-1920: The Politics of Deindustrialization (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
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“Capitalism is never stationary,” writes High, “constantly creating the new and 
incessantly destroying the old, its path is not predetermined.”10 Deindustrialization is a 
characteristic part of capitalist development and underdevelopment. The indeterminacy of 
this process is expressed in my dissertation; deindustrialization must be understood as a 
relationship between those who are affected and the affecting forces of the market, 
politics, institutional actors, and ecology. These relationships are by no means unalterable 
or inevitable. The provincial takeover of the Sydney Works in 1967 – a response to a 
closure announcement by its private owners - reveals an alternative trajectory to the 
common experience of many post-industrial American cities. The politics of this decision, 
its relation to Maritime regionalism within Canada, and its decades-long impact on 
Sydney steelworkers and other residents of Cape Breton Island are foundational to my 
research.   
My understanding of deindustrialization-as-process is also informed by the 
arguments of economic geographers Roger Hayter and Trevor Barnes. Employing a 
renewed Innisian framework of political economy in Canada, these scholars gesture 
towards the “staples trap” to provide an explanation for boom and bust cycles in the 
British Columbia forestry industry since the 1970s. Conflict between centralized 
authority and decentralized rural resource economies creates a feedback loop that helps to 
promote periodic economic crises. The trap culminates with an unwillingness to diversify 
among external stakeholders, such as multinational corporations, and the continued 
necessity of large-scale fixed investment. The state plays a key role in these processes. 
While institutional actors often go unconsidered in neoclassical theory, Innis positions the 
state as a prime mover in rural economies – either through the provision of start-up 
capital or by subsidizing other costs.11 Recognizing the impact of the provincial and 
federal state is likewise vital for understanding the processes of deindustrialization in 
Sydney, both in the period prior to public ownership and in the decades after.  
                                                
10 Steven High, “Introduction,” Urban History Review 35, 2 (Spring 2007): 2. 
 
11 Roger Hayter and Trevor Barnes, “Innis’ Staples Theory, Exports, and Recession: 
British Columbia, 1981-1986,” Economic Geography 66 (1990): 156-73; Roger Hayter, 
Trevor T. Barnes and Michael Bradshaw, “Relocating Resource Peripheries to the Core 
of Economic Geography’s Theorizing: Rationale and Agenda,” Area 35, 1 (2003): 15-23. 
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Framed within this secondary literature, my work expands upon industrial history 
in the Maritimes to reveal the full scope of capitalist investment and disinvestment in the 
regional steel industry throughout the 20th century. This approach weds local experiences 
with the spatial processes of capital mobility that continue to impact working-class 
communities regionally, nationally, and internationally. Historians of the region have 
long focused on underdevelopment within the context of national industrialization. As 
T.W. Acheson argues, the shift from Atlantic trade to a national economy between 1880 
and 1910 resulted in the centralization of economic and political power in Montreal and 
Toronto.12 David Frank expands on this notion, describing the history of foreign capital 
in Cape Breton during the 1920s. Drawing upon Marx, he argues that the contradictions 
prompted by capital accumulation and centralization were visible in the Maritimes from 
its industrialization.13 My dissertation traces the long-term effects of capitalist 
underdevelopment in industrial Cape Breton through to the 21st century, tying the 
concept through oral history to local experiences, forms of resistance, and shifting 
identities.   
In his recent book Lunch Bucket Lives, Craig Heron examines the relationships 
between workers, class, and community in Hamilton, Ontario. Although he describes 
moments of working-class protest and resistance, he writes: 
Over the longer term, what stands out is the much quieter heroism of families, 
neighbours, gangs of friends, and groups of workmates who used every resource 
available to them to fashion daily lives that would give them a modicum of 
security and at least a small amount of pleasure – lives that would lead to a 
profound sense of personal decency and respectability.14 
 
                                                
12 T.W. Acheson, “The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-
1910,” Acadiensis 1, 2 (Spring 1972): 15-19. 
 
13 David Frank, “The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of the British 
Empire Steel Corporation,” Acadiensis 7, 1 (Spring 1977): 4; Similar theories were 
expressed by economic geographers. See David Harvey, “The Urban Process Under 
Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis,” International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 2 (March-December 1978): 101-131. 
 
14 Craig Heron, Lunch Bucket Lives: Remaking the Workers’ City (Toronto: Between the 
Lines, 2015), 555. 
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A similar sentiment percolates underneath the arguments of this text, and it is particularly 
visible in the life histories of participants. Fundamentally, my research is an examination 
of the multi-faceted responses of men and women in Sydney to various forms of crises. 
Despite the economic and bodily violence that is enacted, they do not wholly characterize 
the lives of these people. The men and women who participated in this project, although 
deeply impacted by the operation and closure of Sydney Steel, are also a reminder that 
life continues after disruption– albeit in a changed form. To present the city’s working 
class residents as “ghosts” of a bygone industrial era, as do some post-industrial aesthetic 
representations, further marginalizes and displaces their voices from the concerns and 
issues of the present day.15 
While early studies of deindustrialization focused on economy and activism, by 
the early 2000s historians began to recognize the significant cultural and representational 
aspects of industrial decline. Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott describe this as 
“moving beyond the body count” of lost jobs. In their 2003 collection, Beyond the Ruins, 
Cowie and Heathcott argue that we must recognize the impermanency of industrial 
production – as well as the cultures that production engenders.16 Many have since taken 
up this call-to-action; Jackie Clarke, for example, traces the displacement of working-
class culture from the centre to the periphery in Alençon, France following the closure of 
                                                
15 For further discussion of the aestheticization of industrial decline and erasure, see 
Steven High and David Lewis, Corporate Wasteland: The Landscape and Memory of 
Deindustrialization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Steven High, “Beyond 
Aesthetics: Visibility and Invisibility in the Aftermath of Deindustrialization,” 
International Labor and Working Class History 84 (Fall 2013): 140-153; Alice Mah, 
Industrial Ruination, Community, and Place: Landscapes and Legacies of Urban Decline 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012); Hilary Orange, ed. Reanimating Industrial 
Spaces: Conducting Memory Work in Post-Industrial Societies (Walnut Creek, CA: Left 
Coast Press, 2015).  
 
16 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, “Introduction: The Meanings of 
Deindustrialization,” in Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization, eds. 
Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 5-7; See 
also Sherry Lee Linkon and John Russo, Steeltown U.S.A.: Work and Memory in 
Youngstown (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).  
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Moulinex.17 In 2007, a special edition of Urban History Review on “The Politics and 
Memory of Deindustrialization in Canada” emblematized this shift. Authors explored 
subjects as disparate as the post-industrial “tourist gaze” in Victoria, personalized 
industrial heritage in Nova Scotia, and the public history of deindustrialization in 
Manitoba in an effort to recognize what High describes as “a cultural drama of people 
and communities in transition, changes in the built environment and the politics of 
place.”18 
Recent work also examines representation and memory in aftermath of 
deindustrialization. “Crumbling Cultures,” a 2013 special edition of International Labor 
and Working Class History, explores the artistic, literary, and commemorative practices 
arising in the aftermath of industrial closure. As Tim Strangleman, James Rhodes, and 
Sherry Linkon write, “Representations allow us to consider how those affected by 
deindustrialization remember it, but, because deindustrialization affects not only those 
who were immediately displaced, also those who have no direct experience of industrial 
work, those who were not physically or psychologically present during the era of 
closings.”19 This notion is further explored within my research; Raymond Williams’ 
theoretical “structure of feeling” is particularly useful in understanding this process. In 
Sydney, cultural productions can be read as part of the shifts in industrial and post-
industrial place identities and class sensibilities that occurred between the 1940s and 
                                                
17 Jackie Clarke, “Closing Moulinex: Thoughts on the Visibility and Invisibility of 
Industrial Labour in Contemporary France,” Modern and Contemporary France 19, 4 
(November 2011): 443-58. 
 
18 High, “Introduction,” 2; In the same volume, see: Michael Dawson, “Victoria Debates 
Its Post-industrial Reality: Tourism, Deindustrialization and Store Hour Regulations, 
1900-1958,” 14-24; Robert Summerby-Murray, “Interpreting Personalized Industrial 
Heritage in the Mining Towns of Cumberland County, Nova Scotia: Landscape Examples 
from Springhill and River Hebert,” 51-59; Sharon Reilly, “Deindustrialization as Public 
History: An Exhibition at the Manitoba Museum,” 77-82.  
 
19 Tim Strangleman, James Rhodes, and Sherry Linkon, “Introduction to Crumbling 
Cultures: Deindustrialization, Class and Memory,” International Labor and Working 
Class History 84 (Fall 2013): 9. 
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2016.20 The shift from a dominant to a residual industrial structure of feeling is also 
explored.   
My work contributes to a growing body of literature on the trans-national aspects 
of deindustrialization. The transition between Fordist and post-Fordist managerial 
paradigms in Canada, the U.S. and the U.K. has often made it more difficult for workers 
to resist efforts at “re-structuring” or “right-sizing.”21  These trends also resulted in 
specific shop-floor changes at the Sydney Works that were further influenced by its 
existence as a public corporation after 1967. A transnational focus provides insight into 
how occurrences within the American steel market impacted production in Sydney, the 
relationship between members of the local steelworkers’ union and national and 
international leadership, and the business decisions of foreign owners. These discussions 
correspond with recent trends in Canadian, American, and European labour history.22  
Local, regional, national, and international trends influenced how 
deindustrialization unfolded in Sydney and how citizens have since come to think about 
their community, the industrial past, and the place of working-class men and women in 
the former “steel city” of Atlantic Canada. The dual notions of place and space allow us 
to understand how these trends are experienced and related through the testimony of 
workers and other residents. In her 1995 article “Places and their Pasts,” Doreen Massey 
                                                
20 This concept has also been applied elsewhere; see David Byrne, “Industrial Culture in 
a Post-Industrial World: The Case of the North East of England,” City 6, 3 (2002): 279-
89; John Kirk, Sylvie Contrepois, and Steve Jeffries, eds. Changing Work and 
Community Identities in European Regions: Perspectives on the Past and Present (New 
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Palgrave MacMillan, 2004). 
 
22 Gordon Hak, Capital and Labour in the British Columbia Forest Industry, 1934-1974 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); Leon Fink, ed. Workers Across 




articulates relational space theory. Places, she argues, are constructions based upon the 
interactions of existing social relations. They are not frozen or static; rather, place-
identity is constantly shifting as the result of different imaginings of place that exist 
within separate groups.23 How, then, can historians responsibly define place? This 
question is particularly relevant in areas undergoing substantial economic and cultural 
changes. While Massey rejects essentializing notions of place identity, she admits that 
“some things are . . . more ‘absorbed’ or incorporated into the place than others.”24 In 
realizing the multiplicities of place identities, she argues, we open the door both to 
richness of analysis and the possibility of conflict.25 
 
Industrialization and Working-Class Sydney, 1899-1944 
 
The Second Industrial Revolution of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was predicated 
upon the expansion of coal and steel production in Europe and North America. 
Technological advances, urbanization, working-class organization, and the mobility of 
industrial capital provoked huge changes within the social and economic order. It was 
within this landscape that four large producers came to corner the Canadian market. 
These were the Nova Scotia Steel Company (Scotia) in Trenton, Nova Scotia, the 
Dominion Iron and Steel Company (Disco) in Sydney, the Steel Company of Canada 
(Stelco) in Hamilton, and the Algoma Steel Company in Sault St. Marie.26 In Sydney, the 
founder of Disco, H.M. Whitney, had previously established the Dominion Coal 
Company in 1893, and construction began on the Sydney Works in 1899 to take 
advantage of this ready supply of raw materials.27  
                                                
23 Doreen Massey, “Places and their Pasts,” History Workshop Journal 39 (1995): 188. 
 
24 Massey, “Places and their Pasts,” 186. 
 
25 Doreen Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press 1994), 153.   
 
26 Craig Heron, Working in Steel: The Early Years in Canada, 1883-1935 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 16-23. 
 
27 Donald MacGillivray, “Henry Melville Whitney Comes to Cape Breton: The Saga of a 
Gilded Age Entrepreneur,” Acadiensis 9, 1 (Autumn 1979): 44-70; In addition, Scotia 
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Deindustrialization, as part of Schumpeterian “creative-destruction," must be 
considered alongside these mechanisms of industrialization. Emerging as a secondary 
industry to the Cape Breton collieries, the Sydney Works could have been the basis for a 
broad expansion in secondary and tertiary production. This did not occur. There are a 
variety of reasons for this failure, which are further examined throughout this thesis, but 
an understanding of the city’s industrial development is necessary before such a 
conversation can begin. In this section, the growth of Sydney between 1899 and 1944 sets 
the stage for Chapter One, where the post-war corporate divestment from Cape Breton is 
fully articulated.  
Sydney expanded quickly alongside industrialization.28  In a twenty-year span, 
between 1891 and 1911, its population more than septupled –growing from 2,427 to 
17,723 residents.29 In addition to a smattering of Acadian, Irish, Mi’kmaq, Scottish, and 
other Cape Breton-born workers, the island’s coal mines and steel mill also attracted 
workers from further afield. Of the 6,246 immigrants in Cape Breton County in 1901, “54 
percent were from Newfoundland, 25 percent from the British Isles, 11 percent from the 
United States (some of whom were Blacks from the south), 2 percent from Italy, and the 
remaining 8 percent from other countries.”30 Among these “others” were Eastern 
Europeans – Ukranians, Russians, and Polish – as well as European Jews.31 Many of 
                                                                                                                                            
maintained a steel mill in the Cape Breton town of Sydney Mines. This mill would 
remain in use until the early 1920s. For further information, see James M. Cameron, 
Industrial History of the New Glasgow District (New Glasgow, NS: Hector Publishing 
Co. Ltd., 1960) and Craig Heron, “The Great War and Nova Scotia Steelworkers,” 
Acadiensis 16, 2 (Spring 1987): 3-34.  
 
28 Stephen J. Hornsby, Nineteenth Century Cape Breton: A Historical Geography 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 25.  
 
29 E. Roy Harvey, Sydney, Nova Scotia: An Urban Study (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and 
Company Ltd.: 1971), 17. 
 
30 Ron Crawley, “Class Conflict and the Establishment of the Sydney Steel Industry, 
1899-1904,” in The Island: New Perspectives on Cape Breton History, 1713-1990, ed. 
Kenneth Donovan (Fredericton and Sydney: Acadiensis and UCCB Press, 1990), 145-64. 
 
31 John Huk, Strangers in the Land: The Ukrainian Presence in Cape Breton (Sydney: 
City Printers, 1986), 10-11.  
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these ethnic and cultural identities remain visible in the social landscape of industrial 
Cape Breton today – and these roots are likewise visible in the surnames of many who 
have contributed to this project.32 
Figure 0.1: General Plan of Works, Dominion Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., Sydney, 1900 
Source: Map 220, Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
                                                                                                   
32 Sam Migliore and A. Evo DiPierro, Italian Lives, Cape Breton Memories (Sydney: 
UCCB Press, 1999). 
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This growth was predicated upon the operations of the steelworks at the centre of the 
town, which rested on nearly 450 hectares of land. Robert Morgan describes the frantic 
pace of expansion:  
Four hundred structures were completed by 1900 and former estates such as 
Colby, Ashby, Brooklands, and Sherwood, were divided and rapidly built up […] 
An amazed citizen reported that ‘houses are going up in places where the streets 
are as yet on paper.33 
 
These constructions became the neighbourhoods of Ashby and Whitney Pier, where 
steelworkers and their families would reside throughout the century. At shift change, the 
streets surrounding the plant would be full of men walking to and from work with lunch 
pails in hand. By 1 January 1904, the Province of Nova Scotia officially declared Sydney 
a city.34 
The class dimension of life in the steel city was visible from the beginning. Its 
contrasts were striking; while workers in Whitney Pier struggled to find viable housing – 
often packing tightly into small, smoky shacks in the streets closest to the plant, Disco 
management built grand homes on the waterfront. Arthur J. Moxham, the first general 
manager of the Sydney Works, had his home – “Rockaway” – transported to Sydney 
brick-by-brick from his prior estate in Pittsburgh.35 The thirty-room mansion, colloquially 
known as “Moxham Castle” and replete with an indoor swimming pool, was starkly 
different from the crowded boarding houses near the coke ovens where “beds were 
constantly being slept in as night workmen turned in as soon as the day workers got 
up.”36 While workers suffered through periodic outbreaks of smallpox, diphtheria, and 
dangerous conditions at the mill, Moxham and his wife entertained members of the city’s 
                                                
33 Robert Morgan, Rise Again! The Story of Cape Breton Island from 1900 to Today 
(Sydney: Breton Books, 2009), 20.  
 
34 Ibid., 19. 
 
35 David Farber, Everybody Ought to be Rich: The Life and Times of John J. Raskob, 
Capitalist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 30-1. 
 
36 “The Steel Boom Comes to Sydney,” Cape Breton’s Magazine 39 (1985): 47. 
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elite at lavish parties where – as Moira Ross writes – “Mrs. Moxham always wore white 
and Miss Moxham always wore black.”37 
Despite this growth, Canadian steel firms faced structural challenges.38 Nova 
Scotia producers began to trend towards consolidation in the first decades of the 20th 
century. The Nova Scotia Steel Company in Trenton and Dominion Iron and Steel in 
Sydney soon found their ownership contested by extra-regional forces. In 1910, Disco 
was combined with the Dominion Coal Company by a consortium of Montreal and 
Toronto business interests. Scotia, meanwhile, came under the control of American 
investors in 1917.39 Craig Heron and Robert Storey describe how both companies “were 
in serious trouble by the 1920s when their over-specialization and distance from markets 
in the industrial heartland of southern Ontario forced them to curtail production 
drastically.”40 Further consolidation was the result, as Scotia and Disco were merged 
under the control of the British Empire Steel Corporation (Besco) in 1921. Operations at 
                                                
37 Moira Ross, “Dr. Arthur Samuel Kendall, His Life and Times as a Medical Doctor, 
Politician and Citizen of Cape Breton Island, 1861-1944” (master’s thesis, St. Mary’s 
University, 1998), 5.  
 
38 See David Alexander, “Economic Growth in the Atlantic Region, 1880-1940,” 
Acadiensis 8, 1 (Autumn 1978): 47-76; James D. Frost, “The ‘Nationalization’ of the 
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a Scotia-owned mill in Sydney Mines were wound down, and the Cape Breton collieries 
were – at this point – largely under the control of the single company - Besco.41  
The 1920s loom large in the collective memory of industrial Cape Breton. Poor 
management, a watered stock scandal, and corporate intransigence meant that Besco was 
beginning to feel the pinch of a protracted market downturn by the late 1910s. In an 
atmosphere of working-class resistance in Canada, which famously erupted in 1919, the 
company sought major concessions from its employees.42 A failed union recognition 
strike by the steelworkers in 1923 saw troops stationed at the plant and sporadic attacks 
on workers and their families along Victoria Road in Whitney Pier. In 1925, coal miner 
William Davis was shot dead by company police during a strike in the Cape Breton coal 
field. This event is memorialized each year on June 11 – “Davis Day” in Cape Breton – 
and local children have the day off of school in the former coal towns. 
 Besco did not survive the decade. In 1928, it was placed under the control of a 
new operating company, the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation (Dosco), which 
controlled the Cape Breton coal and steel industries until the government takeovers of the 
1960s. David Frank writes: 
As an episode in Canadian economic history, the development of industrial Cape 
Breton between the 1880s and the 1920s revealed a pattern of industrial growth 
culminating in severe crisis […] After the 1920s, the main functions of industrial 
Cape Breton in the national economy changed: the community was now called 
upon to provide a large pool of labour for the national labour market, and, in the 
time of need, to supply reserve capacity for the national energy and steel 
markets.43 
 
                                                
41 Frank, “The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of British Empire Steel 
Corporation,” 22; Several smaller producers did remain, although the market was 
dominated by Besco and, late, Dosco.  
 
42 Gregory S. Kealey, “1919: The Canadian Labour Revolt,” Labour/Le Travail 13 
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Cape Breton’s industrial transition during this period fundamentally changed the island’s 
role within the Canadian economy, and this early history reveals the roots of the 
deindustrialization process that continues to impact the island’s communities.  
Figure 0.2: Steel Plant during the 1923 strike, 1923 
Source: Photographer unknown, reference number: 89-517-18712,  
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
Gary Burrill positions this history within a regional framework in his examination 
of out-migration from the Maritimes. The 1920s, he argues, can only be described as a 
demographic disaster. “In the course of the decade, more than 147,000 people left the 
region.”44 During its industrialization, Cape Breton had bucked the overall regional trend; 
the crises of the 1920s and Depression in the 1930s prompted a renewed exodus of 
workers heading for the Boston States and other points west.45 Although the population in 
       
44 Gary Burril, Away: Maritimers in Massachusetts, Ontario, and Alberta: An Oral 
History of Leaving Home (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 5.  
45 Patricia A. Thornton, “The Problem of Out-Migration from Atlantic Canada, 1871-
1921: A New Look,” Acadiensis 15, 1 (Autumn, 1985): 27-8. 
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Sydney would continue to increase until reaching an apex of 33,617 in 1961, the context 
of this growth within a broader environment of regional underdevelopment and out-
migration cannot be ignored.  
The Depression years witnessed the re-emergence of unionism within the 
Canadian steel industry. Craig Heron writes, “Steelworkers took their first halting steps in 
the mid-1930s, when independent unions appeared in Hamilton, Sault St. Marie, Sydney 
and Trenton.46 The unionization and corresponding struggles of steelworkers in Sydney 
are further explored in Chapter Two. Although the Second World War proved a boon for 
Canadian producers, the Sydney Works did not benefit to the same extent as its 
competitors. Beginning in 1944, I trace the processes of deindustrialization in Sydney 
past the moment of final closure in 2000 to reveal the layers of personal and collective 
meaning that emerge as the result of, and in response, to its many impacts.  
 
Sources and Methods: Archival Research and Oral History 
 
This thesis is built on extensive archival and oral history research. It benefits from 29 
interviews that I have conducted with former steelworkers, office staff, management, 
provincial and local politicians, residents, union officials, and community activists. 
Business records from the operations of the Sydney Works under both Dosco and the 
Sydney Steel Corporation (Sysco) have been indispensible; the extent to which decisions 
relating to the mill were documented under public ownership provides an overview of its 
operations that would be difficult to achieve were the firm held privately. While many of 
these sources are found within the “Dosco Papers” collection at the Beaton Institute 
Archives in Sydney, documents relating to provincial ownership, the steelworkers’ union, 
and the role of the federal government can be found in archives throughout Canada and 
the United States.    
Records detailing the relationship between Sysco, the Nova Scotia government, 
and regional economic development are held at the Nova Scotia Archives in Halifax. 
These include all provincial reports relating to Sydney Steel, a series of still images from 
the early years at the plant, and government correspondence. The Dalhousie University 
Archives, also located in Halifax, includes in its collection several fonds detailing the 
                                                
46 Heron, Working in Steel, 174. 
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regional holdings of Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. – a parent company of the Sydney 
Works in the decade prior to nationalization. Each of these collections helps to illuminate 
regional attitudes towards steelmaking in Sydney. As a provincial political issue, the 
perception of Sysco among regional politicians and other off-island actors had a 
significant impact on its continued operations, attempts at privatization, and its final 
closure in 2000.   
Collections at Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa and the McMaster 
University Archives in Hamilton include holdings from the United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA) national and district leadership, the Canadian Labour Congress, 
governmental departments, and the correspondence of several federal politicians that 
relate to Sysco. These records help to position the deindustrialization of Sydney Steel 
within a national context. Records from the Canadian National Office of the USWA, for 
example, reveal differences in how national, district, and local union officials sought to 
resist the threat of downsizing and closure. The actions of the federal state, from the steel 
controls during the 1940s to the role of Environment Canada in the clean up and 
remediation of the Sydney tar ponds during the 1990s, affect how deindustrialization 
unfolds at the local level.      
The Historical Collections and Labor Archives at Pennsylvania State University 
in State College have also been instrumental for this study. The international records of 
the USWA were especially useful in framing the response of organized labour to the 
anxieties and challenges prompted by deindustrialization. In the audio-visual collection, 
these archives include recordings of all speeches at the international convention between 
1940 and 1999. Minutes of the International Executive Board, as well as records from the 
Office of the President, the Canadian National Director, and the Canadian districts are 
also included. These offer insight into how economic changes are perceived within the 
highest levels of the USWA; although Sydney is not often directly discussed, 
correspondence relating to the nationalization of the British steel industry, rising inflation, 
and trade agreements between Canada and the U.S. reveal another layer of influences.  
There are also several primary print sources that are used within this thesis. Local 
and regional newspapers reveal different perspectives on Sydney Steel. Locally, the 
coverage found within Steelworker and Miner – a radical labour paper published during 
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the 1940s and early 1950s- is contrasted with the more conservative Sydney Post Record, 
Sydney Daily Record, and Cape Breton Post.47 The Halifax Chronicle Herald, which 
provides a provincial perspective, also frequently covered issues relating to Dosco and 
Sysco. USWA magazines Steelabor and Steelabour – Canadian Edition, published 
between 1936 and 2005, help to frame the political circumstances facing steelworkers in 
Sydney within a broader set of concerns among members of the 20th century labour 
movement. Finally, the Bras d’Or Collection at Cape Breton University includes federal 
and provincial publications relating to economic development in Cape Breton, ecology 
and health, and Canadian steel and coal production.    
Oral history helps to personalize the processes of deindustrialization. In her recent 
book, Exit Zero, Christine Walley writes: 
Personal stories […] are, of course, never just about individuals; such stories are 
also about the social worlds in which we live […] Our individual stories are also 
communal ones. Consequently, telling personal stories means not only looking 
inward but also turning the self outward and tracing the links and relationships 
that shape and define not only who we are as individuals but also the broader 
social worlds of which we are a part.48  
 
In my research, these individual and communal understandings are explored through the 
use of two collections of oral history material. The first is comprised of audio and video 
interviews that I conducted with twenty-nine informants between 2013 and 2016. Our 
conversations were structured as “life-history” interviews, where participants had the 
opportunity to reflect upon their personal experiences, their connection with the history 
of deindustrialization in Sydney, and their perceptions of the city more than ten years 
after the closure of the steel plant.  
The second collection was created in 1990 as part of the “Steel Project” at the 
Beaton Institute Archives at Cape Breton University, corresponding with the end of 
integrated steelmaking at Sysco and the transition to an electric arc operation. Through 
approximately 163 audio interviews, the Steel Project was intended to “emphasize the 
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University of Chicago Press, 2013), 5. 
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centrality of the history of Sydney Steel and [to] provide a link between the past and the 
future of the workers and their community.”49 Interviews were conducted with more than 
200 steelworkers, many of whom are now deceased. This collection offers historical 
insight into a moment of economic disruption; as the result of modernization, the Sysco 
workforce was reduced by nearly half at the time that these interviews were undertaken. 
Daniel James writes, “Life stories are cultural constructs that draw on a public discourse 
structured by class and gender conventions. They also make use of a wide spectrum of 
possible roles, self-representations, and available narratives.”50 As a result, the 
comparative analysis that is afforded by the availability of two collections of oral history 
interviews, conducted twenty-five years apart, helps to reveal how experiences of 
deindustrialization are historically contingent.  
Thankfully, oral histories no longer require a spirited defense against 
methodological scepticism – having escaped from what Paul Thompson refers to as “the 
stigma of amateurism.”51 The debates of the 1970s, which encompassed issues of 
historical subjectivity, historical memory, and the role of the historian, have given way to 
broader understandings of the interview process and the applicability of digital 
methods.52 In my interviews, I rely upon the practical oral history methodologies 
described by Alessandro Portelli in his 1979 article, “Sulla specificità della storia orale.” 
In this piece, reprinted in English in 1981, Portelli offers three main lessons: we must 
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move beyond text-based transcriptions and begin to take language, tone, volume, and 
body language into account, we must apply narrative analysis to oral testimony and pay 
attention to narrative cues such as repetition or time spent on a particular subject, and we 
must keep in mind the question of “who speaks” in the interview process.53 Video 
interviews provide one avenue for this type of analysis. Only five of my interviewees – 
when offered the choice between audio and video recording – were comfortable sitting 
for the camera.54 In other instances, I took handwritten notes on a pad of paper during our 
discussions– making sure to consider how the story was being relayed as much as the 
content of the spoken words. 
“Shared authority,” a concept articulated by Michael Frisch, is another 
methodological goal of many practicing oral historians today. Frisch describes this as the 
creation of a meaningful dialogue between interviewer and interviewee that offers 
participants the power to historicize and frame their own past experiences.55 Linda 
Shopes, commenting on shared authority for a 2003 special issue of Oral History Review, 
argues that this practice must result from the construction of long-term relationships 
between the interviewer and interviewee, a willingness to take participants’ analytical 
frameworks seriously, and an ability to challenge the notion of uninterrupted objectivity 
on behalf of the historian.56 In practice, however, this is more difficult than it might first 
appear; as Lorraine Sitzia cautions: 
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I am not sure that it is possible to have a shared critical perspective with our 
narrators, or that it would be desirable to do so; it is the narrator’s story, it is 
personal to him, or her, and as interviewers our interpretations are affected by age, 
gender, and subsequent understandings of the past.57 
 
Each of my interviews were co-created, but it proved more challenging to extend this 
collaboration beyond the scope of the recorded interview itself. This was particularly true 
of instances where informants only agreed to sit for a single interview.  
In her 2014 book, According to Baba, Stacey Zembrzycki describes the successes 
and pitfalls of meaningfully sharing authority with her grandmother. She writes, “When I 
began this project, I believed that I was both a community insider and an outsider, 
maintaining not only a subjective connection to it through Baba, but also a real distance 
from it because I had not participated in it.”58 Like Zembrzycki, I also viewed my role in 
these terms at the beginning of my project. Although my grandfather worked in the New 
Waterford collieries, I had no direct connection to the Sydney steel plant. It soon became 
clear that being born and raised in the city would not open as many doors as I had 
initially imagined. Cold-calling possible interviewees was made more difficult by my 
having to respond in the negative to the frequent question: “Are you related to any of the 
MacKinnon’s that were on at the plant?” This slowly became easier, particularly as Gerry 
McCarron – my wife’s uncle and a former Sydney steelworker – became more involved 
with the project.   
Gerry and his brother Tommy were the first two people interviewed during this 
research. We came together in August 2013 at my in-laws’ home, where we sat in the 
gazebo and talked about their connection to the plant. The McCarron’s were a 
steelworking family. Jim, their father, worked on the plant between 1943 and 1992, as did 
his father and grandfather. Re-watching our first interview now, in July 2016, I am struck 
by the awkwardness of the encounter. While we discussed a number of issues relating to 
work at the plant and socializing among employees, our conversation also contains a 
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number of pauses, false starts, and direct answers to narrowly framed questions. Until 
that point, I had not spent much time in conversation with either of the men; unlike 
Zembrzycki’s experience with her grandmother, we did not share the type of close 
personal relationship that would make such an interview immediately comfortable. 
Although this was the only time that I sat with Tommy for a formal interview, Gerry 
would help to organize – and sit in on – several others.59  
Figure 0.3: Lachlan MacKinnon and Gerry McCarron, July 2016 
Source: Photo by author 
“Sharing authority,” writes High, “is about much more than speaking to new 
audiences; it requires the cultivation of trust, the development of collaborative 
relationships, and shared decision-making […] Collaboration need not end when the 
       
59 Gerry and Tommy McCarron, interview with author, August 7, 2013; Gerry McCarron, 
Sheldon Andrews and George MacNeil, interview with author, August 5, 2015; Gerry 
McCarron and Dave Nalepa, interview with author, December 8, 2015; Gerry McCarron 
and Joel MacLean, interview with author, April 29, 2016; Gerry McCarron, Alana 
MacNeil, and George MacNeil, interview with author, April 29, 2016.  
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audio or video is turned off, but that it is an ongoing process of dialogue and sharing.” 
The interview process is always envisioned as a collaborative space, but it is through 
Gerry’s participation that this type of extended collaboration was made possible. Not 
only did we conduct a number of interviews together, as we both became more 
comfortable the project was able to benefit in other less formal ways. 
By 2016, it was not unusual for me to call Gerry with a quick question about the 
plant, the people who worked there, or any number of other things. Sometimes, when the 
answer was not immediately clear, he would reach out to other former employees before 
getting back to me. We met at his home in Sydney on another instance to go over some 
documents that he came across relating to the history of Sysco. I hope that I have also 
been able to offer something to the McCarrons. Whenever I came across the work records 
of their father, Jim, I copied them for the family. When Gerry needed information on the 
date-of-birth for a former Sysco employee being memorialized on the site of the former 
plant, our roles reversed and I was able to help him with the information. While this sort 
of personal relationship is impossible to build with every informant – particularly in the 
three years given for this project – it represents a meaningful effort at oral history as 
engaged scholarship, reflexive practice, and shared inquiry.   
The sharing of authority is not simply a relationship between interviewer and 
interviewee, but can also emerge from the relationships between multiple participants in a 
group setting. As Bethan Coupland writes: 
Group oral histories, despite their methodological and interpretive challenges, 
clearly illustrate a more nuanced, multilayered process of remembering which 
occurs in small social groups, a process which is largely obscured by the ongoing 
focus in the exchange between individual and collective positions.60 
 
Six of the 29 interviews that I conducted were group interviews. Five of these were 
organized by Gerry McCarron, and generally consisted of Gerry, myself, and one-or-two 
additional participants. The sixth group interview involved Mickey Campbell and Adrian 
Murphy – close friends and former employees of both Dosco and Sydney Steel. In each, 
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aspects of collective memory and shared experiences were discussed, although the “life-
history” interview structure was largely superseded by communal discussion.  
Although group interviews are sometimes presented as chaotic and un-helpful, in 
my experience these encounters offer insights that were complementary to those 
presented through life-history interviews.61 This format sometimes allowed the informant 
to wield more authority in our interaction. In my interview with Mickey and Adrian, for 
example, I had initially asked only Mickey for his participation. Only after arriving at his 
home to find he, Adrian, and a third man sitting at the kitchen table talking “plant talk” 
was I told that Adrian had been invited to join us. Although the third man, whose name I 
did not catch, left before the interview officially began, their discussion continued 
unabated – aside from the signing of the requisite forms and making introductions. They 
were deeply involved in a collaborative process that Portelli terms history-telling: the 
intersection of biography and history, between “individual experience and the 
transformations of society.”62 This represented a shift in my authority as an interviewer; 
rather than taking on my usual role in facilitating the flow of the narrative, my 
participation was more observational.  
Despite this shift, my presence still informed the interview and its boundaries. 
There was a performative aspect to Mickey and Adrian’s conversation that would likely 
not have occurred had I not been present. While Adrian spoke about the dangerous 
conditions in the Open Hearth Department, for example, Mickey stood from the table and 
removed some papers from a nearby cabinet.  
Adrian: And, you know, when I started working on the Open Hearth, the average 
age . . .  
 
[Mickey places a paper on the table. There are a few seconds of silence as Adrian 
and I read the headline: “Injury at Steel Plant.” I notice the name of the injured 
man, Michael Campbell] 
 
                                                
61 For critical perspectives on group interviews, see Valerie Raleigh Yow, Recording 
Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Scientists, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 289-90; Donald Richie, Doing Oral History, 3rd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 49. 
 
62 Alessandro Portelli, “Oral History as Genre,” in Narrative and Genre, eds. Mary 
Chamberlain and Paul Thompson (London: Routledge, 1998), 25. 
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 Lachlan: Oh, that’s you is it, Mickey? 
 
 Mickey: Yes.  
 
[A few more seconds pass as we sit, in silence, skimming the paper. It describes a 
man falling from a Dosco boat onto ice, and being near death.] 
 
 Lachlan: When was this? 
 
Mickey: 1957 […] It was a German ship, and it had some trouble with the 
propeller […] So it came in that day, or the day before – I’m not sure which now 
– and anyway, the first thousand tonne [of steel] they put on her was on the front, 
on the deck, to get the back end up to repair the propeller […] And when I went 
out that night, on the back shift, we were working on the back end of the boat. So 
up high. And they were loading rails right on the deck […] Cold as could be. […] 
So this rail, on the edge of the roller, fell off. And with all the frost and everything. 
I caught ahold of it with the tongs […] and the tong slipped off . . . And the back 
of the rail was just below my knees. And backwards I went, over . . . And the 
distance I fell now . . . quite high. But I went through the ice, held on to it, spread 
my arms right wide […] And I got out of it. Rolled my body away, a couple of 
times, from the hole – not going back in […] I was there for awhile […] There 
was three guys came to help me […] They had a rope, about a two inch rope . . . 
and they put it around me. I told them not to […] I said, ‘I’m having a hard 
enough time breathing now.’ […] I was inhaling blood and exhaling blood. 
Internal bleeding. Anyhow, I said ‘Get me over to that ladder. I’ll walk up that 
ladder. And anyhow, I did. And when I got up that ladder they had a stretcher 
waiting for me.63 
 
In this instance, Mickey used a prop to help articulate the trauma of his workplace 
accident; he found a way to express – as Robert Storey puts it - an experience that was 
“controlled with difficulty and perhaps never fully mastered.”64 This type of performative 
storytelling is not uncommon during communal interviews; physical objects help provide 
                                                
63 Mickey Campbell and Adrian Murphy, interview with author, 1 September 2014.  
 
64 Robert Storey, “Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will: Engaging with the 
‘Testimony’ of Injured Workers,” in Beyond Testimony and Trauma: Oral History in the 
Aftermath of Mass Violence, ed. Steven High (Vancouver: University of British 
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an impetus for in-depth discussions than might otherwise be uncomfortable in a group 
setting.65 
Using these sources and methods, this dissertation draws together the experiences 
of deindustrialization at Sydney Steel to reveal the layered nature of its many processes. 
In eight chapters, this text moves between the impact of deindustrialization on workers’ 
bodies and the changes it prompts on the shop floor, community-based resistance tactics, 
and political economy. With this approach, I reflect upon the different scales at which 
industrial decline and closure affects workers, their families, and other residents in post-
industrial locales 
The first two chapters focus on steelmaking in Sydney from 1944 until 1966, 
ending on the eve of the near-closure of the mill. Chapter One provides a macro-
economic and political overview of the actions of the Dominion Steel and Coal 
Corporation – the controlling company of the Sydney Works. In refusing to provide the 
necessary upgrades to mill and consolidating its holdings in Montreal and Toronto, the 
company’s actions reveal an explicit corporate strategy of deindustrialization and 
divestment from Cape Breton. Innis’ “staples trap” is used as an explanatory mechanism 
for Dosco’s hesitancy to re-invest in the regional market. Next, Chapter Two shifts focus 
towards “the local,” revealing how the labour achievements of the post-war period 
resulted in a perceived strengthening of working-class institutions and social positions. 
This chapter traces the development of a dominant industrial structure of feeling in 
Sydney and examines the development of the solidarities and social understandings that 
were at stake in 1967. Here, we witness a turning-away from the so-called “red-phase” of 
Cape Breton workers’ culture towards a set of more mainstream understandings of 
steelworkers, their place in the city, and the importance of institutional unionism that 
reflect contemporary concerns throughout Canadian society.   
In the third chapter, we examine “Black Friday” – October 13, 1967 – for what it 
tells us about how nationalization was seen as an acceptable response to 
deindustrialization by the provincial state. Black Friday, as it became known locally, was 
                                                
65 Hugo Slim, Paul Thompson, Olivia Bennett, and Nigel Cross, “Ways of listening,” in 
The Oral History Reader, eds. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (London: Routledge, 
1998), 119-20. 
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the day that Dosco announced the planned closure of the Sydney Works. A corresponding 
community protest movement, which included a massive “Parade of Concern,” reveals 
the extent to which locals perceived the mill to be the economic and cultural heart of the 
city. Oral history testimony expresses a moment of profound disruption; the ‘moral 
economy’ of industrial Cape Breton was directly challenged and traditional beliefs about 
industrial employment, methods of resistance, and working-class masculinities were 
exposed as far more precarious than had been previously imagined.   
Now under public ownership, the next chapters explore the mill’s gradual decline 
and its impact on steelworkers and other residents. Shop floor changes at Sydney Steel 
between 1968 and 1989 form the basis of Chapter Four. Oral history accounts of 
steelworkers in the mill’s departments help to articulate the transition from integrated 
steelmaking to the downsizing of the 1980s, culminating with the changeover to electric 
arc production. Workers’ accounts provide insight into both individual resistance to 
managerial control and the tensions that arise between the desire to maintain employment 
numbers and an administrative desire for “competitive efficiencies” visible throughout 
the Canadian steel industry. These experiences are framed within a broader discussion of 
Fordist and post-Fordist production in 20th century Canada. For its part, Chapter Five 
reveals the aftermath of industrial production as it is expressed within workers’ bodies. 
By the 1980s, steelworkers were beginning to demand state recognition for the dangers 
associated with exposure to carcinogenic agents at work. As workers became more aware 
of these risks, recognizing the significant number of steelworkers afflicted with different 
types of cancers and other illnesses, a small group of coke ovens workers began 
independently lobbying the provincial government for workers’ compensation. Their 
struggle and the resulting concessions on behalf of the province reveal the 
interconnections between bodily health, political activism, and shop floor 
environmentalism.  
Following the coke ovens workers’ fight for compensation, other groups within 
the community became increasingly involved in discussions surrounding the 
environmental and health legacies that resulted from nearly 100 years of industrial 
production. Much of this discussion centred upon the Sydney “tar ponds” – a polluted 
watershed that flowed alongside the steel plant into the harbour. The historical question 
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of how to remediate this site forms the basis for Chapter Six. Included in this chapter is 
an exploration of a failed incineration plan between 1986 and 1996, environmental 
protest and cross-class solidarities within the community, and the experiences of two 
women who were re-located from their homes near the site of the former coke ovens in 
1999 after arsenic and other contaminants were found leaching into their basements.  
The provincial decision to close Sysco is the focus of Chapter Seven. 
Circumstances surrounding the plant had changed dramatically between 1967 and 2001 – 
after Premier John Hamm was elected in Nova Scotia on a platform that included the 
closure or sale of Sysco. A set of political and ideational influences are probed in this 
chapter; while Hamm views the decision as simply a state re-orientation of state 
interventionism, the popular convergence of neoliberal doctrine and regional economic 
development theory during the 1990s meant that market-based solutions had become 
hegemonic by 1999. This also traces the intellectual history of the notion, still popular 
today, that an industrial mindset stands in the way of fostering so-called entrepreneurial 
culture in deindustrializing and post-industrial areas. The role of the local university in 
this process is also explored, as are the constraints placed upon the ability of workers and 
other community members to meaningfully challenge the closure decision.  
Chapter Eight examines the representation and memory of Sydney Steel in the 
period following closure. The creation of “Open Hearth Park” on the site of the former 
plant, part of a $400 million federal/provincial remediation effort, reveals how industrial 
history corresponds with modern politics of place and identity within the city. This 
includes discussion of steelworkers’ current perceptions of the site and a public history 
exploration of the representational value of industrial heritage. This chapter also includes 
discussion of a documentary film, Heart of Steel, which was released in 2012.  The film 
expresses a view of the industrial past that is depoliticized and removed from concerns of 
the present. More broadly, these discussions reflect the “residual” industrial structure of 
feeling that survives in Sydney. Although the steel plant no longer exists, the working-
class cultures, understandings, and moral economies that it shaped continue to inform 
daily life on the island. 
Deindustrialization stretches further than the immediate disruption of a factory, 
mill, or mine closure. It is rooted in the fabric of market capitalism, and its causes – both 
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direct and indirect –are in place long before the final shift. It is a transformative process, 
simultaneously affecting political economy, place identity, environment, and even the 
bodies of workers, their families and neighbours. Writing of a different time and place, 
Eric Hobsbawm reflects upon conventional wisdom:  
The triumph of mechanisation was inevitable. We can understand, and sympathise 
with the long rear-guard action which all but a minority of favoured workers 
fought against the new system; but we must accept its pointlessness and its 
inevitable defeat.66 
 
Just as Hobsbawm rejects this view of the machine-breakers, so, too, do I reject its 
application to 20th century industrial workers. Deindustrialization is not inevitable or, at 
least, the way in which it unfolds is not pre-determined. From Black Friday to ecological 
activism during the 1990s, residents of the former “steel city” of Atlantic Canada have 
been active in their response to the forces buffeting their community. But memory and 
representation have a role to play, here, as well. How people reflect upon these struggles, 
victories, and defeats inform how working-class communities respond to present 
challenges. For Sydney, as for post-industrial rural resource economies throughout the 
world, the road forward must be based on an honest assessment of the industrial past. 
                                                




Diversify or Die: 
Planned Obsolescence in the Dosco Years, 1944-1966 
  
 
Attention is called to the fact that one can readily get a much different impression 
when visiting an idle rolling mill or factory […] compared with walking into mills 
or factory where the plant is in operation […] In other words, the activity and the 
noise of operations may lead to the erroneous conclusion that the plants in 
operation were superior to those that were idle. There is nothing more depressing 
than idle works on a cold winter day. 
 
    - F.L. Estep. “Report to the Minister of Industry.” 1944.1  
 
 
Deindustrialization is most visible at the moment of the final closure. Recollections of 
mass termination centre upon the trauma of learning of plans to relocate or halt 
operations. This trauma is palpable; on February 10, 2016, Carrier Corp. told its 
employees at an Indianapolis manufacturing plant to gather for a company message. In a 
video recording of the announcement, a man in a suit stands on a stage, surrounded by 
employees, and reads from a script. “It became clear that the best way to stay 
competitive . . . and protect the business in the long term . . . is to move production from 
our facility in Indianapolis” – the room stays quiet, although a few voices can be heard 
muttering in disbelief. One woman clearly says, “Oh no.” The man on the stage continues 
after a brief pause, “to Monterrey, Mexico.” The room erupts in anger; employees shout, 
expletives are hurled, and some immediately head for the exits. With this decision, more 
than 1,400 employees are left without work. United Steelworkers (USWA) Local 1999 
representative Chris Jones told reporters, “This was not expected at all […] Because of 
corporate greed […] Our members and their families have a hell of a price to pay.”2   
                                                
1 F.L. Estep, report to the Minister of Industry, Halifax, Nova Scotia, regarding 
operations of Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation [8 April 1944], Nova Scotia Steel 
and Coal, Trenton Works, Hawker Siddeley Collection, MS-4-106, A-127, Dalhousie 
University Archives, Halifax, NS.  
 
2 “Carrier plans to lay off 1,400 Indy workers in Mexico move,” Indianapolis Business 
Journal. February 10, 2016; “Carrier Air Conditioner (part of United Technologies) 
Moving 1,400 Jobs to Mexico,” YouTube Video, 3:31, posted by Joe Brunner, 11 
February 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3ttxGMQOrY. 
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The feelings expressed by Carrier employees in Indiana – shock, surprise, and 
anger chief among them – are products of social, political, and economic processes that 
impact millions of working class men and women around the world. These processes are 
germane to global capitalism; Joseph Schumpeter expanded upon this notion as early as 
the 1940s, when he first described the shape of creative destruction. “In dealing with 
capitalism, we are dealing with an evolutionary process,” he writes: 
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organization 
development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel 
illustrate the same process of industrial mutation – if I may use that biological 
term – that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.3 
 
While neoliberals have used this language to illustrate the logical, dispassionate 
operations of the free market, the recognition that these processes are geographically 
situated had been less forthcoming. In areas that capital has vacated, the destructive 
impulse remains far more visible than the creative. Geographically situated, analysis of 
these processes within Canada reveals the undercurrents of regional disparity. 
Historians and economic geographers have recently revisited Harold Innis’ 
staples thesis, arguing that it remains a useful framework for the development and 
underdevelopment of resource peripheries in Canada. According to Mel Watkins, the 
staples thesis articulates a geographic and spatial argument for the underdevelopment of 
rural resource frontiers. While Innis applied his theory to the cod fishery and fur trade to 
explain Canadian development, his ideas also help to explain the economic challenges 
that plague the industrial hinterland. This is predicated upon the notion that rural 
economies become reliant upon primary industry and nearby service resources.4 This 
form of development may lead to a staples trap, wherein Roger Hayter and Trevor 
Barnes argue: 
                                                                                                                                            
 
3 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, rev. ed. (1942; repr. 
London: Routledge, 2003), 82-83. 
 
4 Mel Watkins, “Staples Redux,” Studies in Political Economy 79 (Spring 2007): 213-




Capitalists in the staples-producing region often maintain an export mentality, 
which limits the range of activities in which such capitalists are willing to invest. 
Second, because of the need for large fixed-capital investments in many staple 
sectors and the resulting indivisibilities of production, firms there are often large, 
oligopolistic, and externally controlled.5 
 
Scholarship on deindustrialization has largely remained focused on industrial towns in 
the heartland. “In Canada,” writes Steven High, “economic change on the resource 
frontier is often understood in terms of boom-to-bust, as resource communities highly 
susceptible to cyclical downturns rather than industrial communities experiencing 
decline.”6 
“A penny wise and a pound foolish” is how former Sydney steelworkers Romeo 
Sylvester and Eddie Parris describe corporate management of the plant in the postwar 
period. The view that executives were ineffectual and risk-averse, evidenced by the 
company’s refusal to invest in the necessary upgrades to keep the mill competitive, is 
popular among many former employees of the Dominion Steel and Coal Company.7 An 
examination of Dosco operations between 1944 and 1966 reveal that these decisions were 
not based upon a misreading of market conditions; rather, the withholding of 
modernization and product diversification from the Sydney Works was part of a 
purposeful strategy of deindustrialization and divestment through planned obsolescence 
resulting from the staples trap.  
 
The Postwar Recovery: 1944-1950 
 
In addition to the Sydney Works, Dosco was the controlling interest in approximately 85 
percent of collieries in Nova Scotia by the 1940s. Following its consolidation of the 
Besco group in 1928, the company began to exercise control over a number of small 
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producers. Essentially, Dosco existed as a large-scale holding group; the Dominion Coal 
Company, for example, had begun operations in 1893 under the direction of H.M. 
Whitney. After the Dosco acquisition, this company continued to operate under its 
original title – although ownership and financial control were both wielded by the parent 
corporation.8 Collieries spanned Cape Breton Island; the Sydney Coal Field included the 
industrial towns surrounding Sydney, such as Glace Bay and New Waterford, while the 
western portion of the island included a number of other working seams, with coal mines 
operating in places like Port Hood, Inverness, and Mabou. As the island’s major 
employer, Dosco wielded a great deal of economic and political power. By the 1950s, its 
holdings included firms throughout Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and 
Newfoundland. 
 Vertical integration was key to the company’s business model. The firm 
maintained strict control over its supply chain. Coke made from Cape Breton coal fed the 
blast furnaces at the Sydney Works from the first years of its operations. Iron ore was 
shipped to Sydney from Bell Island, Newfoundland, where it was mined between 1893 
and 1966. Another subsidiary of Dosco, the Dominion Wabana Ore Limited, operated 
these mines after 1949.9 Limestone, a third major ingredient in the steel making process, 
was sourced from Dominion Limestone Limited in Aguathuna, Newfoundland. After the 
1960s, two additional limestone quarries – Marble Mountain and Irish Cove – began 
operating in Cape Breton. While the processes of steel making are further explored in 
Chapter Four, this supply chain illustrates how Dosco was organized upon resource 
extraction from the Maritimes and Newfoundland.10 
Despite its expansive holdings and profitable operations, Dosco was at a 
competitive disadvantage by the end of the Second World War. The Canadian steel  
                                                
8 W.F. Carroll, Angus J. Morrison, and C.C. McLaurin, Report of the Royal Commission 
on Coal, 1946 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1947). 
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Figure 1.1: Hawker Siddeley Canada 1965; Dosco properties marked in red 
Source: Halifax Industries Fonds, Corporate Records 1990-215-001, 
File 4, Hawker Siddeley Annual Report, 1965, NSARM 
industry was the beneficiary of a great deal of federal modernization capital during the 
conflict. The Sydney Works, however, did not benefit to the same extent as its central 
Canadian competitors. Ernie Forbes writes:  
C.D. Howe and his controllers often appeared to be following an agenda for 
industrialization based on their perception of Canada’s needs after the war. Their 
vision of a centralized manufacturing complex closely integrated with the United 
States apparently did not include the Maritimes in any significant role.11 
       
11 E.R. Forbes, “Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrialization of 
Canada During the Second World War,” in Challenging the Regional Stereotype: Essays 
on the 20th Century Maritimes, ed. E.R. Forbes (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 
1989), 174. 
 36 
As a result, Stelco and Algoma were approved for upgrades to their respective plate and 
rolling mills while similar subsidy was withheld from operations in Sydney. There is 
some indication that there may also have been personal conflict between Dosco 
executives and federal bureaucrats. In the summer of 1940, for example, Clem Anson - 
the general manager of the Sydney Works - met with steel controller Hugh Scully 
regarding proposed upgrades to the mill. Anson was incensed when, months later, Scully 
denied ever having heard the proposal.12 There remained a sense within Munitions and 
Supply that Dosco would be unable to handle a high volume of orders; by 1944, the 
Sydney Works was presented as a perennial laggard when it came to meeting demand.13 
The repercussions of these decisions were plainly visible; between 1945 and 1950, profit 
margins for all Canadian steel producers increased – although Dosco’s return on 
investment was consistently the lowest of its competitors.  
The staples trap was already in place by the 1940s. Dosco, organized around the 
export of coal and steel from the Maritimes, was largely reliant upon fluctuations in the 
markets for these commodities. Simultaneously, as central Canadian firms benefited from 
access to both buyers and federal subsidy, it became less enticing for Dosco to re-invest 
the significant capital required to maintain its regional holdings. This problem pushed the 
company to crisis by the 1950s, when new steel facilities in Europe and Asia came online. 
Compounding this were the transportation costs and relative lack of secondary 
manufacturing capabilities in Cape Breton aside from the Sydney Works. The firm soon 
began using its holdings in the Maritimes as a resource hinterland to provide capital for 
the consolidation of more profitable operations and mills in Quebec and Ontario.   
Company executives used the apparent weakness of their market position as a 
bargaining chip against employees in its regional collieries, steel works, and foundries. In 
advance of the national steel strike in 1946, Dosco ran a series of full-page 
advertisements in the Sydney Post Record to highlight the precarious circumstances at the 
                                                
12 Clem Anson, “Memo,” 21 September 1940, F1157, File 6, Angus L. Macdonald Fonds, 
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Sydney Works. “We aren’t ostriches,” reads one such ad from July 24, 1946 – nearly two 
weeks after workers had walked off the job at Stelco, Algoma, and Dosco. “It is apparent 
that Cape Breton Island and the whole of Nova Scotia have geographical and other 
problems. The markets for most of our products are in Central Canada. To sell in those 
markets, Nova Scotians must compete with those already there […] This means that the 
province is under considerable handicap.”14  
 
Table 1.1 
Profit Margins for Canadian Steel Firms, 1945-1950 (percent) 
 
Year Algoma Dofasco Dosco Stelco 
1945 8.15 5.47 3.05 3.96 
1946 3.88 9.66 2.04 2.28 
1947 4.58 9.08 3.63 7.11 
1948 7.66 7.45 6.97 8.99 
1949 13.06 10.19 7.30 10.87 
1950 10.41 9.11 6.31 13.57 
15 
This negotiation tactic was not unique to Dosco, although – unlike Stelco and 
Algoma – the company tried to link this narrative to an “exceptional hardship” prompted 
by its geographic placement within Canada.16 When Anson appeared before the 
Commons Industrial Relations Committee during the strike, he testified that Dosco 
required government subsidy to avoid operating at a loss.17 Meanwhile, production in 
Sault St. Marie and Sydney remained at a standstill while Stelco continued limited 
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operations through the use of strikebreakers.18 On October 2, 1946, the steelworkers 
voted to accept a contract. The agreement included an 18-cent per hour wage increase, 
the acceptance of the Rand Formula, and the implementation of the 44-hour week.19 
Pickets came down two days later.20 
Figure 1.2: Signing of 1946 agreement, 1946 
Source: Photograph by Raytel Photography, Reference 82-1384-8084, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
       
18 For the circumstances surrounding the 1946 strike at Stelco, see Robert Storey, 
“Workers, Unions, and Steel: The Shaping of the Hamilton Working Class, 1935-1948” 
(PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981), 297-418. 
19 “Steelworkers vote 5-1 to return to work,” Sydney Post Record. October 3, 1946.  
20 Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ 
Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 290.  
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Following the strike, Dosco struggled to recover from its wartime shortfalls. At 
this time, the company also controlled ore mines in Bell Island, Newfoundland; railroad 
car shops, forge shops, a nut and bolt factory, and rolling mills at Trenton, Nova Scotia; 
limestone and dolomite quarries; wire mills in Sydney, Saint John, and Toronto; power 
generating stations; and rolling mills in Montreal, Quebec.21 Recognizing the need for 
product diversification, Dosco was faced with the decision of where to direct capital 
investment. A report by the Arthur G. McKee & Company outlined some of the problems 
facing Maritimes industry: significant modernization was required at the Sydney Works, 
the transportation fleet – which had been destroyed during the war – needed to be 
replaced, investment was necessary for the beneficiation of raw materials, and – 
unsurprisingly – labour power needed to be supressed.22 
These issues translated into a persistent narrative of hard times at the Sydney steel 
mill; they are recalled in several interviews describing the structural limitations of 
regional industry. Anson, interviewed by Cape Breton’s Magazine in 1981, recalled:  
We didn’t have good raw materials to work with. Our iron ore was one of the very 
poorest iron ores to smelt in the world, a very dense hematite […] And the same 
thing about the coal. You know, the Cape Breton coal is not a good metallurgical 
coal […] Made very weak coke, Weak in strength. And the result was that when it 
got in the blast furnace it broke up before it had done its work. And you had to 
use more coke than you should have – consequently costing more money.23 
 
John Campbell, a raw materials engineer and manager at Dosco, described the situation 
in similar terms during an interview in 2014:  
John: One of the disadvantages that we had here was that we were pretty distant 
from other heavy industries. A lot of the steel plants in the U.S. and even in the 
Hamilton area would be relatively close to other heavy industries for repairs and 
maintenance and so on […] And one of the problems Sydney got into in the early 
days, even pre-1950 […] Wabana ore was very poor, by today’s standards […] It 
was high in phosphorous and high in silica […] And the conclusion of research at 
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that time that it was difficult, if not impossible to make any great improvement – 
because of the structure of the iron ore […] But the other problem was that the 
coal in Sydney was very high in sulphur, so even [if] you could cut the slag 
volume down, because you cut the slag volume down you couldn’t remove the 
sulphur anymore. So that showed that Sydney coals were no longer really suitable 
for making coke, in that situation. So over the years […] Dosco started to buy iron 
ore from Labrador [and Brazil], but as time went on they went to pelletizing the 
iron ore […] So because of that, it became optimum to buy other coals. So there 
were coals brought in from the US and even Western Canada to make coke […] 
Suddenly the plant finds that all those advantages that they had, you know […] 
they lost the main thing, which was the coal supply, and the iron ore supply. 
 
Lachlan: And, so is that what led to the decision in 1967? To close it? 
 
John: Part, I would say . . . There was also a feeling . . . that maybe the investment 
wasn’t being made in the plant. To modernize or to expand.24 
 
Both of these accounts are offered decades after the events of 1967, when it became clear 
that private industry would abandon Cape Breton coal and steel. For Anson, industrial 
decline in Cape Breton was predicated upon technological and metallurgical advances 
that outpaced the capabilities of local raw materials. From his perspective, the decision to 
develop Dosco’s mills in Quebec and Ontario was simply a natural response to the 
centralization of the Canadian economy and the nature of competitive capitalism. John 
Campbell remains reluctant to explain the exodus of private industry as inevitable, 
although he describes many of the same material limitations. Rather, he believes that 
Dosco was constrained by technological factors that might have been overcome had 
proper infrastructure investment been provided.  
The recalcitrance of C.D. Howe and the extent of wartime underdevelopment 
cannot be solely blamed for Dosco’s loss of market position. In fact, there is evidence 
that the company had embarked on a program of planned obsolescence by the end of the 
1930s. After it took over the remnants of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company 
(Scotia) facilities at Trenton, Nova Scotia in 1938, Dosco operated these mills at 
whatever capacity could be immediately obtained. Otherwise, they were allowed to fall 
into disrepair. In 1943, Dosco bought the Canadian Tube and Steel Products Company in 
Montreal. Almost immediately, the company announced the closure of its Trenton plant. 
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L. Anders Sandberg writes,  “War-time labour scarcity provided the political 
precondition for the closure of the rolling mills and nut and bolt plant; the wage increases 
awarded by the Federal Labour Board [in 1943] served as an excuse while the cause, a 
conscious corporate strategy of industrial neglect and winding down, was left 
unchallenged.”25 Nearly 600 employees were immediately laid-off, during the wartime 
production boom, and several hundred more were left without work in the following 
years.26 
The corporate response to these pressures is revealing. Brendan Haley argues that 
the Canadian staples trap results in “a series of self-reinforcing rigidities” that can 
promote self-destructive behaviour on behalf of regional operators.27 In failing to re-
invest in their regional holdings and attempting to take a more substantial share of an 
already-saturated centralized market, Dosco set the stage for its eventual subsumption by 
larger firms with greater capital resources. Executives searched for ways by which they 
might divest from the Maritimes without creating significant political or labour turmoil. 
After the closure of the Trenton Works, it was revealed that the company had reported a 
net profit of only $92,916 between August 1938 and September 1943 for that portion of 
its operations.28 When a provincial accountant looked into the matter, he found that 
profits had actually been under-reported by more than $400,000.29 The purpose of this 
was two-fold - it was intended to provide cover for the planned closures while also 
offering an opportunity to increase demands on remaining workers. The plan backfired, 
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however, when it prompted a confrontation with the national leadership of the USWA 
and created the perception that the company was being badly mismanaged.  
Charles Millard, the Canadian Director of the USWA, believed that Dosco was 
employing a similar strategy at the Sydney Works. In a 1946 memorandum sent to 
Forman Waye of USWA Local 1064, a labour activist with the Sydney steelworkers’ 
union, Millard presciently expressed: 
Either deliberately or through carelessness, management has not paid sufficient 
attention to the industrial engineering and maintenance. Management must agree 
to accept the responsibility for reorganizing and streamlining the present plant 
[…] The Governments, both Federal and Provincial, must be prepared to place a 
competent administrator in charge of the Sydney operations of Dosco if 
management fails to meet its responsibility to the Steelworkers and the people of 
Nova Scotia and Canada.30 
 
This recognition would prompt demands for timely modernization among Sydney 
steelworkers and their union representatives that would continue for much of the 20th 
century. Although Dosco provided some additions to the Sydney Works during the late 
1940s and early 1950s, these were outstripped by its contributions to mills in Quebec and 
Ontario. Regional deindustrialization was becoming more visible - a by-product of what 
David Harvey calls geographical switching crises, wherein capital flows and mediating 
institutions are broadly reorganized to open up new avenues for investment in other 
places.31  
As a result of lacklustre production reports, the bungled shutdown at Trenton, and 
labour conflicts, Howe grew increasingly sceptical of the managerial competence of 
Dosco’s president, Arthur Cross. In contrast to the close friendship that blossomed 
between Howe and James Dunn of Algoma Steel, Dosco officials often found themselves 
shut out of industrial planning discussions. As Duncan McDowell writes, “Dosco’s 
lethargic response to wartime incentives irritated Howe to such a point that he 
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unofficially directed Steel Control to ‘use that company to the minimum extent possible 
even if we have to buy the steel in the United States.’”32 Some aspects of federal 
regulatory controls remained after the war; an “accelerated depreciation program,” for 
example, was intended to stimulate expansion in the national steel industry.33 Holistically, 
it was a combination of economic geography, the development of Canadian market 
capitalism, and the decisions of the federal regulatory state that left Dosco in crisis as it 
entered the 1950s. State and business interests continued to promote steel production, 
though in ways that flattened and ignored regional differences.34 
In Sydney, steelworkers and their families suffered the immediate impacts of 
these changes. Corey Slumkoski describes how nearly 50 percent of Nova Scotia’s 
20,000 unemployed workers were located in Cape Breton in 1947. Many hoped for the 
entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, as newly discovered ore deposits were 
viewed as an answer to an emerging raw materials problem at the Sydney Works. 
Renewed American commitment to the St. Lawrence Seaway project, however, would 
make it easier to transport Labrador ore to central markets by the end of the 1950s, to the 
great benefit of Dosco’s competitors. As a result, Slumkowsi writes, the argument for 
modernization at Sydney began to shift away from geographical proximity to raw 
materials and towards the creation of a sound national industrial strategy.35 This would 
resound after the mid-1950s within a political environment more attuned to the economic 
realities of Canadian regionalism. 
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Losing Ground in the Boom Years, 1950-1957 
 
The ability of international steel firms to realize economies of scale during the 1950s was 
a key metric of increased productivity and profitability. Reconstruction in West Germany 
witnessed the development of several new integrated mills in the Ruhr, which overtook 
the smaller British steelworks in productive capacity by 1959.36 This pattern of 
development was not unique; the countries of the European Coal and Steel Community 
each significantly expanded steel production during the decade.37 Although Japanese 
industry weakened in the immediate aftermath of the war, the geopolitical atmosphere of 
the 1950s prompted the U.S. to support the re-development of Japan’s industrial 
capabilities. As a result, Japan more than doubled its steel output from approximately 9.5 
million tons in 1955 to more than 22 million tons in 1960.38 Each of the major Canadian 
firms also expanded, although the concentration of output within the industry slightly 
declined during this same period as a result of comparative growth by small producers.39 
Tariff policy further impacted the Canadian steel industry, and fostered a closer 
economic relationship with the United States. As Bruce Muirhead writes, “Almost alone 
with the United States, Canada implemented the tariff reductions negotiated under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at Geneva, Switzerland (1947), 
Annecy, France (1949), and Torquay, England (1950-1951) without resort to non-tariff 
barriers. And that resulted in a predictable twist; it helped to develop Canada’s economic 
relationship with the United States into a sort of de facto bi-lateralism.”40 These tariffs 
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were imposed based upon type of product and nation of origin. In 1955, three major 
tariffs remained: the General Tariff, the Most Favoured Nation Tariff, and the British 
Preferential Tariff. These were applied to a variety of products, including bars and rods, 
plate, sheet, band and strip, angles and shapes.41 Rates were simplified to a 5, 10, and 20 
percent structure after 1958, and specific products - after this point - were not singled out 
for protection.42  
Exchange rates prompted a decrease in the barrier to imports. The Canadian dollar 
began trading higher than the U.S. dollar in 1952 - a circumstance remained until 1961 
when it returned below parity.43 Despite healthy demand for consumer goods and a 
corresponding increase in basic industry and manufacturing throughout North America, 
Dosco’s ability to reach markets was an important constraint. Dosco shipped coal and 
steel products to purchasers in the Maritimes, Quebec and Ontario, but high 
transportation costs meant that central Canadian steel firms could often outcompete 
within these markets. American markets were restricted through trade policy; as late as 
1966, USWA researcher Harry Waisglass and Andrew Hogan called for “a Canada-U.S. 
common market for steel” to allow for prosperous trade between Atlantic Canada and 
New England.44 Lacking a stable domestic market, the Sydney Works was more reliant 
on world exports than were its direct competitors.  
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Despite the capabilities of the Sydney steel plant, Dosco’s product line was not 
comparable to Stelco or Algoma. Steel ingots and casting remained the largest product, 
followed by pig iron, blooms and billets, rails and track material, rods and bars, wire, and 
nails. The Sydney Works was not capable of producing sheet and strip or skelp and 
plate.45 While hostilities in Korea resulted in steel orders after 1951, these could not 
offset the relative decline of the firm.46 The ingot capacity at Canadian integrated mills 
increased between 1950 and 1959, but each of the other firms eclipsed Dosco’s growth. 
This includes Dominion Foundries and Steel Company (Dofasco), which opened its first 
blast furnace in August 1951 and began operations as a fully integrated mill.  
 
Table 1.2  
Annual Ingot Capacity of Major Canadian Steel Firms, 1950-1960 
(Thousands of tons and percentage of total) 
 
Year 1950 1955 1960 
Stelco 1,247 (35.8) 2,150 (42.9) 2,500 (37) 
Algoma 866 (24.9) 1,120 (22.4) 1,600 (23.7) 
Dofasco 378 (10.9) 785 (15.7) 1,165 (17.3) 
Dosco 877 (25.2) 733 (14.7) 1,050 (15.6) 
 
* Remaining percentages are divided between small producers.47 
 
Lionel Forsyth, who took over as president of Dosco in 1949, did not hesitate to 
use promises of modernization to try and suppress resistance from the steelworkers’ 
union. On October 2, 1951, he addressed the Maritime Provinces Board of Trade at the 
Isle Royale Hotel in downtown Sydney. The future of industry in the Maritimes, he told 
the audience, would be cemented through a massive modernization project. Investment 
included $18 million in additions to the Sydney plant, $7.4 million for the Wabana ore 
mines, and smaller upgrades at Trenton and the Halifax Shipyards. Almost immediately, 
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Forsyth moved on to discuss his concern over union activity. In pressing for cost of living 
wage increases, rank-and-file members had recently engaged in a number of work 
stoppages. He cautioned:  
Such conduct has within it the seeds of a harvest which may well set at naught our 
plans for the future of the industry […] At the risk of undue repetition may I 
mention again our program for capital expenditures in the Maritime Provinces and 
the impressive total of the funds which we are committed to provide to complete 
that program. Such a project creates a heavy burden of responsibility for those 
who have conceived it […] It places an even heavier burden upon any individual 
or any group who by failing to do his or their share toward its realization may 
interfere with, impede, or defeat it. Nothing […] could cause me greater 
disappointment than to be obliged for any reason to curtail this program or delay 
its execution.48  
 
The company, aware of the desire for modernization within the USWA, used such threats 
as part of a carrot-and-stick strategy to promote discord within the union. 
The terms outlined in Forsyth’s address were not simply public posturing. In 
correspondence with Millard through 1952, he indicated that the national union should 
concede to specific contract points, such as wage structure, so that the company could 
enact its planned facility upgrades.49 Millard had a history of fighting for shop floor 
rights rather than submitting to the wishes of planners; as Laurel Sefton Macdowell 
writes, “[during the war, Millard] disagreed with many politicians and government 
officials who thought that labour should help win the war first and then demand 
collective bargaining legislation and wage increases.”50 He soon disabused Forsyth of the 
notion that the plan would find support among the rank and file. Rather, he articulated the 
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USWA position: steelworkers at Dosco would not offer concessions based upon promises 
of forthcoming modernization.51 
A recession in the final quarters of 1953 and early 1954 briefly stalled the 
Canadian economy.52 Forsyth was put in the unenviable position of detailing a stagnant 
profit rate to shareholders. On May 7, 1954, he explained that they had posted net 
earnings of $3,867,714.97 for the year 1953 – lower by $330,160.73 than the previous 
year.53 Despite its threats, Dosco had invested in several additions to its Atlantic Canada 
operations between 1952 and 1954. These included rail-finishing mills and a blooming 
mill at the Sydney plant, as well as a new open hearth furnace; the Wabana mines, 
Trenton Works, and the Halifax Shipyards also benefitted. These additions, Forsyth 
hoped, would offset Dosco’s slumping market position and increase the quality of 
available raw materials. The new rolling mills cemented the Sydney works as one of the 
most efficient rail producers in North America – though it could still not produce flat 
rolled product.54 
Dosco’s capital investments during the mid-1950s were not able to offset the 
structural challenges prompted by the staples trap. Political scientist Adam Wellstead 
describes the role of investment in overcoming structural barriers: “backwards linkages” 
are created when dollars are allocated towards upgrading or modernizing the processes by 
which staples are extracted; “forward linkages” emerge from investment in secondary 
processing of staples; and “final demand linkages” are created through investment in 
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alternate industries that complement and diversify the sector.55 If we consider coal the 
primary staple that Dosco extracted from Cape Breton, then investment in the Sydney 
Works might be considered a “forward linkage.” According to Wellstead, “final demand 
linkages” are the most important in offsetting the staples trap; though this remains elusive, 
he writes, if “exports are in the hands of foreign investors who siphon off their profits 
[…] leaving little behind to invest in local manufacturing.”56 
Table 1.3 
Profit Margins for Canadian Steel Firms, 1951-1957 (percent) 
 
Year Algoma Dofasco Dosco Stelco 
1951 14.13 5.63 6.31 9.18 
1952 6.83 6.08 6.72 7.85 
1953 9.36 6.36 5.67 7.89 
1954 6.91 6.30 5.46 7.27 
1955 11.76 9.04 4.71 10.01 
1956 14.35 9.40 3.59 10.53 
1957 11.94 8.96 6.57 9.35 
57 
Although Dosco posted higher-than average net profits in 1956 and 1957, it was 
not able to achieve profit margins comparable to its competitors during the decade.58 
Forsyth passed away in 1957 on New Years Day at his home in Montreal.59 C.B. Lang, 
Dosco’s Chairman of the Board, resigned his position and took up the office of President. 
According to Frank Manning Covert, a Nova Scotia lawyer and corporate executive, 
Forsyth had previously approached him for the position. He writes, “[I was] not remotely 
interested […] On another occasion, [Forsyth] told me that Dosco had no future in Cape 
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Breton in the long run.”60 In his first address to shareholders, Lang described the terms of 
a two-year contract that had been negotiated with the steelworkers’ union, the slight 
increase in the company’s finances, and ongoing mechanization efforts that had been 
supported by a $5.3 million loan from the federal government.61 Just two months after 
this address, representatives of A.V. Roe Canada Ltd. approached Lang and officially 
expressed interest in acquiring ownership of the firm. 
The corporate history of A.V. Roe Canada is complicated. Its earliest predecessor 
was A.V. Roe and Company, an aircraft production company founded by Alliot Verdon 
Roe in Manchester, England on New Years Day, 1910. The company designed, produced, 
and tested aircraft in the U.K. throughout the First World War and during the interwar 
period. In 1935, another U.K.-based aeronautics firm – the Hawker Siddeley Group – 
purchased A.V. Roe and Company as a subsidiary. By the Second World War, Hawker 
Siddeley was one of the largest aircraft producers in Britain. Its designs included the 
Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire, both of which were used extensively 
during the Battle of Britain. In 1944, Hawker Siddeley entered into negotiations with C.D. 
Howe to purchase the Victory Aircraft factory in Malton, Ontario. When this purchase 
was finalized on November 11, 1945, Hawker Siddeley created A.V. Roe Canada as a 
subsidiary of A.V. Roe and Company. The Canadian division was tasked with repairing 
and retrofitting older aircraft and undertaking aeronautical research and development.  
A.V. Roe’s overtures to Dosco were part of a broader strategy of expansion and 
diversification within the Hawker Siddeley Group. Chairman Thomas Sopwith, speaking 
to the company’s 22nd general meeting in London on January 8, 1958, describes: 
Two years ago the net assets of the Group were divided in the proportion of 85 
per cent aviation and 15 per cent industrial. Today they are roughly 30 per cent 
aviation and 70 per cent industrial [...] We have expanded and diversified 
considerably. We have become one of the leading industrial organizations both in 
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the United Kingdom and in Canada […] I think you will agree that with such an 
industrial spread we should be able to weather any storm which may arise.62 
 
Dosco’s steel holdings were explicitly mentioned during this speech. While Dosco had 
underperformed, the steel market as a whole had experienced remarkable growth. In 1956, 
A.V. Roe and several European conglomerates attempted to gain control of Algoma 
following the death of owner James Dunn. Duncan McDowall writes, “In a transaction 
involving $60 million, a half-million Algoma common shares were sold to Mannesmann 
AG, A.V. Roe Canada, McIntyre Porcupine Mines, and the Royal Bank.”63 Soon after 
acquiring these shares, A.V. Roe President Crawford Gordon approached Dosco.   
Gordon wrote to Lang on August 7, 1957 to establish the terms of the proposed 
sale and to describe A.V. Roe’s industrial strategy. Dosco would exist alongside other 
Canadian holdings, which were divided between aeronautical and industrial divisions. 
The aeronautical division included lesser subsidiaries such as Avro Aircraft, Orenda 
Engines, and Canadian Steel Improvement, while the industrial division held, among 
others, Canadian Car and Canadian Steel Foundries.64 Gordon assured Lang:  
The importance of Dosco to the Maritime Provinces and to Canada is fully 
realized by Avro and the Hawker Siddeley Group. It would be the position of 
Avro to strengthen and maintain the separate identity and autonomy of Dosco 
within the framework of Avro’s Canadian group […] You may wish, for the early 
information of Dosco security holders and to put an end to rumours […] to 
communicate the contents of this letter to them pending […] the formal offer.65  
 
The rumours to which Gordon refers had circulated for nearly six months, with various 
company officials speaking off-the-record about possible bids by A.V. Roe, Pheonix-
Rheinrohr, and Mannesmann International. As news of the deal was leaked, Dosco stock 
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prices climbed to approximately $30 per share, although some community members 
publicly speculated about the possibility of industrial closures.66 
The terms of the proposed purchase agreement would see A.V. Roe immediately 
gain control of more than 52 percent of Dosco common shares as follows: 
 
a.) For each ordinary share of Dosco acquired directly – 1 ¼ fully paid Avro 
common shares plus $10.25. 
 
b.) For each $500 principal amount of Dosco 4% Convertible Debentures due 
August, 1961, with all coupons maturing subsequent to August 15, 1957 attached 
thereto – 31 ¼ fully paid Avro common shares plus $199.75 
 
c.) For each $1,000 principal amount of Dosco 4 ¼ Convertible Debentures due 
May 15, 1970 with all unmatured coupons attached thereto – 68 ¾ fully paid Avro 
common shares plus $574.46.67 
 
The Board of Directors was surprised to receive this offer, and several argued resolutely 
against accepting the deal. Roy Jodrey, the founder of Minas Basin Pulp and Power, lead 
the opposition with support from regional capitalist Frank Sobey.68  
This opposition culminated with a letter to shareholders recommending against 
the offer. “The price being offered is too low,” write Jodrey and Sobey, “Your Board of 
Directors is in a position to report the highest earning for any first six month period in the 
history of the Company.” The $80 million spent on modernization, argued the directors, 
had already resulted in a stronger, more competitive industrial firm. They enumerate the 
recent upgrades: a new 120-acre site in Etobicoke purchased for the expansion of Graham 
Nail and Wire Products and the Canadian Steel Corporation, a plant in Toronto, a new 
Canadian Bridge Company facility and a plant for Truscon Steel in Montreal. Investment 
in Atlantic Canada included funding for another blast furnace at the Sydney works. The 
authors conclude with an appeal:  
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Acceptance of the Avro offer will mean that you, as a Dosco shareholder now 
playing an independent part in one of Canada’s oldest and largest industries, will 
become one of a vast number of minority shareholders in a post-war holding 
company (itself a subsidiary) whose future plans for Dosco are still to be 
disclosed.69 
 
Fears that the multi-national conglomerate would immediately shut down extraneous or 
“inefficient” facilities were common in the days following the proposal. William Allen, a 
Halifax-based journalist, writes:  
The miners, the steel workers, and in their communities, the grocer, the doctor, 
and of course the tax collector all have a concern with the company’s future plans. 
These communities know only too well the crushing effect of a halt to industrial 
activity. Several communities are suffering because mines have closed […] What 
this will mean, then, concerns everyone in Nova Scotia.70 
 
Deindustrialization was not alien to Nova Scotians in 1957. Since the labour wars of the 
1920s, uncertainty and instability were synonymous with absentee ownership; the 
proposed removal of corporate control from Montreal to Hawker Siddeley headquarters 
in London was of great concern to those for whom the conflicts with Besco remained in 
living memory. Despite the surprise with which the Black Friday announcement was 
received in 1967, this response to the A.V. Roe purchase reveals that the availability of 
work in the province’s steel and coal communities was precarious.  
While Jodrey continued to campaign against the sale, A.V. Roe assumed control 
over nearly 76 percent of Dosco common shares on Wednesday, October 9, 1957. The 
Sydney Works, just as in the Besco days, was now under the control of a foreign 
conglomerate based in the U.K. Shareholders hoped that new management could escape 
the comparative decline that had plagued Dosco since the war years.71 In spite of some 
infrastructure investment, the Sydney Works remained technologically underdeveloped in 
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comparison with its central-Canadian counterparts.72 Although former employees often 
identify the Hawker Siddeley takeover as “the beginning of the end,” the acquisition 
appears to have initially been intended to play a role within the company’s diversification 
and expansion strategy. As circumstances facing A.V. Roe changed in the late 1950s, this 
strategy very quickly transitioned into a policy of explicit deindustrialization and 
liquidation.  
 
‘Death by Natural Causes?’  
From A.V. Roe to Hawker Siddeley Canada, 1957-1966 
 
With the October takeover complete, A.V. Roe was positioned in the midst of what 
William MacNutt termed the “Atlantic Revolution.”73 Technological advances 
contributed to a developing consumer market. Television and telephones brought Atlantic 
Canadians into closer contact with their neighbours across the country. Regional 
economic development became an important plank in federal and provincial platforms, 
and the election of Robert Stanfield in 1956 signalled a commitment to economic growth 
in Nova Scotia predicated upon state intervention and regionalism. Meanwhile, Margaret 
Conrad writes, “Centralizing pressures tolled the death knell for many of the region’s 
rural areas” as the total number of workers employed in primary and secondary industries 
declined.74 At the Sydney steel plant, employment fluctuated– peaking at an all-time high 
in 1952  – although ultimately shedding 1,043 jobs between 1951 and 1960.   
The federal election in June 1957 swept the Liberals from power and established 
John Diefenbaker as Prime Minister with a Conservative minority government. C.D. 
Howe, who had controversially supported the Trans-Canada natural gas pipeline during 
the campaign, lost his seat in Port Arthur to Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 
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(CCF) candidate Doug Fisher.75 Although Howe had reservations about the management 
style of Hawker Siddeley director Roy Dobson, he had largely supported the company’s 
Canadian operations since the Second World War. It was Howe, in fact, who 
recommended Crawford Gordon to Dobson as a candidate for the A.V. Roe Canada 
presidency in 1951.76  
Table 1.4  
Sydney Works, Average Employment, 1950-1960 
 













The Diefenbaker administration had fewer professional associations with A.V. 
Roe. Conservative MP George Nowlan, who maintained close ties with the newly 
appointed cabinet, had supported Jodrey’s resistance to the Dosco sale - citing fears of 
decline in Maritime coal and steel.78 Although the Conservatives did not interfere directly, 
these political developments were of concern to A.V. Roe directors. In 1957, all but one 
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member of the board were committed Liberal Party loyalists. Their fears were 
compounded by the fact that the company’s most lucrative contracts were awarded by the 
Canadian government, including orders for the CF-105 – the “Avro Arrow.”  
The original $200,000 CF-105 design contract was awarded to A.V. Roe in May 
1953, and hundreds of millions of dollars were allocated to the project before the end of 
the decade. Officials were concerned with the strategic capabilities of Soviet long-range 
bombers, and the Arrow was designed specifically as an interceptor aircraft.79 The roll-
out of the first CF-105 occurred on October 4, 1957, and several test flights took place 
over the next months. On March 31, 1958, Diefenbaker was elected with a majority 
government and was now in a position to scrap the project altogether.80 Although the 
reasons for the decision remain contested, the Canadian government decided to follow 
American proposals for a missile-based air defense system and cancel the Arrow.81 The 
decision was announced to the public on February 20, 1959, and the company 
immediately laid-off 14,528 Avro and Orenda employees. With its aeronautical division 
decimated, A.V. Roe was in crisis during the final months of 1959.82 
The Dosco division could not help offset this disaster, as the Maritime coal and 
steel industries were also facing hardship. In 1959, R.B. Elver authored a report to the 
Royal Commission on Coal on the competitive position of Dosco. Although he describes 
problems with raw materials, Elver argues that the Sydney Works could regain 
competitive status if it were supported with proper infrastructure investment. This view 
remained popular among Sydney steelworkers. Elver cautions: 
If very little is done in the way of increasing the types of steel products produced, 
improving the quality and relative cost of raw materials consumed, and improving 
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processing techniques, it is quite likely that the company will stagnate and even 
decline, in absolute as well as in relative terms.83 
 
The Commission also found that Cape Breton coal reserves were becoming less 
economically recoverable, as miners had to travel further underground for their tonnages. 
Ivan Rand, the head of the commission, wrote in support of further subsidy but predicted 
the closure of at least four collieries before 1970.84   
A study by Arthur D. Little Inc. revealed further challenges. The inability of the 
Sydney mill to produce flat-rolled product had now become a major problem; these 
comprised 50 percent of the rolled steel market in 1960. The company recognized this by 
1957, when planning began for a new mill with flat-rolling capabilities to be established 
at Contrecoeur, Quebec. In the view of management, the addition of these mills to 
operations at Sydney was not an option; freight rates meant that shipping from Sydney, 
over a ten-year period, would accrue an approximate cost differential of $40 million.85 By 
the early 1960s, it became clear that USWA-led calls for diversification of the product 
line at the Sydney Works – to “diversify or die” – would go unheeded by Dosco, A.V. 
Roe, and the Hawker Siddeley Group.86  
These issues were compounded by national and international developments 
buffeting the North American steel industry. The opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 
1959 proved a boon for mills in Hamilton and the Sault, as it offered a ready supply of 
iron ore from the Ungava region of the Labrador-Quebec border, but this further 
diminished the geographical reasoning for production at Sydney.87 Competition from 
modernized European and Japanese producers remained fierce; in 1958, British 
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steelmakers spent $280 million on upgrades to achieve an even greater productive 
capacity.88 In the U.S., the Iron and Steel Rate Disparities Investigation in 1963-64 found 
“the lower Japanese production costs were an almost insurmountable barrier to American 
sales in that country,” although ocean shipping rates did not explicitly discriminate 
against North American steel.89  
 
Table 1.5  
Installation of New Steel Facilities Between 1950-1960 
 
Type of Equipment Canada and US Europe and Japan 
Blooming Mills 37 40 
Hot Strip Mills 16 31 
Structural Mills 1 6 
Plate Mills 4 30 
Merchant and Light Mills 15 28 
Rod Mills 7 14 
90 
On the labour front, Canadian unionists grew increasingly concerned over the 
confrontation taking shape on the American side of the border. USWA President David 
McDonald promised American steelworkers higher wages in 1959 to offset several years 
of inflation. Management at U.S. Steel and other producers had grown similarly 
disenchanted with the terms of existing agreements, particularly surrounding issues of 
work control.91 Strike action was the result, and more than 500,000 American workers 
walked off the job on July 15. After three months on the picket line, the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act forced steelworkers back to work.92 Larry Sefton, director of District 6 
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in Ontario, feared a similar employer offensive in Canada. In April 1960, he called for a 
spirited defence of the union’s achievements and asked members to support the nascent 
New Democratic Party (NDP) “in order that the workers and farmers of [Canada] have a 
government that truly represents them.”93 
At Dosco, Roy Dobson and the new president A.L. Fairly outlined the company’s 
financial position: the company had posted a $495,192 net profit between July and 
December 1960. This indicated a decline from the previous twelve-month period, 
wherein the company had amassed nearly $3.5 million. They write, “There has been no 
general increase in selling prices, thereby offsetting our increased costs, mainly labour, 
which have continued to rise. Basically wage costs […] handicap Canadian producers 
against those of every country except the United States.”94 Net income decreased again in 
1961, to $1.1 million, before an uptick in 1962 to nearly $2.3 million –the result of a 
declining Canadian dollar and increased steel exports. By 1962, rails were shipping to 
countries such as the U.K., Colombia, Mexico, South Africa, and Venezuela.95 
The problems facing A.V. Roe worsened in the early 1960s; since the cancellation 
of the Arrow, a number of the company’s executives – including Crawford Gordon – had 
resigned. The rail division was increasingly uneconomical as the result of car and air 
transport, and a failed attempt to acquire American shipbuilding contracts resulted in 
protracted losses.96 The company reported nearly $3.6 million in losses during 1961.97 
Dobson responded by appointing a former executive from Ford and Massey Ferguson, 
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T.J. Emmert, as President and CEO of A.V. Roe and to a directorship at Dosco.98 
Emmert’s job, as it soon became clear, was to oversee the transition to a new company, 
Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd, and the divestment from Nova Scotia coal and steel.  
At this point, the staples trap was quickly resulting in a terminal crisis. The failure 
to create final demand linkages under Dosco meant that when nearby raw materials were 
exhausted there would be little need for continued investment in Cape Breton. The supply 
chain of the Sydney Works, the initial basis for the location of the facility, was now 
threatened by problems throughout the Cape Breton coal industry and in the Wabana ore 
mines. These issues were compounded by the financial problems facing A.V. Roe after 
the collapse of its aviation division. Once Dosco was re-organized under Hawker 
Siddeley Canada, it became clear that the intentions of the parent company were to begin 
winding down steel operations in the Maritimes entirely.  
The creation of Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd. was officially announced at the 
annual shareholders meeting of A.V. Roe in Toronto on April 30, 1962. Emmert told 
those gathered:  
[A new name will] convey more accurately the scope of your Company’s 
operations. As you know, these now embrace  […] shipbuilding […] different 
primary products and services ranging from iron ore and basic steel to electronic 
equipment and railway rolling stock. Since, in many minds, the name A.V. Roe 
Canada has been identified with aviation almost exclusively, the new name will 
help to correct this situation quickly and effectively.99  
 
The company had already taken steps towards disassociating with the legacy of the 
Arrow. The previous year, Hawker Siddeley Group transferred management of its aircraft 
facilities at Malton to De Havilland Aircraft of Canada.100 In 1962, A.V. Roe’s holdings 
were placed under five new divisions of Hawker Siddeley Canada. 
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As part of this transition, the Dosco Empire was split between several different 
management structures. The new steel division included the integrated works at Sydney, 
rolling and wire mills at Montreal and Etobicoke, a power plant near Sydney, the 
limestone quarry in Newfoundland, and the $20 million rod and bar mill at Contrecoeur – 
which became fully operational in 1964. Emmert named Chipman Drury, a former 
president of the Canadian General Transit Company, as head of the steel division. The 
Wabana mines, Halifax shipyard, Cape Breton collieries, and fabrication mills at Trenton 
were placed under the auspices of J.E. Clubb and Dosco Industries. Other A.V. Roe 
holdings were re-organized under the Transportation Equipment Division, Orenda 
Division, and Engineering Division.101  
Financial reports reveal a short-term plan for divestment from Atlantic Canada 
and the move away from vertical integration. Hawker Siddeley Canada continued to fund 
the expansion of flat-rolling capabilities at Contrecoeur and continuous billet casting in 
Montreal, while demanding subsidization from the Nova Scotia government for any 
upgrades at Sydney. Although construction began on a $12 million coal pier at the 
Sydney Works in 1965, this project was largely funded through a grant from the Atlantic 
Development Board (ADB). Steel production was briefly interrupted that year, as the two 
antiquated blast furnaces in Sydney were in such poor condition that they could not 
continue to operate without modernization. The company responded by re-lining both 
furnaces, but refused to replace the aging equipment. This was necessary to maintain 
even a basic level of production at the plant, and it mirrors Dosco’s earlier actions during 
the wind-down at Trenton.102  
Despite an upward trend for net sales within Hawker Siddeley Canada, the parent 
company blamed the industrial division for a shortfall in expected profits. “Income from 
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operations for 1965 was appreciably below that of 1964,” reads the company’s annual 
report, “The decline was wholly attributable to operating results of our largest partly-
owned subsidiary (77%), Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation.”103 The company soon 
began liquidating assets; the Seaboard Power Station in Cape Breton was sold to Nova 
Scotia Power for $2,553,465.104 Dosco closed two of its Bell Island ore mines between 
1959 and 1962, and on April 19, 1966 announced that Wabana No. 3, the longest 
continuously-operating iron ore mine in the country, was to shut down by June.105  
The steelworkers’ union recognized these actions as a corporate exit-strategy. 
New wire drawing machines had been added to the Sydney Works during the 1950s as 
part of the Forsyth modernization. In March 1966, Dosco announced that two of these 
machines, valued at more than $60,000, were to be transported out of Sydney to facilities 
at Etobicoke, Ontario. Sydney steelworker and USWA District 2 President James 
Nicholson opined that Dosco was “stripping the mill” of useful equipment. He writes: 
One can quite honestly assume that, after a comparatively short period with the 
additional high costs [associated with stripping the mill] and inefficiency 
arguments added to their arsenal of reasons why finished steel should not be 
processed in Sydney, the Company may well want to close this mill.106 
 
Waisglass and Hogan supported these points in their presentation to the ADB at the end 
of the month: 
Our concern is not a new one. For a very considerable period of time, [the USWA 
has] warned of impending disaster for the Sydney Steel operations if 
diversification was not carried out. Our admonitions seem, for all practical 




What should be the ultimate fate of the Sydney Steel Plant? That is the critical 
question […] We can be sure that the future for steel will not be decided by the 
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Steelworkers or by the people of Cape Breton, nor should it be expected that the 
decision should rest exclusively on the basis of their particular economic interests, 
or solely on the considerations of their welfare. At the same time, however, the 
decision should not be based exclusively on the ambitions of private business to 
maximize its profits, or on the self-interest [sic] decisions of private capital which 
are rationalized by the counterfeit principles of a free enterprise system which has 
proved to be neither free nor enterprising.107 
 
These concerns went unheeded, although they informed the decisions of provincial and 
federal politicians tasked with responding to the industrial crisis taking shape on the 
island. By the end of 1966, the company revealed plans to divest from its holdings in the 
Cape Breton coal field entirely, and the federal government announced that these 
operations would be taken over by the newly formed Cape Breton Development 
Corporation (Devco).  
Considering this framework of a years-long process of corporate withdrawal, it is 
hardly surprising that Dosco announced the closure of the Sydney Works on October 13, 
1967. For residents in Sydney, however, the decision could not have come as more of a 
surprise. Shock is the primary sentiment expressed through written narratives, oral 
history accounts, and cultural productions of the event from the decades after 1967. 
While the provincial government quickly announced plans to take control of the Sydney 
mill, Hawker Siddeley Canada continued to shutter and sell Dosco operations as part of 
what they called the “elimination of non-competitive costs.”108  
Operations in central Canada, including the mills at Contrecoeur, were sold to 
Sidérugie du Québec (Sidbec) – a provincial crown corporation formed in 1964 by the 
Quebec government. In the midst of the Quiet Revolution, the Sidbec nationalization 
occurred alongside a renewed conceptualization of the provincial state under Jean Lesage. 
It corresponded with the overarching trend toward modernization and organization of the 
public service, the secularization of education and healthcare, and the creation of several 
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state-run enterprises.109 Between 1960 and 1966, Quebec created several public 
corporations; these included: Société Générale de Financement, the Société Quebecoise 
d’Exploration Minière, and the Cause de Dépôt et Placement du Quebec. In 1963, the 
province also nationalized private power corporations to add to Hydro-Quebec.110 
Through its industrial acquisitions, “Sidbec” officially became “Sidbec-Dosco” in 
1968.111  
The federal government also wrestled with questions of economic nationalism. 
After Lester Pearson defeated Diefenbaker in 1963, these challenges became more visible. 
Although, as Doug Owram writes, agreements such as the 1965 Auto Pact imply move 
away from economic nationalism, politicians on the right and the left used its language to 
frame their policy arguments. This included, for example, a defeated proposal by Finance 
Minister Walter Gordon to issue a 30 percent “takeover tax” on foreign companies 
seeking to gain majority shares in Canadian firms.112 Economic nationalism also 
informed bottom-up resistance; Steven High describes how workers’ protests against 
deindustrialization elsewhere in Canada drew upon this “new nationalism” to prevent 
offshoring and job losses.113 
The provincial takeover of the Sydney Works is further explored in Chapter Three, 
but that decision was also informed by a Keynesian sense of nationalism, wherein 
governments were more willing to taking direct action in the economy. Meanwhile, the 
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remainder of Dosco’s holdings in Atlantic Canada were transferred to another Hawker 
Siddeley Group subsidiary, Hawker Industries Ltd. These included the Trenton Works, 
Halifax Shipyards, Canadian Bridge Divisions, Dosco Overseas Engineering, and all 
colliery assets outside of Cape Breton.114 The company that had controlled Cape Breton 
coal and steel since its incorporation in 1928 had, by this time, become so fragmented 
and fractured as to be unrecognizable. After more than two decades of planned 
obsolescence, the era of private ownership at the Sydney Works drew to a close.  
 
Conclusion 
On Black Friday, steelworkers and other residents experienced the culmination of a 
decades-long staples trap. The island’s economy, long predicated upon the ability of 
extractive industries to facilitate secondary steel production in Sydney, required a scale of 
fixed investment that dissuaded extra-regional owners from contributing to existing 
facilities or developing other areas of secondary manufacturing. The provincial 
government assuaged concerns immediately, through the nationalization of the mill, but 
modernization and technological upgrades would remain contested under provincial 
ownership. At this point, the operation of the plant became a provincial political issue.  
Throughout the postwar period, private owners continued to view investment at 
Sydney or Trenton as less profitable than expenditures at Montreal, Etobicoke, or 
Contrecoeur. Far from the traditional boom-and-bust of the resource frontier, the 
economic history of Dosco reveals the mechanisms through which regional industry was 
intentionally exploited and abandoned as profits were re-invested elsewhere. When 
modernization funds were provided, these were simply intended to facilitate the basic 
maintenance of production. Substantive upgrades, such as the changeover to Basic 
Oxygen Furnaces, were never provided - although open hearth systems were already 
becoming out-dated by the 1950s. When A.V. Roe gained control of the Sydney Works, 
decision-making was further removed – from Montreal to London. Once the Arrow 
program collapsed in 1959, Dosco became a target of corporate re-structuring and 
liquidation.   
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The long exodus of private capital from the Maritimes steel industry has more in 
common with steel crisis in the industrial heartland of the U.S. than it does with central 
Canadian producers. High effectively contrasts obsolescence in American and Canadian 
steel industries; American firms failed to reinvest after lacklustre expenditures in the 
1950s, while Canadian producers benefitted from tax incentives to upgrade facilities and 
remain competitive. As a result, U.S. companies like Youngstown Tube and Steel and 
Bethlehem Steel decided to expand upon mills located in the Midwest – to the detriment 
of “out-dated” operations in places like Lackawanna and Youngstown.115 Had the 
provincial government not interjected in 1967, the closure of the Sydney Works would 
have occurred in response to the same set of disinvestment decisions that resulted in the 
collapse of American heartland firms in the following decades. 
Uniquely Canadian, however, is the reasoning behind the abandonment of 
regional steelmaking by the ownership class; while American firms pressed westward 
after growing markets, Dosco was constrained by its geography and the centralization of 
its direct competitors. Decisions made by corporate executives in Montreal or London did 
not take into account the wellbeing of the still-profitable communities from which they 
extracted surplus capital, and the staples trap meant that re-investment would always 
favour locations closer to central markets. Diversification, argue Hayter and Barnes, 
represents “the only permanent solution” to this trap – a revelation clearly understood by 
Sydney’s steelworkers since the 1940s.116 This was not a strategy employed by the 
absentee owners of the Sydney Works; rather, constructed crises and the spectre of labour 
conflict were marshalled to excuse the economic violence of regional divestment.  
  
                                                
115 Steven High, Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 121.  
 




Radical Reds and Responsible Unionism: 
The Postwar Compromise and an Industrial Structure of Feeling, 1944-1966 
 
 
The most difficult thing to get hold of, in studying any past period, is this felt 
sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time: a sense of the ways in 
which the particular activities combined into a way of thinking and living. 
 
- Raymond Williams, 19611 
 
Dosco’s long downgrading of its Maritime operations reflects a particular aspect of 
maturing Canadian capitalism, but workers’ accounts of the postwar period reveal a very 
different understanding of life in Sydney. Rather than viewing the years between 1945 
and 1967 as an unmitigated slide towards closure, marked by underinvestment and 
decline, former employees recall the better wages and working conditions that were made 
possible through trade unionism, an emerging consumer culture, the urban expansion of 
the city, and the development of local businesses. While the historical and sociological 
representation of these positive recollections have sometimes been castigated as 
“smokestack nostalgia,” Steven High and David Lewis write that “there is also a danger 
in middle class academic audiences assuming that the warm memories of working people 
are nothing but nostalgia. This, too, serves to depoliticize.”2  
Steelworkers in Sydney did not ignore corporate divestment; Chapter One reveals 
the extent to which representatives from Local 1064 and the international steelworkers’ 
union challenged this management strategy as early as the 1940s. In the realm of memory, 
however, the postwar years are characterized by a sense of progressive modernism and 
class achievement. It is for this reason that Black Friday is recalled as a moment of such 
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profound disruption. Despite the declining fortunes of Dosco and the removal of 
equipment from the Sydney Works, employees and community members perceived a 
strengthening of local institutions and class identities – a maturity of what David Byrne 
has termed an “industrial structure of feeling – the sentiments which inform and construct 
‘ways of life’, ways of doing things, sense not just of personal but of collective identity, 
[and] understanding of possibilities.”3 Workers’ livelihoods were threatened on Black 
Friday, and an entire set of social understandings and working-class cultures were at 
stake.  
Raymond Williams first articulated the “structure of feeling” in his A Preface to 
Film (1954); he describes art and literature as the primary modes through which “the 
effect of the totality, the dominant structure of feeling, [are] expressed and embodied.”4 
The theory is expanded in The Long Revolution (1961): 
It is as firm and definite as structure suggests, yet it operates in the most delicate 
and least tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this structure of feeling is the 
culture of a period: it is the particular living result of all the elements in the 
general organization. […] I do not mean that the structure of feeling, any more 
than the social character, is possessed in the same way by the many individuals in 
the community. But I think that it is a very deep and very wide procession, in all 
actual communities, precisely because it is on it that communication depends.5  
 
This is not simply the reduction of the social to fixed forms, or to a Hegelian spirit of the 
times; Williams explains in Marxism and Literature (1977), “the mistake, as it so often is, 
is in taking terms of analysis as terms of substance. Thus we speak of a world-view or of 
a prevailing ideology or of a class outlook.”6 While working-class culture in the West has 
been constrained and shaped by the economic and social relationships germane to global 
capitalism, Williams argues that we must pay close attention to the negotiations and 
contestations that occur within “residual” and “emergent” cultural expressions. These, he 
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writes, “are significant both in themselves and in what they reveal about the 
characteristics of the ‘dominant’.7 
David Frank draws upon Williams’ cultural analysis to explore the emergence of 
an industrial working-class culture in Cape Breton during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.8 “In the coal and steel towns,” he writes, “older expressions of the folk 
tradition survived, often incorporating new themes. At the same time, common 
experiences in the industrial environment promoted the creation of a vigorous local 
tradition of industrial folk song.”9 During the Cape Breton labour wars of the 1920s, 
working-class poets and songwriters such as Dawn Fraser and Dannie Boutilier 
contributed to a form of local identity based upon shared experiences of work and class 
struggle. These radical worker-poets existed at the crux of a cultural crisis. David Frank 
and Donald MacGillivray argue: 
[These individuals], Fraser included, became "reds", attended "red" events and 
supported "red" leaders, but it would be misleading to claim that the majority of 
[workers] became committed communists. The "red" phase was too brief and 
transitory to develop an entirely new radical culture. Nevertheless, the crisis of the 
1920s did strengthen and maintain the [workers] "rebel" outlook and their 
populist critique of industrial capitalism. These remained the basic elements of 
working class culture in industrial Cape Breton for more than a generation.10 
 
Work-poetry in Cape Breton soon reflected these changes. John “Slim” McInnis, 
an employee at the Sydney Works, wrote several poems between 1940 and 1988. His 
earliest, “From Breadlines to Battlefields” in 1940, questioned the war effort and called 
for class-based solidarity:  
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 What right, we ask, have this useless class 
 To demand we engage a foe 
 They helped maintain with the selfish aim 
 Of saving the ‘status quo’? 
 
 Why should we band in a far off land 
 And wealth for another wrest, 
If here at home we have only known 
The fate of the dispossessed?11 
 
McInnis’ work retained this rebel outlook, although his poetry soon began to express the 
hope that industrial unionism could achieve better circumstances for workers without 
necessitating revolution. From his 1946 poem, “The Steel Strike:” 
But at last there came an end to the pain 
And my heart no more could feel, 
Then the talks were stalled and the union called 
For a national strike in steel.  
 
So we’re struck at last and all we ask 
Is a forty hour week 
So our brave young sons who fought the Huns 
Can find the work they seek 
 
And a slight increase will give release  
From the worry we have long known 
And a chance to pay for the right to stay 
In the hovel we call our home.12 
 
By the 1950s, local cultural productions lacked the bitterness and explicit calls for 
class war that were visible in their predecessors. Through the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the “Dishpan Parade” program on CJCB radio asked local composers to contribute songs 
and poems. Nell Campbell of Glace Bay, whose husband Joseph worked in the Dosco 
collieries, wrote “Plain Ol’ Miner Boy’ to describe working-class life:  
 I’m a plain ol’ miner boy, a tough hard-workin’ miner boy,  
 I have a few on Saturday night and I sleep all day on Sunday 
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 I lead a very simple life, but I love my kids and I love my wife 
 I’ll be goin’ down that ol mine shaft when the whistle blows on Monday.13 
 
Campbell’s song expresses a different sort of experience than does the earlier poetry of 
Fraser and McInnis. In her verses, the life of a Cape Breton working-class family remains 
difficult – but it is a far cry from the poverty, starvation, and state-sanctioned violence of 
the interwar years. Eric Hobsbawm remarks, “In the course of the 1950s many people, 
especially in the increasingly prosperous ‘developed’ countries, became aware that times 
were indeed strikingly improved, especially if their memories reached back to the years 
before the Second World War.”14 For steelworkers in Sydney, this sentiment cannot be 
divorced from the achievement of union recognition in 1937 and the material gains of 
Canadian steelworkers in the years following the Second World War.  
In this chapter, a discussion of political trends within the steelworkers’ union and 
the achievements of Local 1064 reveal the emergence of a mainstream industrial structure 
of feeling that found purchase during the 1950s. This begins with the turn away from 
what David Frank has termed the “red phase” of Cape Breton workers’ culture, when 
radical ideals flourished in a landscape of crisis and class conflict. Following the 1946 
national steel strike, and keeping with trends throughout Canada and the United States, 
Local 1064 turned towards the promise of “responsible unionism” – a compromise that 
initially produced significant benefits. The dominance of this structure of feeling offered 
steelworkers visibility; this is reflected in oral history recollections and cultural 
productions that highlight the plant and its workers as a fundamental aspect of the city’s 
class identity.  
The final section examines steelworkers’ responses to the increasing pace of 
planned obsolescence in the early 1960s. As Hawker Siddeley’s disinvestment from the 
Sydney Works became clear, some employees at the plant began to recognize 
shortcomings in the ability of responsible unionism to confront crises. In the early 1960s, 
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workers responded to a structure of feeling under threat through a return to more militant 
forms of unionism – including wildcat strikes and the election of oppositionists to the 
1064 executive. In contrast to other areas of Canada during the 1960s, the workers at the 
heart of this effort in Sydney were not “rebel youth;” rather, they were experienced 
steelworkers who perceived deindustrialization as a challenge to their hard-won place 
within their workplace and community.   
This argument broadly emerges from the theoretical foundations of historical 
materialism, but not as the concept has narrowly been considered within classical or 
orthodox Marxism. Rather, drawing again upon Williams, this discussion does not begin 
with the assumption that economic pressures and the resulting class struggle determined 
the contours of an industrial structure of feeling in Sydney, but that: 
‘The base’ to which it is habitual to refer variations, is itself a dynamic and 
internally contradictory process – the specific activities and modes of activity, 
over a range from association to antagonism, of real men and classes of men – 
that we can begin to free ourselves from the notion of an ‘area’ or ‘category’ with 
certain fixed properties for deduction to the variable processes of a 
superstructure.”15 
 
Through an understanding of these contradictions, we come to recognize the production 
of cognitive dissonance through, on one hand, Dosco’s disinvestment in the Sydney mill 
and, on the other, the perceived economic security established through the actions of 
Local 1064 and the participation of steelworkers and labour leaders in the public sphere. 
It was the continued relevance of this structure of feeling that produced such a strong 
community backlash on Black Friday; the notion that it could be displaced through a 
simple corporate announcement seemed unimaginable.   
 
Turning Right: The Decline of Union Militancy, 1946-1949 
 
Gordie Gosse, a third-generation steelworker in Sydney, remembers growing up in 
Whitney Pier and hearing about work at the plant from his father and grandfather. Gosse 
was hired by Sysco in 1974, and worked in the mill until he was laid-off in 1992. 
Following his time at Sysco, Gosse acted as the director of the Whitney Pier Boys and 
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Girls Club; he also served as the MLA for Sydney and Whitney Pier between 2003 and 
2015. He recalls: 
I remember my grandfather talking about Bloody Sunday […] when they came to 
Whitney Pier with troops . . . and beat them up and ran them over and everything 
[…] They had brought in the army, my grandfather said, and the provincial police 
at that time. And they were on horses. And people were coming home from 
church […] And the army and provincial police beat them up and everything […] 
And they had Gatling guns at the General Office, set up on the roof! […] Oh 
[things] were a lot better [by the 1950s]. My father said, and my grandfather . . . 
They could retire then, with a small pension, and get on with their lives – you 
know?16 
 
The event to which Gosse refers occurred in the summer of 1923 during a strike at the 
Sydney Works. On June 28, workers walked out of the mill and set up pickets preventing 
strikebreakers from entering the plant. Soldiers arrived from Halifax two days later, and 
provincial police reached Sydney on July 1. That evening, David Frank writes: 
A squad of sixteen mounted provincial police charged through the pickets at the 
plant gates […] The police charged on […] and headed up Victoria Road into 
Whitney Pier. They attacked all pedestrians who came in their way. Men, women, 
and children were chased off the streets, many of them escaping into yards and 
homes.17 
 
Although the steelworkers were unable to achieve union recognition in 1923, the state 
violence enacted upon them has remained a lasting part of their collective memory. With 
memories of direct conflict remaining with later generations of steelworkers, it is 
unremarkable that some recalled the postwar period with a sense of nostalgia – 
particularly when contrasted with the violence of earlier struggles. These changes 
mirrored shifts in industrial relations occurring nationally and internationally.  
In Canada, labour relations were increasingly bureaucratic and institutional during 
the 1940s. Between 1941 and 1943, more than 425,000 workers were involved in strikes 
related to wages, working conditions, or shop-floor issues. This includes a national steel 
strike of more than 13,000 steelworkers in 1943, wherein Steel Workers Organizing 
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Committee (SWOC) unionists sought to equalize wage rates across the entire industry.18 
Meanwhile, the CCF was increasing in popularity among moderate organized workers – 
particularly those within the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). In addition to these 
economic and political pressures, members of the National Wartime Labour Board 
pressured the federal government to develop a collective bargaining policy.19 In response, 
the King administration passed order-in-council PC 1003 on March 20, 1944. This 
legislation compelled employers within federal and war-related industries to bargain with 
unions, participate in conciliation, and engage in grievance arbitration.20 
PC 1003 emerged from an historical context broadly shaped by the passage of the 
1935 National Labour Relations Act in the United States. This offered American workers 
a set of procedures to achieve state recognition of trade unionism. This legislation, also 
known as the Wagner Act, prompted an expansion within the American labour movement 
– but so, too, did it prescribe a set of industrial and workplace relations that did not 
challenge managerial and capital control on the shop floor. PC 1003 was, in many ways, 
more illiberal than its American predecessor; according to Bob Russell, “the Canadian 
legislation contained […] special provisions intended specifically to preserve the unique 
status of craft organizations in national industrial relations […] [and] added a 
corresponding category of employee transgressions to the list of employer unfair 
practices.”21  
The contours of this “capital-labour compromise” remain contested; Marxist and 
feminist scholars have challenged the notion that PC 1003 represented a major victory for 
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Canadian labour on the grounds that it simply reified traditional systems of power.22 Peter 
McInnis argues that “historians have either assessed this moment as one of intense 
conflict that secured a measure of legitimacy for organized labour or, alternatively, as a 
time when workers and their leadership entered into a Faustian bargain that limited 
unions’ effectiveness in succeeding generations.”23 Nonetheless, by the war’s end 
Canadian steelworkers were poised for a confrontation that would result in higher wages, 
a shorter workday, and the spread of unionization throughout nearly the entire industry.  
The steelworkers’ union in Sydney achieved recognition earlier than had occurred 
at the other Canadian firms. The Independent Steelworkers’ Union of Nova Scotia met as 
early as 1935 and gained a SWOC charter as Lodge 1064 the following year under the 
CIO. Nova Scotia Premier Angus L. MacDonald signed the Nova Scotia Trade Union 
Act in 1937, which forced Dosco to recognize the new union; this was done in the hopes 
of avoiding a plant-wide recognition strike.24 The timing of these decisions matched with 
developments on the American side of the border; on March 3, the New York Times 
reported that CIO President John L. Lewis and Myron C. Taylor, the Chairman of the 
Board for U.S. Steel, had reached an agreement for SWOC recognition from the 
country’s largest steel producer.25 In 1942, SWOC Lodge 1064 officially became Local 
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1064 of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). Despite these early victories, as 
Craig Heron and Robert Storey remind us, “Canadian steel companies fought back, and 
the struggle for collective representation became bitter and pronounced.”26  
The Canadian “Wagner model” was strengthened in January 1946 with the 
implementation of the Rand Formula. Following a bitter, ninety-nine day strike at the 
Ford plant in Windsor, Ontario, Supreme Court Justice Ivan Rand awarded the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) the right to automatic deduction of union dues. In addition, 
however, his decision would weaken the relationship between union leadership and their 
members. Union executives were forced to repudiate the direct-action tactics that had 
characterized much of the labour battles of the 1920s and 1930s in favour of a more 
bureaucratized, legalistic model.27 Despite this changing landscape of labour relations, 
Canadian workers turned to their traditional method of achieving gains from recalcitrant 
employers: strike action. Between May 11, 1946 and November 18, 1947, more than 
180,000 workers engaged in strikes across the country. This includes the 1946 Canadian 
steel strike, which involved workers from Stelco, Algoma, and Dosco.  
This strike wave has attracted scholarly interest, much of which focuses on the 
charged conflict at Stelco. The industry leader was positioned as a bellwether for the 
Canadian steel industry and management had long attempted to avoid unionization 
through the creation of a workers’ council. Stelco was forced to recognize USWA Local 
1005 and a contract was agreed upon in February 1945. Despite this, workers and 
management both foresaw conflict once the federal government ended its direct control 
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of industrial relations.28 Hamilton was also an epicentre for workers resistance in other 
sectors; employees at Westinghouse, the Spectator, and the National Knitting Mills all 
engaged in strike action before the year’s end.29 Dofasco steelworkers were 
conspicuously absent from this agitation; that company was successful at stamping out 
unionism through a campaign of corporate welfare and targeted intimidation during the 
1920s and 1930s.30 
Union organizers at Stelco, Algoma, and Dosco each formulated their demands 
based upon the fundamental tenets of fairness and security. This did not extend to 
challenging the right of employers to control production; rather, as Heron and Storey 
describe, steelworkers sought internal systems of bureaucracy that would regulate hiring 
and provide economic security from the arbitrary exertion of power by shop floor 
foremen or supervisors.31 Despite the common goals of industrial unionism, better wage 
rates and working conditions, and the 40-hour week, steelworkers at Dosco were more 
hesitant than those at Stelco or Algoma to conclude their strike in favour of the proposed 
contract. The offer left the matter of a 5¢ wage differential in Sydney undecided and did 
not offer steelworkers the 40-hour week.32 Although members of Local 1064 voted five 
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to one in favour of the contract, this was a far narrower margin than at the central 
Canadian firms, implying stronger support for militancy within Sydney’s rank-and-file.33 
The response of Local 1064 to the new contract was fractured; there were a 
significant number of workers who voiced displeasure over the compromise offered by 
National Director Charles Millard. Not all of this opposition was rooted in the radical 
left; Ron Crawley writes, “The criticisms of the settlement were voiced mainly and most 
strongly by non-communist oppositionists.”34 Canadian communist leader Tim Buck, 
who visited Sydney in the aftermath of the strike, congratulated steelworkers on their 
gains – undercutting the position of some left-oppositionists within the local. Buck 
reflects, “I argued it was a tremendous achievement because recognition of the legal 
necessity for collective bargaining, placing it on the level of the law […] was, perhaps, 
one of the most revolutionary advances that the trade union movement had made.”35 
Among management, Dosco president Arthur Cross was also unhappy with this 
outcome. Refusing to re-open the Sydney Works, the company sought assurance from the 
federal government that any redress of the Sydney differential would be provided through 
subsidy – not from the company’s profits. Some 1064 members viewed this as further 
grandstanding not dissimilar from Dosco’s earlier claims of financial exigency; a poem 
published in the Sydney independent labour weekly, Steelworker and Miner, by the 
pseudonymous “Roddie Rodd” reveals: 
 No brother, Dosco carries on 
 Entirely for Cape Breton’s good 
 It daily loses cash upon 
 It’s job of giving you your food 
Or so it says.36 
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The National War Labour Board found that “the weight of evidence supports the Union’s 
contention that a gross inequality existed in the wage rates of the production workers at 
Sydney,” and revealed a prorated wage scale ranging from full 5¢ per hour increase for 
those employees earning less than 61¢ per hour, to a 1/2¢ increase for employees 
between 80-89.5¢ per hour.37 Donald Gordon, chairman of the Wartime Prices and Trade 
Board, announced on October 8 that the federal government would provide a subsidy for 
Dosco to offset these increases.38 Soon after, Dosco agreed to restart steel production.   
Moderate institutional unionism was entrenched within the national and 
international leadership of the USWA by the end of the 1940s. By 1950, Heron writes, 
“the most important skills for effective union leadership were [no longer] the ability to 
inspire […] from the back of a pickup truck or to maintain picket lines […] but rather to 
engage in closed-door, across-the-table dialogue with management representatives.”39 
This shift was cemented through Cold War political conflict within the labour movement; 
the same impulse that resulted in the 1949 expulsion of left-led unions from the CIO also 
allowed conservative leaders within the USWA to gain a strategic foothold.40 According 
to John Hinshaw, “before the infamous 1948 USWA convention, at which communists 
were banned from holding office, most left-wingers had already been driven from 
office.”41 
Despite these changes, radical voices remained; several letters to the local labour 
newspaper excoriated Millard and 1064 president Ed Corbett for their failure to achieve 
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the 40-hour-work week following the national strike.42 By 1948, with communists 
officially excluded from the executive, an editorial in Steelworker and Miner reflected:  
The workers, now being securely shackled, the big talks starts all over again.  Our 
information is that National Director C.H. Millard is calling on the locals to take 
part in a nation-wide campaign for a forty-hour week. And so the cycle starts 
again – militant statements to the press, militant demands, tub thumping at its 
phoniest between negotiations, and then, in the crisis, the let-down.43 
 
Left-opposition within Local 1064 suffered their major defeat in 1949, when a 
strike by the Communist-led Canadian Seamen’s Union (CSU) brought radical and 
conservative trade unionists into direct conflict.44 Harry David, President of the CSU, 
announced the strike on March 31, 1949; steelworkers in Sydney initially supported this 
action, as did Corbett and the union executive. Members were ready to support CSU 
pickets at the Dosco piers and ignore orders to unload cargo brought in by non-union 
crews.45 Then, rather suddenly, the executive reversed its decision and announced that 
Local 1064 would not honour CSU pickets. In his autobiography, former 1064 president 
and labour activist George MacEachern writes:  
When Eddie Corbett […] was called to Ottawa, he was supporting the seamen’s 
strike. When he came back from Ottawa, he was in a terrible nervous state. They 
had to get a doctor for him. They had to put a policeman out on the lawn. I don’t 
know what they did to him in Ottawa, but he was terrified when he came home. 
He wasn’t bribed, because he wasn’t any better off when he came back than he 
was going. But whatever pressures they put on him, whatever they told him […] I 
never asked him.46 
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In 1990, former steelworker Walter Pickles recalled the situation during an interview 
with Michael Earle:  
Michael: Well, there were some pretty controversial things that went on when 
[Corbett] was president. That business with the Canadian Seamen’s Union and so 
on . . .? 
 
Walter: Oh yes, a lot of those things, yeah. And he told us a lot of stories about 
being in Montreal and places like that and being followed, shadowed, and 
knowing that their phone was tapped and . . . government keeping track of things 
going on too, you know? […] Oh yeah, he went on at great lengths to tell us 
different stories about that.  
 
 Michael: But who’d be doing that though? 
 
Walter: Oh, God. Who knows the intrigue that goes on between unions and rival 
political factions, and governments, you know.47 
 
Although other workers expressed disbelief that Corbett could have been intimidated, this 
common explanatory narrative presents the executive’s abandonment of radical politics 
as the result of unnamed “off-island” actors and agitators – including within the national 
USWA.48 
 
Achieving Visibility: A Working-Class Structure of Feeling in the 1950s 
 
The decisive turn towards so-called “responsible unionism” occurred alongside what Ira 
Katznelson describes as “the long moment when liberalism thickened and became both 
more legitimate (swallowing some of its former conservative and socialist competitors) 
and more vulnerable.”49 While Cold War political tensions played a role in this process, 
                                                
47 Walter Pickles, interview by Michael Earle, May 15, 1990, Steel Project, MG 14, 206, 
Box 6, File 65, transcript, BI.  
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including anti-democratic red-baiting within the USWA, material gains achieved through 
contract negotiations helped to shore-up support among the local rank-and-file. 
Between November 15, 1941 and October 15, 1946, the basic wage rate at the 
Sydney Works increased from 43.5¢ to 59.5¢ per hour – outpacing increases in cost of 
living during the same period.50 Members benefitted from another 6 percent wage 
increase following the 1946 strike and an additional 11.5¢ in 1948, which was based on 
the patterns set by Local 1005 at Stelco.51 Although the 40-hour week was not achieved 
in 1949, members of Local 1064 voted to approve a contract that offered a 10¢ increase 
and the 44-hour week; this was in spite of popular criticisms of the “penalty clauses,” 
which punished strike action during the terms of the contract.52 With these gains, the 
years immediately following the Second World War are recalled fondly. As Wally 
MacKinnon told Michael Earle in 1990:  
That was really the crunch in 1946 […] From then on, the union played a major 
part in the industry and in the community. Local 1064 played a magnificent role, 
in my opinion. It produced great leaders. And it’s a sad commentary on the fact 
that many men who led the union are forgotten. They’re still my heroes. They’re 
still men who made a major contribution to the welfare not only of steelworkers, 
but of steelworkers’ families, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. You know 
vacations with pay, the right to have free time, to have some sort of quality of life, 
came out of Local 1064 […] It was a bright, bright period in the history of this 
region.53 
 
During the 1950s, USWA negotiators continued to seek wage concessions from 
employers across Canada. In 1950, Local 1005 reached a deal whereby steelworkers were 
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offered the 40-hour week and a wage increase.54 Dosco refused to abide by this pattern; 
rather, the terms of the 1064 contract provided a smaller wage increase and a scaled 
transition to the 40-hour week over a period of two years.55 Sydney steelworkers were 
once again unable to achieve parity in 1952, when those in Hamilton had negotiated for a 
$1.43 ½ base labour rate per hour and the introduction of the co-operative wage survey 
(CWS) to help regulate job rates throughout the industry.56 1064 achieved short-lived 
parity in 1954, when Dosco agreed to the implementation of the CWS system, but broke 
from the pattern again in 1956 when held to only an 8¢ increase over a two-year period.57 
Although Local 1064 continued to bargain for higher wages, Sydney steelworkers 
remained approximately 6¢ behind their colleagues in Ontario for the remainder of the 
decade.  
For historian Ron Crawley, the gains made by Local 1064 during the late 1940s 
and 1950s pale in comparison to the achievements that may have been possible had the 
membership decided to take a more radical approach. Noting the declining share of 
productivity achieved by workers during the decade, he writes, “Overall, the moderate 
and accommodationist approach by the leadership produced modest results in improving 
the material benefits to workers when one considers the possibilities that presented 
themselves to the union.”58 Nonetheless, the accommodationist approach did provide 
tangible benefits for employees at the Sydney Works, and the repeated re-election of 
moderate leaders within the union reflects support among a majority of the rank-and-file.  
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Figure 2.1: Local 1064 contract negotiations, 1950 
Front: M.E. Corbett, Walter Coadic, Alphonso Murray, Clarence Mac Innis, Charles 
Millard, E.P. Pledge, James Nicholson.  Back: Eamon Park, Martin Merner, Bob 
McNaughton, Ben O'Neil, Dan Mac Kay, unidentified, Cleve Kidd, Ted Joliffe. 
Source: Photographer unknown, Reference 76-78,  
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
This is highlighted further through oral history testimony of former workers, who recall 
the 1950s as a “boom” period for the city and its inhabitants.  
As with any oral history accounts, workers’ recollections of the 1950s in Sydney 
must be contextualized within the life histories of each speaker and the circumstances 
surrounding each story’s transmission. Among the informants interviewed between 2013 
and 2015, Bernie Britten, Mickey Campbell, John Campbell, and Fabian Smith each 
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worked at the plant prior to 1960.59 While the specificities of wage gains during the 
decade are not explicitly discussed, all four men reflect upon the interconnections 
between work in the steel mill, familial relationships, and the fabric of the community. 
John, who began on the plant as a summer student in 1950, describes:  
I grew up in a steelmaking family with dad and uncles and, you know, steel was a 
topic of conversation when anybody dropped in […] The steel plant was a 
dominant part of the fabric of the community in 1950. A lot of people worked 
there and a lot of people depended on it.60 
 
Bernie started working in the chemical lab at the Dosco mill in 1951 at the age of 18. He 
says: 
That was 1951. The people were coming back from the war were now well-
established. And finished university, that kind of thing. So things were booming 
[…] In the Dosco days, I was quite far removed from the seats of power but Mr. 
Anson was the general manager at a time. He was a very powerful individual and 
he didn’t take too much baloney from people in Montreal as far as we could tell. 
And he ran a good ship. Always made money, as far as we know. Which of 
course changed after Hawker Siddeley took over and that . . . wasn’t the best of 
times, with them.61 
 
Mickey also speaks of a boom in the post-war years, and recalls - correctly -  that it was 
in 1952 that the mill employed the most workers of any time in its operational history.62 
All agree that Sydney in the 1950s was a quintessential steel town – a “going concern.” 
These memories, relayed more than 60 years after-the-fact, and 13 years after the 
final closure of the mill, reveal an “in-between moment” that stretches from the end of 
the Second World War to the uncertainty of the 1960s. Within this period, the 
achievements of unionism were being felt without the violence of the earlier labour wars, 
while the worst anxieties of deindustrialization were yet to manifest. In terms of 
organizational nostalgia, these retirees recognize an epoch when Sydney steelworkers 
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60 John Campbell, interview with author, September 6, 2014. 
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62 Mickey Campbell, interview with author, September 1, 2014.  
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fundamentally belonged to the time and place.63 Jackie Clarke writes that 
deindustrialization renders industrial workers invisible through “various forms of 
marginalization, occlusion, and disqualification from the mainstream political and media 
discourses which play an important role in shaping public understanding of the social 
world.”64 Contrarily, it was in the postwar decade that a working-class structure of 
feeling – albeit one de-radicalized from its pre-war iterations – was most visible and 
strongly felt.  
Cultural representations of working class life in Sydney during the 1950s also 
reflect these transitions. While Ian McKay argues that bourgeois representations of Cape 
Breton Island were increasingly informed by anti-modern romanticism, local songs and 
poems relating to working-class experience in Sydney expressed an optimistic sense of 
modernity not found within the protest songs of earlier decades.65 It should be noted, 
however, that the community of working-class cultural producers also expanded beyond 
the factory floor. The early poetry of Dawn Fraser and John “Slim” McInnis was revealed 
in the pages of local labour newspapers or through word of mouth, while the availability 
of mass media in later decades provided avenues for other popular representations of life 
in the steel city.66 
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While Nell Campbell’s “Plain Ol’ Miner Boy” described life in Cape Breton’s 
coal towns, several other entries detail life in and around the Sydney Works. Aileen 
Stephen penned “Dumping the Slag” for CJCB – a song that has since entered into 
popular memory in Sydney. The verses detail a newcomer to the city becoming 
acclimatized to the night-time noises of steel production:  
The first night in Sydney heard an awful bang, 
 The windows rattled and the rafters rang! 
 Jumped three feet and was half out of bed, 
 Papa grabbed me by the ankle and calmly said: 
 
 They’re dumping the slag over at the steel plant, 
 Dumping the slag in the middle of the night, 
 They’re dumping the slag over at the steel plant,  
 Come back to bed, Momma, everything’s alright!67 
 
Industrial sounds, at first alien to the narrator, slowly become symbols of normalcy and 
comfort. In the final verse, the narrator returns to her “country town” and finds herself 
unable to sleep without the noise of the plant. The notion that industrial noise was central 
to the sensory-scape of Sydney is also something that arises in accounts of the post-
industrial city. Sydney Slaven, who was raised in the city and also worked at the plant, 
writes: 
When I was a boy I would lay in bed on open window summer nights listening to 
the symphony of night music that pervaded our community […] A loud clang 
signified the dropping of a sling of rails at the rail-finishing mill. On a clear night 
the softer sound of rails being loaded into a ship’s hole could be heard from the 
distant International Piers. The zing of the hot saw cutting a glowing rail at the 
rail mill had a unique sound of its own […] Now, outside of the siren of an 
emergency response vehicle, the nights of Sydney are, please excuse the metaphor, 
as silent as a cemetery.68 
 
Another unattributed entry describes how fair wages at the Sydney Works impacts the 
entire city: 
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68 Sydney Steel Museum website, “Sounds of Silence – The End of an Era,” entry by Syd 
S. Slaven, http://www.sydneysteelmuseum.com/history/end_era.htm. 
 
 88 
 What is it keeps the steelman on his mettle night and day,  
 It’s the income . .  
 What is it pays his pension when he’s getting old and gray,  
 It’s the income . .  
 What’s it keeps the living standard of Cape Breton up to par 
 And buys the rum that buys the vote that puts in Gallagher 
 It’s the income.69 
 
“Spring in Sydney,” contrasts the natural change of seasons with the ever-present sooty 
air in the neighbourhoods surrounding the plant:  
 Went for a walk around the town,  
 Wore a grey hat and now it’s brown 
 The soot and smoke sure get me down, 
It’s Spring in Sydney darlin’70 
 
These cultural artefacts reflect the culmination of a more mainstream working-
class structure of feeling than was visible in earlier radical expressions. The steel plant 
and its employees, in each of these entries, are central to the sense of place within the city. 
This structure of feeling is not entirely divorced from the “red-phase” articulated by 
David Frank, but it is informed by the political circumstances of the postwar compromise 
and the achievements of Local 1064. These descriptions reflect an entirely different set of 
meanings than were present in earlier decades; they could not be more distinct from the 
vision of the city articulated by H.M. Bartholomew in 1923:  
Steel is the backbone of Sydney. The long rows of ugly chimneys belching forth 
torrents of smoke and fire bear witness to the fact (of which the papers are so 
proud) that Sydney is a town of steel […] Under this small forest of chimneys toil 
the slaves of steel – chained, by grim necessity, to the chariot of a brutal, 
relentless corporation.71 
 
Williams’ metaphor of language is useful for understanding the fuzzy processes by which 
these structures of feeling are transformed. He writes, “No generation speaks quite the 
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same language as its predecessor […] It is a general change, rather than a set of deliberate 
choices, yet choices can be deduced from it, as well as effects.”72  
By the time of the A.V. Roe takeover in 1957, the declining power of left-
opposition within the USWA had resulted in the entrenchment of moderate and 
conservative leadership. In Sydney, this transition found purchase among the rank-and-
file as a result of both Cold War anti-communism and the material achievements of the 
postwar period. The leadership of 1064 had become an important part of the community; 
Ed Corbett, for example, held positions on the Canso causeway committee and the 
hospital commission – and was even invited to sit on the conservative Board of Trade, 
although this offer was declined.73 For a brief moment, expressed through the 
recollections of former employees and contemporary cultural creations, Sydney 
steelworkers were able to reflect upon their achievements and look forward to a 
promising future. This sense of belonging would be challenged as deindustrialization 
became more visible in the early 1960s.  
 
A Return to Militancy? Responding to Deindustrialization, 1957-1967 
 
Corporate divestment from the Sydney Works became more noticeable on the shop floor 
in the years after 1957. The decision to locate new facilities at Contrecoeur, Quebec 
rather than in Sydney and a desire to depress labour costs by increasing the “efficiency” 
of a smaller workforce caused some workers to re-evaluate the accommodationist 
impulse.74 This reflects the illusory nature of working-class achievement under industrial 
capitalism; as O. Nigel Bolland writes, “To obtain unionization within a factory […] may 
be a strategic victory for the workers, but in the society as a whole trade unionism 
remains a tactic of the weak in so far as it continues to acknowledge the subordination of 
the workers under capitalism.”75  
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While periodic layoffs and the threat of disinvestment challenged the economic 
foundation of the city’s largest employer, shop floor changes began to contest some 
aspects of work-control. In 1961, Dosco greatly contributed to rank-and-file 
dissatisfaction by hiring a team of Taylorist “efficiency experts.” The Alexander 
Proudfoot Company, un-affectionately nicknamed “the cutworms” by steelworkers, was 
contracted to conduct an on-site efficiency review of all operations at the Sydney 
Works.76 Otis Cossit, a linesman at the plant, recalls:  
They were just a bunch of hoodlums from up around Chicago, I believe, is where 
that outfit came from.  They all came dressed like Dick Tracy.  They all looked 
alike. They reminded you of some of these religious sects that you see going 
around like a flock of herring.77 
 
Another steelworker, Walter Clarke, describes the activities of the efficiency experts: 
Everybody was up in arms about it because . . . you had to write down what you 
done on this job and how long it took you to do this and how long it took you to 
do that […] All the while they were there, they had trouble […] One less man, 
that was the name of their game – to cut down on manpower and get more 
production […] Sometimes he used to have a stopwatch there – how long did it 
take you to do this? And you’d have to write it down.78 
 
Popular discontent with these measures resulted in increasing support for direct action 
and militant tactics during the early 1960s. The “cutworms,” combined with growing 
uncertainty surrounding the Hawker Siddeley deal, prompted steelworkers to walk off the 
job at least 46 times between 1961 and 1964.79 The largest of these occurred between the 
fall and winter of 1961-62, when the efficiency teams arrived on-site.80 On October 10, 
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1961, nearly 500 employees walked out in a protest over proposed scheduling changes; 
workers interviewed by the Cape Breton Post also expressed dissatisfaction over 
managerial strategy.81 Larger walkouts occurred in January and March, when wildcat 
strikes by workers in the rod and bar mills prompted employees in other departments to 
join in sympathy.82 Local union officials and members of the USWA International 
Executive Board condemned these expressions of class militancy.83 
The walkouts at the Sydney Works correspond with a period of growing 
radicalism within the Canadian labour movement. This culminated in the “wildcat wave” 
of 1965-1966, when between 359 and 575 wildcat strikes took place across the country.84 
Bryan Palmer describes an emerging “demography of dissent,” with males under the age 
of 25 occupying a larger percentage of the labour market and facing more precarious 
employment than their older colleagues.85 Ian Milligan offers further evidence for the 
importance of youth and masculinity to this emerging radicalism through his analysis of 
strikes by USWA 6500 (Sudbury) and USWA 1005 (Hamilton) in August 1966. He 
writes, “At both, young men were the sparks that ignited large conflagrations, 
confounding union leaders, government agents, and managers alike.”86  
Youth at the Sydney mill had less of an impact on this renewed labour militancy. 
During the 1966 Stelco walkout, Palmer relates, an older union member blamed “young 
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men who worked at the plant for only 6 to 9 months” for the strike action.87 This was not 
the same demographic that prompted the 1962 walkout wave at the Sydney Works. Of 
the approximately 255 workers in the Sydney rod and bar mill in 1962, where the two 
largest walkouts began, the employees with the least seniority had already been working 
at the plant for more than a decade.88 After an extremely brief work stoppage on 30 
August 1963, management identified seven workers as the possible cause. Only one of 
these men had been hired within the past year, while each of the others had started at the 
plant between 1940 and 1953.89 By 1964, the average worker within the department had 
20.8 years of plant experience.90 
Nor was resistance in Sydney confined to extra-union activity. In 1962, 
oppositionist leader Jim Ryan was elected as president of Local 1064. Ryan, who 
defeated the moderate Merner, favoured a more militant style of trade unionism.91 
National leadership was concerned; Ryan was a reputed communist, which was brought 
to the attention of Canadian Director William Mahoney in 1963. Roy Flood, another 
member of 1064, wrote to Mahoney to describe the “breakdown of leadership” within the 
local. He describes a confrontation between himself and Ryan:  
[Mr. Ryan] berated what he referred to as my ideology and among other things 
called me a “wiseacre” and a “smart Alec.”  Here I might say that I suspect the 
outburst was prompted by past experience when on numerous occasions I took 
issue with Mr. Ryan and some of his cohorts who were noted for their loud-
mouthed negativism. You are no doubt aware that Mr. Ryan is suspected of 
having communist leanings. Certain it is that he fought every effort of the 
previous President.92 
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Mahoney responded to another member of the 1064 executive, Ben O’Neill, noting that 
“[Flood] sounds like a type who might be quite useful in the local union.”93 
Figure 2.2 Local 1064 Steelworkers' Hall, Prince Street, Sydney, 1963 
Source: Photograph by the Steel Project, Reference 90-1790-21222b, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
If young workers in Ontario and Quebec rallied against their employers and union 
executives based upon a forward-looking enthusiasm for ‘new unionism’ and ‘the just 
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society,’ employees at the Sydney Works responded to a different set of influences.94 
While the workforce at Stelco expanded by 62 percent between 1960 and 1966, 
employment at the Sydney plant was reduced by 28 percent during the same years.95 This 
reduction was most palpable during the period in which the majority of walkouts 
occurred, as 887 workers were laid-off between September 1961 and March 1962.96 
Unlike Stelco’s “rebel youth,” who perhaps took the gains of the postwar years for 
granted, steelworkers in Sydney were confronted with a slow unraveling of their place on 
the shop floor – through the efforts of the Proudfoot efficiency experts – and, ultimately – 
within the community altogether.  
The turn towards “responsible unionism” by Local 1064 coincided with an 
increasingly dominant industrial structure of feeling that placed the city’s steelworkers at 
the economic and cultural heart of their community. The brief period between 1946 and 
1957 is recalled fondly in oral testimony, narratively situated after the strife of the Cape 
Breton labour wars and prior to the worst impacts of deindustrialization. These 
experiences fit squarely within “les trente glorieuses” in Canadian history – described by 
Magda Fahrni and Robert Rutherdale as “an extended moment of unprecedented 
prosperity, developed welfare states, high modernity, and advanced capitalism.”97 The 
unevenness of this process became clear in the experiences of the Sydney steelworkers 
who, as the pace of disinvestment quickened, attempted to return to the labour radicalism 
of earlier struggles. It was in this context that steelworkers formed their response to the 
sudden announcement on October 13, 1967 that the Sydney Works were to be closed.   
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It Brought Us Joy, It Brought Us Tears:  
Black Friday and the Parade of Concern, 1967  
 
 
We Stand United, One and All 
The Maritimes must never fall 
So let’s all get behind the wheel 
To save our coal and save our steel 
 
- Charlie MacKinnon, 1967 
 
On Thursday afternoon, October 12, 1967, a group of Dosco executives arrived in Ottawa 
to meet with federal officials. Representing Dosco was T.J. Emmert, the President of 
Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd., Sir Arnold Hall, President of the Hawker Siddeley Group 
of the United Kingdom, and Chipman H. Drury, President of Dosco. These three men met 
for nearly two hours with Allan MacEachen, the Minister of National Health and Welfare, 
Jean-Luc Pépin, the Minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources, and Charles M. “Bud” 
Drury, the Minister of Industry.1 Charles and Chipman Drury were both sons of Montreal 
businessman Victor M. Drury, who had gained prominence through his involvement with 
the Royal Securities Corporation in the early 20th century.2 Although each remained 
tight-lipped after the meeting, this assembly of powerful men prompted rumours on the 
shop floor at the Sydney Works.  
Steelworkers openly wondered whether the company would announce a new 
product line, or if officials planned to expand or reduce investment in the aging plant. 
Others considered the possibility of a seasonal layoff or downturn in the international 
steel market. Such whispers were so frequent that they were often shrugged off; former 
steelworker Charles MacDonald laughed as he recalled, “Some people always said, you 
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know, if you didn’t hear a good rumour by ten o’clock it’s time to start one.”3 In this 
instance, the findings of the Sydney Steelmaking Study – released just a week prior - had 
described competitive challenges arising from technological advancements in 
steelmaking. Nonetheless, the report assured that production in Sydney would be 
maintained.4  
The next morning, Dosco’s Board of Directors gathered at corporate headquarters 
in the neighbourhood of Ville Sainte Pierre, Montreal. In the spacious offices, Emmert 
outlined a recommendation that the company “disengage itself from the operations 
carried out at the Sydney Steel Plant at Sydney, Nova Scotia, effective April 30th 1968.” 
The Board unanimously passed the resolution, although Frank Sobey abstained from the 
vote.5 It was this decision that had been communicated privately to members of the 
federal government the prior afternoon in Ottawa. Emmert and Hall immediately set out 
for the Montreal airport, where they boarded a private aircraft for a scheduled 4:30 p.m. 
meeting in Halifax with Nova Scotia Premier George Isaac Smith.6 According to the 
Brandon Sun newspaper, “the two company officials were stern-faced and silent when 
they entered the meeting […] They left with similar expressions, still refusing to 
comment.”7  
                                                
3 Charles MacDonald, interview with author, March 3, 2015.  
 
4 Voluntary Economic Planning Board, Sydney Steelmaking Study (Halifax: Queen’s 
Printers, 1968). Dosco executives and the Atlantic Development Board also played a 
significant role in researching and publishing this report. “Steel Report is Released: 
Sydney Plant Will Remain Basic Producer,” Cape Breton Post, October 3, 1967. 
 
5  Dosco Meeting Minutes, 13 October 1967, Premier’s Correspondence, Volume 39, File 
11, Office of the Premier Fonds, RG 100, Nova Scotia Archives and Records 
Management (NSARM), Halifax, NS.  
 
6 Emmert offers differing accounts of exactly when Premier Smith was informed of the 
decision to close the plant. In his testimony before the legislature, Emmert mentions that 
he informed the premier on 12 October. Later in the same session, he clarifies that he had 
only mentioned that the subject of conversation would be the Sydney steel mill. Nova 
Scotia, Debates and Proceedings of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, December 5 
1967: 172-78. 
 
7 “Closing of Dosco Stuns Cape Breton,” Brandon Sun, October 14, 1967.  
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Three hours later, at 7:35 p.m. Emmert’s assistant released a press notice that 
outpaced even the most pessimistic shop floor conjecture. The decision had been made. 
The Sydney Works was to close, effective by November. Further, the release explained, 
“If the money was available to completely modernize the mill, its geographical location 
relative to markets and the resulting freight charges on its products would still prevent 
Sydney from being truly competitive.”8 In human costs, 3,225 steelworkers – more than 
twenty-five percent of the city’s workforce - would be unemployed within months. 
Switchboards at newspaper offices and radio stations throughout the Maritimes lit with 
activity as the news spread to Sydney and beyond. “The Company has become 
increasingly aware that its Sydney Works has an abnormally high cost of production due 
to age and attendant maintenance and manning costs,” the release explained. 
“Consequently, high capacity production and a reasonably stable market price and labour 
cost are essential conditions to its economic operation. Such conditions have disappeared 
over a relatively short period.”9 Martin Merner, who had regained his position as 
President of Local 1064, heard the news while returning from the USWA national offices 
in Toronto. Upon arriving in Sydney, Merner found himself before television cameras 
attempting to calm a city already in the grip of panic.10 
With more than 3,200 employees on Black Friday, the Sydney Works was by far 
the city’s largest employer. In the entirety of the island, only Devco employed more Cape 
Bretoners. In 1961, a labour force classification study lists the operations of the Sydney 
                                                
8 J.N. Kelley - Hawker Siddeley Canada Press Release, 13 October 1967, Premier’s 
Correspondence, Volume 39, File 11, Office of the Premier Fonds, NSARM; The stated 
reason for announcing the decision on Friday evening was to avoid an impact on stock 
prices. In the words of Arthur Pattillo, senior council to Dosco: “[it was] so that there 
would be an opportunity for the week end, for people not to become hysterical and 
perhaps go into the market, and try to make money or upend things.” Nova Scotia, 
Debates and Proceedings of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, December 5, 1967: 150.  
 
9 “Sydney Steel Plant Will Close By April,” Cape Breton Post, October 14, 1967; “Dosco 
to Close Sydney Steel by April 30,” Chronicle Herald, October 14, 1967; Nova Scotia, 
Debates and Proceedings of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, December 5, 1967: 135.  
 
10 Nova Scotia, Debates and Proceedings of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, 
December 5, 1967: 4. 
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Works as comprising 26.01 percent of the total employment in the city. This did not 
substantially change during the decade; if anything, the decreasing population of Sydney 
coupled with a small increase in the number of employees at the plant between 1961 and 
1966 made the mill’s importance even more visible.11 Seventy percent of the city’s 
employment drew from the labour poor within the city. While few residents commuted to 
the nearby towns for employment, it was not unusual for residents in the nearby coal 
towns to travel into Sydney for work. This matches the workforce at the steel plant; while 
comprised largely of workers from within the city, steelworkers from Glace Bay, Sydney 
Mines, and other rural areas were not uncommon.12 As a result, the Sydney Works was 
important not only to Sydney, but to the economy of the entire island.  
Men, women, and children who experienced Black Friday recall the 
announcement as a moment of collective trauma; it was truly a defining point in the 
history of Sydney. The owners of several local businesses denounced the decision; the 
shops and stores that had sprouted in the streets surrounding the plant were suddenly 
facing the complete destruction of their consumer base. The day, locally tarred with the 
pejorative “Black Friday,” is now seared into the memories of those who experienced it.13 
Psychologists Roger Brown and James Kulik first coined the term “flashbulb memories” 
in 1977 as an explanation for the phenomenon where people who are affected by a public 
tragedy “can remember, with an almost perceptual clarity, where he was when he heard, 
what he was doing, who told him, [and other details].”14. Black Friday is a local example 
of this phenomenon.  
                                                
11 E. Roy Harvey, Sydney, Nova Scotia: An Urban Study (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and 
Company Ltd.: 1971), 43.  
 
12 Ibid., 20-21.  
 
13 The earliest reference to “Black Friday” that I have identified is in a Cape Breton Post 
article that uses the term as though it is already in common usage. See “Called Black 
Friday,” Cape Breton Post, October 17, 1967.   
 
14 Roger Brown and James Kulick, “Flashbulb Memories,” Cognition 5, 1 (1977): 73. See 
also Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1996), 195-205; William Hurst, et. al., “Long-term memory for the 
terrorist attack of September 11: Flashbulb memories, long term memories, and the 
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Adrian Murphy was in his early twenties when he had his first shift in the mill’s 
general yard on April 28, 1964. He worked the night of the announcement: 
I was down in the docks, down in the rail boat, and it was over a dirty, rotten, cold 
night. On the 4:00 to 12:00. And it was rainy and miserable, it was. Somebody 
said, “They’re closing the plant.” And all, well, like I said what would I have been 
then – 24 or [2]5, whatever I was, not very old. “Thank Christ, let me out of here,” 
I said. I came up, my father – he had, well, he was on 1940, so he had 27 years on 
– he had tears coming down his cheeks. And rightly so, he had about 7 or 8 kids 
going to school. So rightly so. He was in big trouble. And then they had the big 
Parade of Concern. And then they got together and turned it around.15 
 
Fabian Smith, who worked in the General Office, was married with three children in 
October 1967. He clearly remembers the shock, and describes going downtown in the 
aftermath: 
It was a Friday night. And Bill Jessome was on […] to read the news. And he had 
a lead in. He said, “We have a very important announcement about the steel plant.” 
And at that time, I think it was Brazil. We were looking for a rail order, anyway. 
And I said, “Oh jeez, we must have got that rail order. And I had my coat on, I 
was sitting on the arm of the chair, and we, my wife and I were going to the 
Vogue for a movie. And she said, “Are you coming,” and I said “No, no, let’s 
wait for that announcement. Anyway, he came on. And he read . . . And if you 
have ever been hit in the stomach – hard - that’s what it felt like. And I mean, she 
was in shock. We had four kids, you know? Well, three kids at the time […] She 
says, “What are we going to do?” I said, “We’re going to a movie. And we 
went . . . Charlotte Street was wall-to-wall people. The whole length of Charlotte 
Street. […] Just people. And it was almost like you were looking at zombies 
because, you know, everybody’s shaking their heads. “How could this possibly 
be?” You know? […] And Monday morning at work was total silence.16 
 
Mickey Campbell remembers seeing the Dosco press release posted inside the Coke 
Ovens Department:  
I seen guys there that didn’t believe it. Yeah, there was a notice put up in every 
office in the plant […] that they were going to close. So one guy read it, and he 
was going to tear it off the wall. And I told him if he did that I’d report him 
[pauses] I said there’s other fellas that’ll want to see it. Sure enough, they didn’t 
                                                                                                                                            
factors that influence their retention,” Journal of Experimental Psychology General 138, 
2 (May 2009): 161-176.  
 
15 Adrian Murphy, interview with author, September 1, 2014.  
 
16 Fabian Smith, interview with author, September 7, 2014.  
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believe it. Thought it was put there for a joke or something. It was right out of the 
blue.17 
 
In these accounts, the perceived finality of the decision and its potential impact on 
the families of the plant’s workers are highlighted. The interpenetration between 
workplace and industrial community is clearly visible; as Steven High remarks, “oral 
narratives suggest that [where people work and where they live are] physically and 
psychologically interconnected.18 Fabian recalls the impact of the decision in the city’s 
streets, while Adrian immediately compares his youthful obliviousness with his father’s 
sober understanding of the closure from inside the mill’s gates. In many accounts, the 
moment of disaster – while deeply important – is quickly superseded by a lengthier 
description of the community-based response.  
In the hours and days following Black Friday, shock turned to anger. The Cape 
Breton Post featured a “Street Reaction” column; of the ten men interviewed, six 
immediately called for resistance. Gus MacDonald, the operator of a local service station, 
was clear: “We can’t allow this to happen. The steel industry is the mainstay of our 
economy. Let’s fight to keep it. Unity is necessary.”19 The editorial cartoon summed up 
the situation with an image of two stereotypical capitalists, replete with top hats and coats 
marked “Hawker Siddeley,” strolling away from Cape Breton Island as it sinks beneath 
the waves of the Atlantic. 
These sentiments are not unique to Sydney. In response to plant closings in 
Youngstown, Ohio more than a decade after the Sysco announcement, Staughton Lynd 
questioned: 
Why may a corporation unilaterally decide to destroy the livelihood of an entire 
community? Why should it be allowed to come into a community, dirty its air, 
                                                
17 Mickey Campbell, interview with author, September 1, 2014. 
 
18 Steven High, Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America’s Rust Belt: 1969-1984 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 53.  
 
19 “Street Reaction,” Cape Breton Post, October 14, 1967.  
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foul its water, make use of the energies of its young people for generations, and 
then throw the place away like an orange peel and walk off?20 
Residents responded in ways that mirrored American fightback campaigns in the late 
1960s and 1970s. Why did steelmaking continue in Sydney for another 33 years, while in 
the United States these protest movements were frequently ineffectual? Through 
November, the public and members of the political class worked in tandem to formulate a 
suitable response to the threat facing the city.  
Figure 3.1: Black Friday, Editorial Cartoon 
Source: Cape Breton Post, October 16, 1967 
       
20 Staughton Lynd, The Fight Against Shutdowns: Youngstown’s Steel Mill Closings (San 
Pedro: Singlejack Books, 1982), 4.  
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The Parade of Concern, a massive anti-closure protest held in Sydney on 
November 19, 1967, exists concurrently with Black Friday in the collective memory of 
those who experienced the events. For residents, this moment of solidarity was the 
defining moment when the mill was saved. In their protest, residents drew upon a shared 
identity as Cape Bretoners to defend the economic basis of their city and island. In these 
accounts, however, the willingness of provincial politicians to intervene is often 
understated. Immediately upon leaving the meeting with Emmert and Hall, Nova Scotia 
premier G.I. Smith was visibly angry. He denounced Dosco in the strongest terms as a 
company “completely lacking in any sense of corporate responsibility to its employees 
and to the community in which it has operated.”21 Unlike in the United States, where 
state governments failed to respond to plant shutdowns, the administration of G.I. Smith 
was positively activist in its response to the Sydney Steel Crisis. Barring this unique set 
of regional circumstances, the Parade of Concern – based, as it was, on a localized sense 
of community – would perhaps have met the same fate as the failed American fightback 
campaigns of later decades.22 
The first section examines the actions of G.I. Smith and the provincial 
government in the month following the Black Friday announcement. The development of 
a Keynesian framework for regional economic development under the previous Tory 
administration of Robert Stanfield, Smith’s desire to employ these tactics in Nova Scotia, 
and the politics of the Steel Crisis are further explored. In the second section, an 
overview of the community response – focused on the Parade of Concern – reveals the 
contours of Cape Breton Island identity during the 1960s. Recollections of the fightback 
campaign frame Sydney as a fundamentally white, masculine, working-class city. 
Women, citizens opposed to the nationalization of the plant, and Mi’kmaq residents are 
                                                
21 G.I. Smith, statement, 7:40 p.m, 13 October 1967, Premier’s Correspondence, Volume 
39, File 11, Office of the Premier Fonds, NSARM. 
 
22 For further discussion of the tension between ‘community’ and political responses to 
plant shutdowns, see Steven High, “In Defense of Local Community,” in High, Industrial 
Sunset, 131-66; Dimitry Anastakis, “Industrial Sunrise? The Chrysler Bailout, the State, 
and the Re-industrialization of the Canadian Automotive Sector, 1975-1986,” Urban 
History Review 35, 2 (Spring 2007): 37-50.  
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largely absent from these recollections except as illustrations of solidarity. As Talja 
Blokland argues, “the processes of collective remembering reconstruct places and 
recreate their identities;” memories of those who lived through the 1967 Steel Crisis 
reflect an understanding of place and space that expresses the social relationships found 
within the 1960s steeltown.  
 
Taking Action: Deindustrialization and Regional Economic Development 
 
The man tasked with organizing the provincial response to the Steel Crisis, G.I. Smith, 
held an extensive pedigree in Nova Scotia politics. Though elected as an MLA for 
Colchester County in 1949, Smith’s first cabinet experience came under Premier Robert 
Stanfield when the Progressive Conservative (PC) party was elected in 1956. Stanfield 
viewed state-driven industrial diversification as a response to regional underdevelopment 
and disparity. In 1957, this focus resulted in the creation of Industrial Estates Limited 
(IEL) – a provincial crown corporation headed by Dosco board member and regional 
businessman Frank Sobey. IEL’s mandate was to attract extra-regional investment to the 
province.23 Following the popularity of these efforts, the government rechristened the 
Department of the Provincial Treasurer as the Department of Finance and Economics in 
1962. Stanfield named G.I. Smith as minister of this new department.24 
In his role as minister, Peter Clancy writes, Smith was an “enthusiastic advocate 
of planned regional development […] [he] described the European planning experiences 
as a middle way, offering advantages over laissez-faire policies on the one hand and 
wholesale social ownership on the other.”25 Smith’s positions were also informed by a 
trip he had taken to Britain and France in 1962, where he witnessed firsthand the 
successes of the Marshall Plan development strategy.26 Consequently, he supported the 
                                                
23 Roy George, The Life and Times of Industrial Estates Limited (Halifax: Dalhousie 
University Institute of Public Affairs, 1974), 7.  
 
24 Peter Clancy, “Concerted Action on the Periphery? Voluntary Economic Planning in 
‘The New Nova Scotia,’” Acadiensis 26, 2 (Spring 1997): 8.  
 
25 Clancy, “Concerted Action on the Periphery?,” 9.  
 
26 Ed Haliburton, My Years With Stanfield (Windsor, NS: Lancelot Press, 1972), 93.  
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establishment of the provincial Voluntary Economic Planning Board later that year. This 
board was designed to operate alongside IEL to mobilize business and labour in the 
service of a workable economic plan for Nova Scotia.27 
Between 1962 and 1967 these methods of economic intervention appeared to have 
found some success. According to Dimitry Anastakis: 
[IEL] attracted companies from outside Nova Scotia and Canada and helped a 
number of Nova Scotia firms through direct lending and providing facilities. By 
1968, more than 60 firms had been supported by IEL initiatives, and Sobey 
boasted that nearly 10,000 jobs had resulted from IEL agreements and projects, 
adding $40 million to the province’s revenue.28 
 
James Bickerton argues, “the absolute improvement in economic conditions in the 
Atlantic region during this period did not substantially reduce the relative disparities 
separating it from the rest of Canada.”29 When Smith took the reigns of the province in 
1967, he found himself thrust into a heady atmosphere wherein targeted state intervention 
and economic support for private industry was seen, in some quarters, as a panacea.   
On May 30, 1967, Nova Scotia went to the polls. The incumbent PCs routed the 
opposition Liberals and wiped out the provincial NDP contingent. Stanfield’s economic 
reforms were at the heart of the campaign, and his personal popularity helped to drive the 
party to victory.30 Meanwhile, the federal Tories were deeply split between duelling 
political factions. By the summer of 1967, Stanfield was under pressure from party 
loyalists to submit his candidacy for the September leadership convention. On September 
                                                                                                                                            
 
27 Andrew Thiesen, “G.I. Smith and Economic Development in Nova Scotia” (master’s 
thesis, Saint Mary’s University, 1995), 100-101.  
 
28 Anastakis, “Building a New Nova Scotia,” 8.  
 
29 James P. Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and the Politics of Regional Development 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 171.  
 
30 When the election was over, the PC party took 40 of the 46 available seats in Nova 
Scotia. The Liberals sat in the legislature with a mere six seats, while the NDP were 
unable to hold a single seat. Richard Clippingdale, Robert Stanfield’s Canada: 
perspectives of the best prime minister we never had (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University 
School of Policy Studies, 2008); Geoffrey Stevens, Stanfield (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1973), 138.  
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9, 1967, he was elected leader of the federal party and after resigning his provincial post 
on September 11, 1967, G.I. Smith officially became the 18th Premier of Nova Scotia.31 
Smith was premier for just over a month when the Black Friday crisis erupted. 
Smith immediately vowed to meet with representatives of the federal government and 
community members to help and organize a concerted response.32 He contacted Allan 
MacEachen to schedule a Sunday meeting to explore the options. The two men met late 
into the night at the Isle Royale Hotel in downtown Sydney, along with several provincial 
and federal cabinet ministers, to discuss the possibility of some form of nationalization of 
plant operations. In a handwritten note by Smith, dated October 16, the Premier outlines 
possible government actions under the “Industry Closing Act.” This includes the option 
of calling an inquiry and forcing Dosco to open its financial records for inspection by the 
province.33 On Monday, MacEachen revealed to reporters that a takeover of the Sydney 
plant by the recently formed Cape Breton Development Corporation (Devco) was another 
possibility.34 
In raising the spectre of federal intervention, MacEachen was referring to the 
solution recently enacted in the Cape Breton coal industry. By the mid-1960s, the Dosco-
controlled Sydney coal field alone employed more than 5,000 miners.35 In 1966, the 
company announced plans to phase out these operations. The federal government 
commissioned J.R. Donald to draft a report on the state of the industry, who 
recommended that the state help to facilitate the transition away from an industrial coal 
                                                
31 P.E. Bryden, A Justifiable Obsession: Conservative Ontario’s Relationship With 
Ottawa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 153; See, for a fuller discussion of 
Stanfield’s campaign for national leadership, Stevens, Stanfield, 172-80. 
 
32 “Premier Smith Irked: ‘An Incredible Change of Attitude,’” Cape Breton Post, October 
14, 1967.   
 
33 G.I. Smith, handwritten note, Premier’s Correspondence, Volume 39, File 10, Office of 
the Premier Fonds, NSARM. 
 
34 “Plant Nationalization Possibility – MacEachen; Says Cape Breton Development 
Corporation has wide powers,” Cape Breton Post, October 17, 1967.  
 
35 J.R. Donald, The Cape Breton Coal Problem (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 52.  
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mining economy in Cape Breton.36 Devco, a federal crown corporation with a mandate to 
“phase out Cape Breton’s collieries, while establishing new industries on the Island to 
take the place of coal-mining,” was the result of this decision37 The Cape Breton coal 
field was nationalized under the control of Devco in 1966. 
MacEachen’s colleagues in the leadership of the federal Liberal Party were more 
hesitant to commit to the nationalization of the Sydney Works. As with Devco, Allan 
Tupper argues, any consideration of nationalization was concerned with popular welfare 
– not an economic alternative to private capital.38 It was for this reason that Jean-Luc 
Pépin – another federal Liberal - condemned the “instant solution” of nationalization in 
the House of Commons. According to Pépin, if such an operation were undertaken in 
Sydney, it would be difficult to deny the same consideration for deindustrializing 
communities in Northern Ontario or North-western Quebec. Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson later wrote to Smith: 
As indicated, [we are] prepared to assist financially in certain immediate steps 
[…] to meet this situation. The primary responsibility […] remains with the 
Provincial Government. The Federal Government will continue to assist the 
industrial development and economic growth of the region as a whole.39 
 
In a move designed to buy time, Smith announced that the province would underwrite 
Dosco’s debt – up to $4 million – if the company would maintain existing production 
until April 1968 without implementing a mass-layoff.40 
In the following weeks, Smith attended several meetings with Dosco and Hawker 
Siddeley officials in Sydney, Halifax, Montreal, and Toronto.41 The Premier’s intentions 
                                                
36 Donald, The Cape Breton Coal Problem, 34-35. 
 
37 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and the Politics of Regional Underdevelopment, 200. 
 
38 Allan Tupper, “Public Enterprise as Social Welfare:  The Case of the Cape Breton 
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39 Lester Pearson to G.I. Smith, 8 November 1967, Premier’s Correspondence, Volume 
39, File 3, Office of the Premier Fonds, NSARM.  
 
40 “Provincial Government Acts in the Sydney Steel Crisis; Offers to ‘Buy Time,’” Cape 
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are clearly visible in the draft copy of a letter sent to Emmert on October 24. In 
marginalia, Smith scrawled: 
The immediate objective of the Province is to maintain the Sydney Works as a 
going concern until such time as we have an opportunity to examine every way by 
which the Sydney Works may be continued as a going concern.  
 
In a redacted paragraph, he continues, “These concepts are advanced in the light of your 
understanding that our objective is to assure the continued operations at the Sydney 
works for an indefinite period.” Instead, this phrasing is replaced with:  
Our immediate purpose is to assure that nothing would be done in the immediate 
future to render the continued operation of the Sydney works an impracticability 
or an impossibility. These means [sic], of course, that operations as a going 
concern must be continued until such time as we have had an adequate 
opportunity to consider and make arrangements for possible alternatives.42 
 
By the end of October, Dosco agreed to allow provincial auditors to examine its finances. 
The province pressed for access to these files in the hopes that a private buyer for the 
Sydney plant could be found.43 Although there were several meetings with 
representatives from both Algoma and Stelco, neither company expressed interest.44  
Despite Smith’s desire to maintain production in Sydney, even if it meant 
nationalization, the Premier never intended the plant to operate indefinitely under 
provincial control. This position, also favoured by Allen MacEachen, is visible in 
governmental approaches to regional economic development. Federal organizations, such 
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as Devco, were never intended to operate solely as industrial firms, but to facilitate the 
orderly transition to an economy based upon other combinations of private capital.45  
A major break in the Steel Crisis occurred on Wednesday, November 15 - just 
four days before the planned Parade of Concern. Following an afternoon conference 
between Emmert and Smith, the premier revealed that an “agreement in principle” had 
been reached. This would see the ownership of the plant pass into the hands of the 
provincial government by the end of December 1967; Smith hoped “to call a special 
session of the Legislature to approve the sale and establish a provincial Crown 
corporation to operate the plant.”46  
That weekend, as residents of Sydney crowded the downtown in mass protest, 
Smith and his cabinet finalized the terms of the agreement. On November 22, the deal 
was signed. The province would pay approximately $25 million for all remaining stock 
and infrastructure and assume full control of the facility.47 Although operations would 
continue under provincial management for more than 30 years, the decision was initially 
designed to protect against immediate social and economic collapse while an alternative 
to public control could be found.48 On New Year’s Day 1968, the Province of Nova 
Scotia assumed control of operations through the newly formed Sydney Steel 
Corporation, and a new era for steelmaking in Sydney began.49  
The immediate state response to the Black Friday announcement reveals the 
extent to which governmental action can influence the processes of deindustrialization. 
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This notion has been explored elsewhere. In the United States, laissez faire notions of 
free-market stability prompted inaction in the face of crisis by the federal government. As 
Judith Stein reminds us in her examination of the 20th century American steel industry, 
“the incentives to which all companies must respond are constructed by states.”50 In 
failing to recognize and act upon this reality, the state ultimately doomed many American 
steel facilities. Stein explains, “For the industry as a whole, U.S. trade, fiscal, and foreign 
policies increased the costs of steel modernization at a time when American efficiency 
was being matched by foreign competitors that were supported by their governments.”51 
Such inaction, Jefferson Cowie writes, prompts a situation wherein “industrial capital 
[leaves] not just local sites, but the nation itself […] the community whose needs are in 
tension with those of capital is not just the place defined by a zip code but the imagined 
community of the nation.”52  
While the circumstances surrounding deindustrialization in the United States have 
been particularly well examined, the American process should not be assumed to be 
universal. Deindustrialization is profoundly transnational, and policy responses have 
varied throughout North America and Western Europe. In the United Kingdom, 
discussions surrounding deindustrialization have more often focused on the explicit role 
of the Thatcherite state in prompting industrial decline in favour of finance capital during 
the 1980s. In Work Identity at the End of the Line, Tim Strangleman explores the impact 
of state-driven privatization in the nationalized British railway industry. While the 
explicit turn towards fiscal austerity, privatization, and deregulation quickened after 1979, 
he asserts that a national narrative supporting these types of policies existed as early as 
the first Beeching Report in 1963.53 Deindustrialization in Britain is frequently referred to 
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as an explicit consequence of particular forms of direct state action; this differs from the 
American experience, wherein the unwillingness of state actors to combat damaging 
market fluctuations is more commonly blamed.  
In Canada, Steven High examines several legislative responses to proposed 
shutdowns in a comparative analysis of the central Canadian “Golden Horseshoe” and the 
American “Rust Belt.” High argues that workers and their organizations were able to 
draw upon a nascent “new nationalism” to combat the threat of industrial closure in the 
1970s and 1980s. This response is particularly visible in the popular campaigns of 
Ontario workers to protest the closure announcement of British-owned Dunlop Tire in 
1970. The optics of a large multi-national corporation leaving Canadians out of work 
with only a few weeks notice prompted calls for a legislative response.54 This tactic 
prompted federal and provincial governments to develop policy that would shield 
workers against the impact of sudden closures. High concludes: 
The identification of the inhabitants of industrial Ontario with a national 
community provided the unity of interest necessary to resist plant closings. […] 
Canadian trade unionists literally wrapped themselves in the flag in order to defy 
foreign owned companies that wished to abandon workers with little or no 
compensation.55 
 
Popular and political responses to the 1967 Sydney Steel Crisis were not as 
heavily influenced by the sense of new nationalism that would soon enliven the Ontario 
labour movement. Why such a sentiment did not emerge within the local protest 
movement is unclear; perhaps Cape Bretoners had grown used to the notion of foreign 
ownership behaving in a manner fundamentally at odds with “the local.” Dating back to 
the General Mining Association in the 19th century, or the struggles against Besco in the 
1920s, the island’s workers had to forge local solidarities against the machinations of 
absentee owners. Motivations for political action can be quite different. As Anastakis 
writes, “The ‘visible hand’ of state intervention provides an essential element in helping 
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to understand why [Canadian auto manufacturers] largely avoided deindustrialization.”56 
In circumstances that matched the later political response within the auto sector, Nova 
Scotia politicians “did not need to be ‘convinced’ to act to protect worker interests […] It 
was more than part of a political calculus: it simply made good public-policy sense.”57 
Steeped, as he was, in the politics of Stanfieldian interventionism, Smith did not hesitate 
in applying the levers of government to combat structural effects of disparity.  
The impact of regionalist modes of thinking on the processes of 
deindustrialization has also been explored in other contexts. Andrew Perchard and Jim 
Phillips argue that a regionalist “moral economy” in the Scottish coal field directly 
informed local resistance to workplace closures. In 1980, when Albert Wheeler became 
the Director of the Scottish Area of the National Coal Board, Scottish miners operated 
under the duel presumption of joint industrial regulations, decided upon by both labour 
and management, and some state responsibility for economic security. A series of 
draconian cuts, which disrupted worker-management relations, resulted in a transgression 
of the established moral economy of the coal field. Thus, the authors’ conclude, “the 
great but doomed strike in 1984-1985 in Scotland was duly much more the product of 
Wheelerism than Thatcherism […] [though] it was tailored to suit Thatcherite political 
economy.”58  
The concept of moral economy is defined at its basest level as a form of “popular 
consensus as to what [are] proper or improper [business] practices,” community outrage 
and direct action are the expected responses to any transgression.59 Certainly, economic 
security was central to an existent moral economy in Sydney. The perception that Dosco 
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was in violation of these mores is clearly visible.60 The immediacy of the planned 
shutdown, with massive layoffs scheduled for the following month, is considered 
particularly galling, as is the perception that the company lied about maintaining 
production just a few weeks prior. The 1967 steel report outlines that “Sydney can be 
expected to continue to supply ingots and billets to Contrecoeur for many years provided 
it is economic to do so [emphasis added].”61 
Unlike in Scotland during the 1980s, the party committing the transgression 
against the moral economy in Sydney was not the state, but the private employer. In this 
context, members of the political class also felt betrayed by the transgression. During a 
special session of the Nova Scotia Legislature on December 5, 1967, Dosco’s 
“immorality” is explicitly discussed. The following encounter between MLA G.H. 
Fitzgerald and Arthur Pattillo, Senior Council to Dosco, refers both to the proposed 
closure and the company’s plan to raid an employee contribution fund for unemployment 
or layoff insurance: 
Fitzgerald: Now we come to the question of legal and moral obligation. Do you 
think that there is any moral obligation, on the part of Dosco, to refund to the 
employees or transfer the account, to whatever succeeds you, for the purposes for 
which the fund was set up? 
 
Pattillo: And that question I can’t propose to answer – morals are objective things. 
As I see our society today, they are changing overnight. What my morals may be 
tomorrow, I wouldn’t like to say. [Laughter].62 
 
Although politicians used the language of moral outrage to castigate the architects of 
Black Friday and inform the political response, residents of Sydney, the steelworkers’ 
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union, and the local business class expressed their rage in the streets. This blossomed into 
a moment of community protest and upheaval that continues to anchor historical memory 
of the event: the Parade of Concern.  
 
A Community Problem: The Parade of Concern and Cape Breton Identity 
 
The political response is generally downplayed in popular recollections of Black Friday. 
Rather, a narrative has emerged in which united resistance, grassroots protest, and the 
Parade of Concern were successful in singlehandedly forcing the state to take action. In 
contrast to workers’ campaigns in central Canada, the “Save Our Steel” protesters in 
Sydney did not wrap themselves in nationalistic sentiment. Instead, the movement was 
rooted in the same type of “struggle between capital and community” that Barry 
Bluestone and Bennett Harrison describe in The Deindustrialization of America.63 
Community, in this context, was broadly imagined; within Sydney, Black Friday was 
perceived as a death blow to the city. Local organizers also stressed the importance of the 
mill to the entire island – appealing to a shared identity as Cape Bretoners to inform the 
response. Others appealed to alternative identities; labour leaders, for example, described 
the event as a bellwether for the Maritimes or Atlantic Canada as a whole, while 
politicians focused on the place of the Sydney Works in the industrial economy of Nova 
Scotia.  
Two days after Black Friday, with the city still reeling from the news, priests and 
ministers across Cape Breton took to their pulpits to decry the announcement. Anglican 
Rev. J.W. Young of Saint Alban’s Church in Whitney Pier told his congregation that the 
plant must remain open at all costs. He went further than the politicians in his call for 
ownership of the steel plant to exist fully under the control of Cape Breton workers. 
George Topshee, a Catholic priest and the Director of the St. Francis Xavier University 
Extension Department urged parishioners to demand some form of nationalization.64 
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Another Catholic priest, Andrew Hogan, would later publish a Teach-In for those seeking 
information on the Steel Crisis. He writes:  
I am sometimes asked if I was building a new steel plant today and was trying to 
make the best profit would I put it in Sydney. My answer of course is no. But there 
is a basic steel plant there already sustaining a large community. It has made profit 
in the Post War period (not comparable to its competitors but a profit nonethe less 
[sic]) right up to and including 1966. It can be done again with modernization, 
good management, and the cooperation of the Union and employees.65  
 
That evening, religious leaders met in Whitney Pier with nearly 600 concerned workers 
and residents to discuss the first steps towards an organized and united response. 
The following week was punctuated with similar meetings, youth protests outside 
the gates of the plant, and a small protest of 300 Xavier College students in the city’s 
downtown.66 Children in local elementary schools organized a letter-writing campaign to 
Prime Minister Lester Pearson; Helena, a grade five student from Constantine School, 
writes, “I want you to know how many jobs will be lost and how many people will go 
hungry. So you think about it!”67 On Tuesday, District 26 of the UMWA officially 
declared their support. District president and local labour leader William “Bull” Marsh 
offered solidarity to the steelworkers’ union, “We know the threat of closure and the 
effect it has on the morale and the outlook of the workers and their families […] whatever 
the steel union wants us to do, they need only let us know.”68 In each of these examples, 
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the perceptions and opinions of white working and middle class men are foregrounded. 
Women’s thoughts on the crisis, when they were included in the media, were firmly 
anchored in the concerns of the home. Helen Muise, a woman interviewed in the Post on 
October 18, 1967, was asked about the closure in the context of the family’s future, the 
household budget, and mortgage payments.69 
Local 1064 and the national office of the United Steelworkers’ of America were 
involved in the crisis from the beginning. It was union officials who first spoke publicly 
not only of nationalizing the plant, but also of going further to expropriate Dosco 
holdings and regulate the national steel market. Merner supported calls for nationalization, 
but stopped short of supporting expropriation. William Mahoney, the Canadian Director, 
issued a recommendation that “not only in Sydney, but the outlets for Sydney steel in 
Nova Scotia and Quebec be placed under immediate public control […] recompense to 
Hawker-Siddeley must be tied to acceptance of steel deliveries, not paid over in advance 
or without strings attached.”70 This message appealed to residents in Sydney, some of 
who had called for Hawker Siddeley to be “banned” from Canada as punishment for their 
actions.  
Politically, expropriation was never an option that was seriously considered. In 
addition to mid-century concerns regarding “socialism,” this solution did not fit within 
the Third Way paradigm of regional development that was promoted by the Smith and 
Stanfield regimes. Had expropriation occurred, the provincial government would almost 
certainly have had to commit to a long-term plan of operations. Nonetheless, the option 
was popular enough in Sydney that Smith felt he had to address it in the legislature. On 
December 1, the Premier outlined the case against expropriation. The Dosco finishing 
mills at Contrecoeur, Quebec were the major purchaser of product from the Sydney 
Works; therefore, Smith concluded, to expropriate the mill would remove its largest 
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source of demand.71 The more radical calls for action declined as the province moved 
ahead with a purchase agreement.  
The union almost immediately began working alongside a “Citizen’s Steering 
Committee” to plan the Parade. This included representatives from Sydney’s religious 
community, union leaders, journalists, lawyers, and private citizens. Fr. William Roach – 
one of the committee members - later recalled, “The idea, right off the bat, was to take it 
away from the Steelworkers’ Union […] because we had them. […] It wasn’t like trying 
to put them down. […] What we needed was broad community support.”72 This group 
soon settled upon November 19 as the date for the Parade, and it was expected that huge 
numbers of Cape Bretoners would come out to show their support for the steel plant and 
its employees. 
The city bustled with activity on the morning of the Parade. By noon, busses were 
arriving in the downtown to bring citizens from the nearby coal towns. In New Waterford, 
transportation was organized for all high school students and residents were encouraged 
not to go to Sydney without a full carload of protestors.73 The march officially began at 
12:30 p.m., starting outside of the plant and heading towards the city’s horse racetrack. 
Roach later described concerns over the proposed route:  
We never had a crowd like that before, so we had no experience […] We were 
hoping for no trouble. And people had told us there might be trouble. Because 
there was anger […] And we intentionally, and this was no accident, we put that 
starting point […] over at the beginning of the steel plant. Rather than Victoria 
Park [in the city’s north end]. So we wouldn’t have to come through the business 
district. And we went right down Inglis Street, out […] And then we got to the 
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Figure 3.2: Parade of Concern, Route 
Source: Cape Breton Post, November 18, 1967 
Upon reaching the sports grounds, “The marchers assembled in the infield of the 
harness racing track as their ranks grew. More than an hour after the first marchers 
appeared, people still were filing into the huge park.”75 After an opening prayer by 
archbishop W.W. Davis, Roach addressed the crowd. Drawing upon a collective sense of 
working-class identity in industrial Cape Breton, he called for significant government 
intervention, declaring: 
       
75 “Talks to Resume Today,” Cape Breton Post, November 20, 1967.  
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The Sydney Steel Crisis is not an isolated thing. It is part of a much bigger 
problem. When we start talking about the future of Cape Breton, we must talk 
about more things than steel […] We have to speed up our approach to new 
secondary industries […] First of all, we must see to it that the Sydney steel 
industry continues. We must see to it that Cape Breton gets an industrial 
development program on a massive scale […] The machinery for action is already 
there, the government of Canada and of nova scotia have already enacted 
legislation creating such bodies as the Atlantic Development Board, the new Cape 
Breton Development Corporation, the ARDA program, Industrial Estates Limited, 
and many others. There is nothing new or startling in this approach to regional 
industrial development […] There are hundreds of precedents for government 
encouragement of industrial development ranging all the way from the building of 
the Canadian Pacific Railway in the last century, to the financing of Expo ’67 this 
year.76 
 
Roach frames the issue as a crisis for the entire island, and outlines how solutions that 
had been enacted elsewhere in Canada might effectively be utilized. Identifying several 
examples of state intervention, he positions nationalization as a sensible course of action. 
It “is not revolutionary,” he says, to ask that government step in to take control of the 
situation.  
The next speaker, Andy Andreas from the Canadian Labour Congress, placed the 
demands of the Parade within a regional and national context, expressing: 
It is not only a question of Sydney, it is not only a matter of Cape Breton Island, 
what is at stake here is the future of this part of Canada and, by inference, for 
Canada as a whole. Because we cannot tolerate for a moment a situation where 
the Maritimes are relegated to a state of economic stagnation and depopulation. If 
this is to be part of Canada, if Canada is to be a united nation, than we cannot 
afford the closure of Dosco, we cannot afford the destruction of Sydney.77 
 
Andreas was followed by Allen MacEachen, who committed his own efforts and those of 
the federal government to offer “direction and assistance” to Cape Bretoners in their time 
of need.  
 The final speaker of the day was the premier, G.I. Smith, who highlighted the 
“special resolve” of all Cape Bretoners – singling out the steelworkers and the 
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steelworkers’ union for their efforts. He described the Sydney crisis as a matter of 
provincial and national concern, revealed that he had been in constant communication 
with members of the federal government since October 13, and re-doubled his promise: 
“I said that anything within the ability of the province to do would be done. And this I 
say again.”78  
 The speeches during the Parade of Concern reveal the different collectivities 
invoked by groups within the campaign. Locals drew upon island identity in their calls to 
action; the exodus of Dosco was perceived as just another step in a history of exploitation 
by off-island capital. Having long existed at the margins of a Canadian economy that 
would, as Acheson writes, “devour its children” promoted a more insular response than 
would later erupt in the nationalist protests in central Canada.79 For residents, whether the 
decision had been made in Montreal or London was immaterial, its impact would be the 
same in either case. Other speakers considered the issue in different ways. Government 
officials viewed the Steel Crisis as a provincial and regional issue. Roach obviously 
recognized these distinctions; in his speech, he cleverly avoids foreign examples of 
nationalization, such as industrial nationalization within the U.K., focusing instead on 
actions already taken by provincial and federal governments within Canada.  
The next day, the headline of the Post declared the Parade “a huge success.” 
Although the day was overcast and cool, the final estimated number of participants were 
somewhere between 20 and 30 thousand.80 One cultural production that emerged from 
the Parade, Charlie MacKinnon’s song “Let’s Save Our Industry,” retains a great deal of 
popular cachet in Sydney.”81 The song was initially broadcast live on CJCB radio. It was 
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written the night prior, on the urging of Martin Merner.82 MacKinnon’s daughter later 
recalled:  
He was so wrapped up in the moment […] that when he tried to stop, his hands 
and his knuckles and his fingers were almost freezing from the cold. And it was 
an effort to play that guitar. But the people just wanted more and more, and they 
were carrying on the song and consequently he had to keep going.83 
 
In oral history interviews, respondents often referred to the song, or even began to hum or 
sing the chorus to illustrate popular sentiment at the time: “Let’s save our industry (x3), 
The industry we need.” The song also refers to other examples of Canadian state 
intervention to highlight the necessity of such a response in Sydney:  
It brought us joy and brought us tears 
 It’s been here more than sixty years 
 It built our homes and stilled our fears 
 And made this island what it is. 
 
 We need the help of Ottawa 
 We are also part of Canada 
 They can subsidize Ontario 
 Expo and the seaway, too! 
 
Three days after the Parade, the agreement organized by Emmert and Smith on 
November 15 was officially signed. The province would become owner-operators of the 
Sydney Works as of New Years Day, 1968. Popular perception of these events, however, 
is that the Parade had a direct causative relationship with the decision to nationalize the 
plant. This is also visible in oral accounts. Leon Colford, a welder at the plant in the 
1960s, recalled in 1990: 
Leon: October of ’67: Black Friday […] We put on quite a demonstration, well 
organized, and the whole of Cape Breton Island turned out for that. We were 
successful in maintaining a Steel Plant in Sydney. 
  
Michael: Yes.  Do you think it was the pressure the people put on in the political 
demonstrations and so on like that, that made the provincial government do 
something about it? 
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Leon: Definitely, definitely.84 
 
The two events are interconnected to such an extent in the collective memory of the 
community that their meanings are sometimes transposed. When asked about “Black 
Friday,” another former employee responds: 
Black Friday. The day of the parade. I was working that day. I think I sneaked 
home [to attend the parade] because I felt kind of embarrassed.85  
 
As storytellers, we each order our accounts of the past to correspond with the 
conditions of the present. Alistair Thomson calls this process “Composure;” the 
composition of memory occurs through two processes. The first deals with the 
mechanisms by which memories are selected, stored, and related. Thomson writes, “Only 
a selection of an individuals myriad experiences are recorded in memory, and for each of 
these there are a range of ways in which the experience might be articulated.”86 In the 
second sense, narrative “composure” is used to explain the present in a satisfactory way – 
to provide a comfortable explanation for our lives and identities. The conflation of Black 
Friday and the Parade of Concern reveals these aspects of composure; it provides a 
comfortable and empowering sense of successful, community-based activism. It allows 
Cape Bretoners to have singlehandedly saved their own steel mill.  
Stories lauding the success of community fightback efforts are understandable. As 
Pamela Sugiman describes in another context, Composition allows for restoration of 
personal or collective dignity after trauma.87 After all, a narrative in which residents’ 
protests were of secondary concern to political preferences does not restore the perceived 
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power of the community after it was disrupted on Black Friday. We, as oral historians, 
must pay close attention to how “community” is considered in these recollections. 
Elizabeth Faue writes, “Focusing on how labour and working class mobilisations 
straddled both workplace and community means understanding and critiquing the 
tendency of many labour and social historians to endow ‘class’ and ‘community’ with the 
same nostalgic character that Ferdinand Tönnies and Emile Durkheim did a century 
ago.”88 It is clear that there are also groups whose voices can be excluded from collective 
Compositions. The positions of women, indigenous peoples, and residents who may have 
politically opposed the continued operations of the Sydney Works after Black Friday, for 
instance, are generally ignored.  
Despite the popular trope of unity and cross-class solidarity, there were residents 
in industrial Cape Breton who did not support the continued operation of the Sydney steel 
plant. A letter, posted from North Sydney on November 1, arrived at the office of G.I. 
Smith. Without a return address and signed as “a disgruntled Cape Bretoner,” the letter 
outlines the local case against saving the Sydney mill: 
Other than Sydney proper (Pop. 34,000) the steel crisis DOES NOT effect [sic] 
the surrounding districts […] There is too much propaganda by a half dozen or 
more selfish interests. Who do not give a damn about the perpetual TAX PAYER 
[…] Cape Bretoners have become some sort of professional criers or mourners. 
ALWAYS making a mountain out of molehills. I was born here and do love the 
island, but the inhabitants are or have become a lot of PROFESSIONAL 
BEGGARS.89 
 
Opposition to the “Save Our Steel” sentiment – when mentioned – is most often 
attributed either to undefined residents of “the mainland” or “the government.” As the 
above letter reveals, there was some minor local opposition to the nationalization of the 
plant. This opposition was never mentioned in interviews about Black Friday, and I have 
not identified any locals who had publicly argued against the decision in 1967. The 
reason for “disgruntled Cape Bretoner’s” anonymity is likely the fear of recriminations. 
After a closure announcement in Kenosha Wisconsin in 1988, for instance, local 
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oppositionists had their homes fired upon, death threats were sent to local politicians, and 
violence nearly erupted at a town meeting.90 
Accounts of Black Friday and the Parade of Concern also frame women within 
particular roles in the working-class city. Notably, they are often left out of discussions 
relating to the immediate political impact of the closure, but are drawn into the narrative 
to describe the “community” orientation of the Parade. Lucy Taksa writes: 
Community can be ‘viewed as a vehicle for the reproduction and perpetuation of 
‘traditional’ gendered social roles’ and particularly women’s subsidiary role in 
male dominated society. This has been particularly the case in working-class 
communities, which have excluded women ‘from the principal forms of public 
activity’ that underpinned collective action.91 
 
Media coverage in the immediate aftermath of Black Friday reflects this truth. The Post 
interviewed several women for their thoughts on the crisis. In contrast to the interviews 
conducted with men, who were asked about the possibility of nationalization, their 
thoughts on Smith’s capabilities, and the impact on local businesses, the women were 
asked to comment on domestic affairs.92 In one article featuring women’s responses, 
children, the household budget, and the possible negative impacts of uprooting large 
families are main subjects of concern.93 Although the Sydney Works did employ women 
in the offices, the impact of looming layoffs is explored solely in reference to an assumed 
male breadwinner ideal.  
These gendered accounts reflect a predominantly masculine, working-class “place 
identity” that was hegemonic in many industrial cities. Geographer Doreen Massey 
describes place identity as a construction based upon the interaction of existing social 
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relations. These identities are not frozen or static, but constantly shifting as the result of 
different imaginings of place that exist within distinct groups.94 Despite the gendered 
presentation of men and women’s roles in response to the crisis, historians must – as Joy 
Parr reminds us – “problematize and unmake the chain of binary oppositions […] and 
rethink the categoricalism that cantonizes gender, class, race, ethnicity, and nationality, 
so as to see past the conceptual signage.”95 While the process of industrial loss can 
certainly prompt significant changes in place identity, popular narratives surrounding 
Black Friday among those who were involved in the event can be uncritical in their 
reflection of the gender relations endemic within the city in 1967.96 
There is also a form of racial exclusion present within popular re-imaginings of 
the community response to Black Friday. While women’s voices are sometimes included 
in narratives of resistance, if only in gendered references to the home, the reactions of 
Mi’kmaq residents in the nearby community of Membertou are entirely absent from 
collective memory of the event. This is reflective of what Steven High has termed “mill 
colonialism;” race and exclusion in the Sydney steel mill conforms with the 
circumstances in Northern Ontario, aptly described by High, wherein “aboriginal people 
were employed at the margins of these extractive industries and relatively few found 
employment in the mines or mills themselves.”97 
Although First Nations peoples were infrequently employed in the steel mill, 
Mi’kmaq families were closely interconnected with the development of industry in Cape 
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Breton. In 1882, two and a half acres of land was formally reserved as the “King’s Road 
Reserve” for the Sydney Mi’kmaq population. This reservation grew as the city 
developed; European and American immigrants seeking work at the plant in the 1910s 
created demand for Mi’kmaq wares and were sometimes a source of odd jobs for pay. 
William Wicken writes, “The transient character of the reserves population meant it was 
a busy place and was sometimes overcrowded […] it may also have been a noisy 
place.”98 After a series of legal complaints by lawyer and King’s Road landowner J.H. 
Gillies, the federal government resolved to move the reservation. One proposed location 
for a new reserve was within walking distance of the Coke Ovens, but the Mi’kmaq 
rejected this plan. In 1926, the Department of Indian Affairs relocated the King’s Road 
Reservation to a 65-acre lot away from the harbour.99  
Despite the proximity of Membertou to the plant and its working-class 
neighbourhoods, only a single article in the Post, dated November 20, 1967, refers to a 
“Group of Indians” in attendance at the Parade. The article celebrates the diversity found 
within the march:  
Some sights were particularly significant. The number of women there, a nun who 
carried a sign ‘People Matter;’ a group of Indians in traditional dress; a child 
being pushed in a baby carriage; a girl in a wheelchair; and above all the spirit of 
optimism.100 
 
Groups found on the peripheries of a white, masculine industrial place identities can be 
enlisted into community resistance when that sense of place is explicitly under attack. 
The absence of these groups in more recent accounts of Black Friday and the Parade of 
Concern, however, reflect that the place identity being recalled can sometimes leave 




                                                
98 William C. Wicken, The Colonization of Mi’kmaw Memory and History, 1794-1928: 
The King v. Gabriel Syliboy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 214.  
 
99 Wicken, The Colonization of Mi’kmaw Memory and History, 226.  
 
100 “We were there,” Cape Breton Post, November 20, 1967.  
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The 1967 Sydney Steel Crisis is remembered as a community of Cape Bretoners rallying 
under the united banner of “Save Our Steel” to combat the predatory destruction of 
international capital. Nationalism, when visible at all, is far less prominent than in other 
Canadian anti-shutdown campaigns. At first glance, the successful combination of 
community protest and state efforts to nationalize the mill appears to run counter to what 
has been termed the “High thesis:” that Canadian workers relied upon strong unionism 
and a developed nationalist sentiment to combat the destructive aspects of so-called 
“creative destruction.”101 Without the opportunity to employ such tactics, American 
fightback campaigns in places like Youngstown, Ohio were met with abject failure. In 
Sydney, the community response emerged at a time when the provincial government was 
more amenable to targeted interventionist models of regional economic development. 
Were this not the case, and barring the appropriation of nationalist rhetoric that would 
later enliven closure campaigns in Ontario, it is hard to imagine that circumstances in 
Sydney would have differed substantially from those in deindustrializing Rust Belt cities 
in the U.S.  
While the overwhelming support for nationalization within Cape Breton helped to 
provide the necessary social capital, the notion that the Save Our Steel campaign 
represents a singlehanded victory of community over capital is largely a myth. These 
stories, however, are useful. They reveal a continuing source of working-class pride. So, 
too, does the repetition of this story serve to underscore a particular place-identity; 
Sydney, in popular stories of Black Friday and the Parade of Concern, is a ‘working-
man’s town.’ Although sometimes visible as symbols of community diversity, women 
and aboriginal peoples are firmly located on the margins of this fond vision of past social 
relations. 
On New Years’ Day, 1968, plant employees officially began working under their 
new employer – the Sydney Steel Corporation. Although Dosco would continue 
managerial operations at the plant until April, new directors sought to disentangle the mill 
                                                
101 See Ian McKay, review of Steven High, Industrial Sunset: The Making of North 
America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984, H-Canada, H-Net Revews (April 2005): http://www.h-
net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=10458.  
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from the company’s influence as quickly as possible.102 Sysco’s new board of directors 
began exploring options for a private sale, while the Chairman of the Board and President, 
R.B. Cameron, sought to expand production to prove the facility viable. Operations 
remained largely unchanged on the first day under new management, but the coming 
weeks and years witnessed modernization attempts, new production techniques, and 
countless managerial changes. The departure of private industry from Sydney represented 
the end of an era, but on January 1 the city awoke with the perception that a major battle 
had been won – the future, perhaps, could once again be hopeful.
                                                





Decades in Transition: 
Modernization and Restructuring on the Shop Floor, 1968-1989 
 
 
From 1967 to 1989 . . . If you wanted to say that the steel company owed the 
worker something, indeed they did. That’s my own personal opinion. The workers 
were out of this world when they brought that plant back in 1967 […] But it’s like 
you say, the cutting still never stopped. It was always, “You must cut, you must 
cut.” That’s a nasty word in the union and it’s a nasty word with supervisors. As a 
supervisor I don’t like to see cutbacks. You’re making it very hard for me to 
maintain my production when you’re continually wanting to cut people. 
 
     - Garfield Ross, Finishing Mill Supervisor, 19901 
 
 
An optimistic attitude invigorated many Sydney residents during the early months of 
1968. Fresh from the successful effort to keep the plant open, workers turned their 
attention towards increasing production and ensuring the continued viability of the 
operation. Sydney Steel now appeared well positioned in the Canadian steel market, 
which was organized around four dominant firms. In addition to Sysco, there were 
Dominion Foundries and Steel Limited (Dofasco), Algoma, and the Steel Company of 
Canada (Stelco).2 
Despite the optimism, Sysco faced serious problems in its first months under 
provincial ownership. Decades of underinvestment by the Dominion Steel and Coal 
Company meant that equipment and operations would have to be overhauled should the 
plant remain viable in the longer term. The province, intending to find a buyer for the 
mill, was not immediately willing to provide such extensive capital investments. A 1968 
consultants’ report reveals the need for substantial capitalization. The blast furnaces, 
according to this report, were losing heat as the result of age. The consulting firm 
                                                
1 Garfield Ross, interview by Michael Earle, March 19, 1990, Steel Project MG 14, 206, 
Box 6, File 70, transcript, Beaton Institute Archives (BI), Sydney, NS.  
 
2 Voluntary Economic Planning Board, Sydney Steelmaking Study (Halifax: Queen’s 
Printers, 1968). 
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concluded that there was “no solution to the problems involved other than by means of 
sizable capital outlays for modernization.”3 
 New management tackled these problems head-on. Robert Burns “R.B.” Cameron, 
a Pictou County businessman and President of Deuterium Canada, was appointed as CEO 
of the new crown corporation. Just months after Sysco took over, Cameron hired Derek 
Haysom – a South African engineer – as his right-hand man and Executive Vice 
President of Sydney Steel.4 Haysom became President of Sysco in 1970. These men had a 
mandate to re-organize the company so that the private sector might be enticed into 
purchasing the mill. Although changes were not immediately apparent, over the next 
years the plant would be re-structured from “Fordist” towards “post-Fordist” production. 
This resulted in significant changes between 1968 and 1989, when the plant transitioned 
from an integrated steelmaking operation to an electric arc furnace mini-mill. The 
methods by which these changes occurred, their relation to capitalist re-structuring, and 
the resulting changes in workers’ daily routines are the focus of this chapter.  
Industrial sociologist Bob Russell describes Fordism as “a unique combination of 
Taylorism in the workplace, Wagnerism in the sphere of industrial relations, and 
Keynesianism in the labour market.”5 The scientific management of work forms the basis 
for Taylorism, which was popularized in the late 19th century by Frederick Winslow 
Taylor. Harry Braverman argues that scientific management remained key to managerial 
control into the mid-20th century. He quotes extensively from Peter Drucker, a 
management consultant from the 1950s, to describe the contemporary understanding of 
this process: “Its core is the organized study of work, the analysis of work into its 
simplest elements and the systematic improvement of the workers’ performance of each 
                                                
3 Arthur McKee and Company of Canada, “Preliminary Review of Operations, Sydney 
Steel Corporation, Sydney, Nova Scotia,” 1968, Box 21, B(i) k File 4, Dominion Steel 
and Coal Company Papers, MG 14, 26, BI. 
 
4 Sydney Steel Corporation, “Notice: To All Department Heads,” 19 August 1968, Box 
117, File 13, Dosco Papers, BI.   
 
5 Bob Russell, More With Less: Reorganization in the Canadian Mining Industry 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 14. 
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of these elements.”6 The 1962 Proudfoot study conducted at the Sydney Works is one 
clear aspect of Fordist control mechanisms; far from having disappeared after the 1930s, 
Braverman writes, Fordism was “‘outmoded’ or ‘superseded’ only in the sense that a sect 
which has become generalized and broadly accepted disappears as a sect.”7  
 The organization of production at the Sydney Steel Corporation is explored in the 
first section of this chapter. Workers’ accounts reveal the skills developed through work 
in an integrated plant, how managerial turnover sometimes resulted in occupational 
knowledge being undervalued, and methods by which steelworkers’ could contest work-
control. The second section reveals flawed attempts at modernization and re-structuring 
during the 1970s. Money and time was wasted as several sections of the mill were closed, 
an experimental method of steelmaking was implemented and abandoned, and the failure 
to modernize resulted in deep financial losses. The perceived wastage of taxpayer money 
during this period contributed to a growing sense, clearly felt by the late 1970s and early 
1980s, that the mill had become a “political football” and an economic albatross around 
the neck of the province. Workers’ responses to these challenges, including a renewed 
fight to Save Sysco, are examined in the final section, as is the final transition to a “post-
Fordist” operation.  
 
Meet the New Boss: Making Steel at Sysco, 1968-1970 
 
The Sysco Coke Ovens Department is where the first stages of the steelmaking process 
occurred. Two large coke oven batteries were used in pre-production. The first, 
constructed in 1949, contained 53 ovens; the second, constructed in 1951, held 61 ovens. 
Raw coal burned too quickly for it to be used in ironmaking. Coke was necessary for the 
production process to begin. Under Dosco, coal from the Cape Breton mines was 
transported to the steel plant by rail and held in large stockpiles. The coal was fed 
through a pulverizing machine until it became small enough so that the majority could be 
sluiced through a 6” mesh screen. Coal baked in the coke ovens, along with oil and water, 
                                                
6 Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York, 1954), cited in Harry 
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth 
Century (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1974). 
 
7 Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 87-88.  
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to form the brittle, porous substance known as “coke.”8 While this process continued 
after the creation of Sysco, the Coke Ovens Department was transferred to the authority 
of the Cape Breton Development Corporation (Devco) – until it returned to the control of 
Sysco in 1974.9  
Figure 4.1 – Aerial View, SYSCO, ca. 1970 
Source: Photograph by the Nova Scotia Information Service, Reference 90-678-20110, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
       
8 Technical description of Sydney Steel Works, c. 1960, Box 32, File 12, Dosco Papers,  
BI. 
9 R.B. Cameron to Gerald Blackmore, 23 February 1968, Box 117, File 13, Dosco Papers, 
BI. 
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The first step in the steelmaking process at the mill occurs in the Blast Furnace 
Department. Iron ore, coke, and limestone are fed into a large cylindrical tower – the 
blast furnace – through the top of the structure.10 Clarence Butler, who worked on these 
furnaces, describes the loading process: “You kept going around, as there was eight 
buckets to a charge. Three [iron] ore, two limestone, and three coke . . . you went by 
weight.”11 Once these ingredients are added, hot air is blown through the bottom of the 
furnace. The burning coke consumes the oxygen from the ore, and the melting limestone 
forms a by-product known as “slag.” The slag floats to the top of the iron and absorbs 
some of the impurities from the iron ore.  
John Campbell recalled these processes with great clarity in 2014: “The blast 
furnace was the heart and soul of the steelmaking process . . . The metallic iron drips 
down . . . and collects in the bottom of the furnace. Slag, which is also molten, is much 
lower density so it sticks on top of the iron. So periodically, you punch a hole in the 
bottom of the blast furnace, drain the iron out, and watch until the slag comes and then 
divert the slag into another area . . . and it becomes the big pile of slag that we see over at 
the steel plant [site] today.”12 Not only is slag still visible around the landscape of the 
former plant, but it has also been used in the construction of dozens of houses throughout 
Ashby and Whitney Pier. In this sense, these by-products of steelmaking remain a 
physical presence in the homes of many Sydney residents.13  
                                                
10 In the 1960s, Sysco acquired iron ore from the Wabana iron field on Bell Island as well 
as pelletized iron ore from operations at Carol Lake, Labrador. Limestone stocks were 
drawn from Port au Port, Newfoundland, as well as from a quarry located about 50 km 
from Sydney in Irish Cove, Nova Scotia. See Sydney Steel Corporation, “Ore and Stone 
Book,” 1966-1970, Box 63, File 10, Dosco Papers, BI. 
 
11 Clarence Butler, interview by Michael Earle, February 13, 1990, Steel Project, Box 6, 
File 2, transcript, BI.  
 
12 John Campbell, interview with author, September 6, 2014.  
 




Sysco employees produced hot metal from two blast furnaces and ran on a three-
shift system round the clock.14 The first ran from 8:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m., the second shift 
was 4:00 p.m. – 12:00 a.m., and last shift was 12:00 a.m. – 8:00 a.m. Life in the city, 
during the 1960s, revolved around these rhythms. People visiting might comment that 
“rush hour” began at strange times; it was not unusual for the streets to fill with traffic 
between 11pm and 1am, as workers changed shift. On each blast furnace, a stove tender, 
furnace blower, keeper, slagman, first keeper helper, craneman, and second keeper helper 
worked to maintain production.15 These men were tasked with producing the supply of 
metallic iron, which would be transported to the next stage of the steelmaking process at 
the Open Hearth Department.  
Adrian Murphy started working in the general yard as a young man, where 
labourers were assigned to different sections of the plant on a per-day basis. “You didn’t 
know where you were going, you didn’t know how to dress, if you went in with an 
overcoat on they’d send you to the open hearth furnace, if you had a light coat on they’d 
send you out on the high piers or somewhere like that where you’d freeze to death.”16 
After gaining some experience, Adrian was sent full-time into the Open Hearth 
Department – where his father also worked.  
He arrived to find a 938 ft. long building enclosing a 700-ton hot metal mixer and 
five large furnaces. Each was approximately 92 ft. long and 25 ft. wide, and there was 
also an additional 10-tonne electric furnace used for small tonnages of specialty steels.17 
Here, pig iron from the blast furnace was combined with scrap metal, limestone, and 
alloys before being periodically exposed to superheated air. This air supports the 
                                                
14 The No. 1 blast furnace had a hearth diameter of 20’6”, while the No. 3 furnace is 
listed as 21’6”. See Technical description of Sydney Steel Works, BI.  
 
15 R.B. Cameron, organizational charts, 1969, Box 114, File 1, Dosco Papers, BI.  
 
16 Adrian Murphy, interview with author, September 1, 2014.  
 
17 Introducing Sydney Steel Corporation to the Engineering Student (1968) and Sydney 
Railroad Rails, (1968), Box 32, Dosco Papers, BI.   
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combustion of an oil flame, which supplies direct heat to melt the charged material.18 
Labour was divided into five main sections: the furnaces, stock and labour, scrap 
preparation, mechanical, and carpentry. Adrian recalls his work:  
You put in your stone for the bottom, then you put in – depending on what you 
were making – if it was a rail . . . everything had to be right. You had to have 
cleans, the fosse had to be good, the iron coming up couldn’t be dirty – high in 
iron and fosse – but the fosse had to be down about 15, and you had to have the 
sulphur set. So then you put in scrap. Certain percentage of scrap depending on 
your supply of iron. If the iron was good you’d put in 100,000 of scrap and then 
the rest was iron and you’d make steel easy that way. If you had a really good 
supply of iron, and good clean iron, it was great, she was rolling right along.19 
 
Once molten steel was created, crane operators transferred the hot metal into steel 
ladles, which poured into six-tonne ingot moulds. Adrian worked as a crane operator in 
the late 1960s. “We started off on what they called the metal crane . . . and they’d bring 
up 50 tonnes of molten iron, and all the guys were working on the bottom . . . and you 
had to stick-handle, you had to be like Bobby Orr . . . You wouldn’t dare go over 
anybody’s head or near anybody’s head.”20 The temperature of each ingot was 
standardized in soaking pits before workers would forward the material on to the rolling 
mills.  
The Sysco rolling mills were organized into three sections: the roll shops, the 
heavy mills, and the light mills. Within these, there were the blooming or “breakdown” 
mill, the billet mill, the rail mill and the rail-finishing mill. At this time, Sysco also 
included a rod and bar mill and a nail mill.21 Ingots created at the open hearth were 
subjected to the first stage of rolling, which would transform the ingots into semi-finished 
steel products such as blooms or billets. Blooms intended for the rail mill typically 
measured 8.5” cross-sectioned, while those destined for the billet mill were generally 
                                                
18 Voluntary Economic Planning Board, Sydney Steelmaking Study (Halifax: Queen’s 
Printers, 1968); John Campbell, interview with author, September 6, 2014. 
 




21 R.B. Cameron, organizational charts, 1969; Sydney Steel Corporation, “Steelmaking at 
Sydney,” 1968, Box 32, File 12, Dosco Papers, BI. 
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approximately 6” x 5”. Blooms and billets could be sold as semi-finished steel, which 
comprised a majority of Sysco sales in the late 1960s, or directed into the light mills to 
continue the process of creating finished steel products.22  
The strict hierarchy of rolling mill jobs mirrored the processes of steelmaking, 
according to machinist Owen Bonnell. “When you first went in the shop, you worked on 
the billet rolls for the billet mill.”23 These included jobs such as billet pusher, catcher, and 
helper; these men were responsible for overseeing the shaping of the metal.24 Dave Ervin 
began working at the “mechanical screw” machine in the rolling mills on July 9, 1968. 
He recalls working on the final roller, which placed grooves in rebar: “as soon as they 
would get it in the roller, I’d jam down the lever on the mechanical screw and it would 
run through. And I remember being in the lunch shack and some of the guys were taking 
off their shirts and showing where the bars had gone through their sides or singed their 
sides.”25  
Other finished steel products, such as nails, wire, or steel rail, required shaped 
billets. As John Campbell explains, “a rod mill would make a rod that was, well, various 
sizes, but something that was the diameter of a pencil or a pen. And that, in turn, could be 
taken to the wire mill and that rod would be drawn down to successive steps to get wire 
of a certain size . . . and there would be specific composition for that kind of product. 
That would be taken into a nail machine, to make roofing nails or, ordinary nails, all 
kinds of specialized nails and so on.”26 At the time of the provincial takeover, Sysco’s 
production capabilities were divided: 22 percent rails and rail accessories, such as tie 
plates and reinforcing bars, 70 percent semi-finished steel, such as ingots, billets, or 
                                                
22 Voluntary Economic Planning Board, Sydney Steelmaking Study (Halifax: Queen’s 
Printers, 1968). 
 
23 Owen Bonnell, interview by Michael Earle, March 28, 1990, Steel Project, Box 5, File 
2, transcript, BI. 
 
24 R.B. Cameron, organizational charts, 1969. 
 
25 David Ervin, interview with author, August 8, 2013.  
 
26 John Campbell, interview with author, September 6, 2014.  
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blooms, and 8 percent of production was rods, nails, wire, and other finished steel.27 Not 
only would the plant’s production line fail to diversify further after nationalization, 
within only a few years productive areas of the mill would suffer cuts and downsizing. 
Total production numbers were the measure upon which R.B. Cameron staked his 
success. Speaking to the Empire Club in Toronto on April 30, 1970, he describes, “In 
1967, [production had shrunk to less than 618,000 tons. In our first year of operation, we 
produced 870,000 ingot tons […] in 1968, Sydney Steel Corporation had an operating 
profit of nearly three millions dollars […] and in 1969, we broke the million-ton mark.28 
Fabian Smith had a different perspective on the claimed million tonnes:  
That phantom million tons of steel . . . we were digging up rails that were so darn 
rusty you could hardly see the marks on them, you know. But he wanted that as 
his legacy . . . I mean, we did roll a lot of steel. But it wasn’t a million tons. And 
we all got a billet with our names on them, engraved […] We were drawing out 
inventory that never existed!29 
 
Workers, while largely supportive of this goal, were willing to fight to protect 
their own interests. On March 10, 1969, steelworkers in Sydney showed that they were 
not cowed by the events of Black Friday. The majority of the 1,200 day-shift employees 
walked out over the contracting-out of plant work. Martin Merner appealed to the rank 
and file to return to work, as he had in the wildcat wave of the early 1960s. To a chorus 
of jeers, he addressed the striking workers, “regardless of the boos, return to your jobs 
immediately.”30 Steelworkers went back to the plant the following day, and one 
unidentified employee told the Cape Breton Post: “Our point was well demonstrated, I 
think we should go back to work and let our executive work it out with management.”31 
                                                
27 Sysco Submission to the Parliamentary Committee on Regional Transportation, 1967: 
2, Box 86, File 2, Dosco Papers, BI.  
 
28 R.B. Cameron, “Speech to the Empire Club of Canada,” The Empire Club of Canada 
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Figure 4.2: 1,000,000th ton presentation, Open Hearth, SYSCO, 1969 
Pictured from the left: SYSCO Chairman R.B. Cameron, Premier G.I. Smith, 1064 
President Martin Merner, and company President D.R. Haysom 
Source: Photographer unknown, Reference 90-1377-20809, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
In August, the province announced the closure of the wire and nail mill. Implicit 
within this decision, Joan Bishop writes, was the closure of the rod mill – as rods were 
the semi-finished steel from which nails were produced.32 Non-competitive production 
       
32 Joan Bishop, “Sydney Steel: Public Ownership and the Welfare State, 1967-1975,” in 
The Island: New Perspectives on Cape Breton history 1713-1990, ed. Kenneth Donovan 
(Acadiensis Press and UCCB Press: Fredericton and Sydney, 1990), 171. 
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costs was the reason given, although management assured the Post that “the absorption of 
the mills’ personnel into other functions of the steel plant can be carried out in a manner 
whereby the abilities of the [more than 100] individuals concerned are taken into 
consideration.”33 According to Bishop, this decision was hardly based on sound 
economic reasoning. “First, the province and management knew from the time [Sysco] 
was taken over that it suffered a cost disadvantage […] Second, it was unsound to 
analyze each part of Sysco’s operations separately […] Finally, management had argued 
that modernization of the nail mill was not justified because the Maritime market was too 
small to absorb the output. Again, the province knew at the time of the takeover that this 
was true of Sysco’s entire production line.”34 The wire and nail mill closed on October 31 
and, although these jobs were re-absorbed, this was the first major reduction of Sysco’s 
product line following nationalization.35  
Another wildcat occurred just two days before the scheduled closure. Nearly 200 
maintenance workers left their jobs, when “11 carpenters refused to abide by a 
management work-schedule change.”36 Employees from the mechanical and blast furnace 
departments soon joined in, and management feared that these protests would spread to 
the entire plant.37 Representatives from 1064 met with management the following day 
and Winston Ruck – the local vice president - asked all striking workers to return for their 
next scheduled shift. The steelworkers respected Ruck, who would go on to become the 
first black president of Local 1064. He had the reputation of a more radical unionist, who 
had supported the rank-and-file in the intra-union conflicts of the 1950s. He was also 
known to conflict with the South African-born Derek Haysom, whose racism created a 
frosty atmosphere between the two men. Employees once again returned to the mill, and 
                                                
33 “Plant’s Nail Mill to Close Oct. 31,” Cape Breton Post, August 12, 1969.  
 
34 Bishop, “Sydney Steel,” 171. 
 
35 “Wire, nail mill will close today,” Cape Breton Post, October 31, 1969.  
 
36 “Wildcat Strike Hits Steel Plant,” Cape Breton Post, October 30, 1969.  
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although problems remained – production drew closer to Cameron’s goal – the much-
discussed million tonnes of steel.38  
Figure 4.3: Winston Ruck, United Steelworkers of America Presentation, 1970 
Source: Photograph by Abbass Studios Ltd, Reference C-3310, 
 Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
Returning to Russell’s definition of Fordism - Taylorism on the shop floor, 
Wagnerism in industrial relations, and Keynesianism in the labour market - it is clear that 
Sysco, in the first years of production, fits within this framework. The Proudfoot study, 
discussed in Chapter Two, reveals the Taylorist order of production. The second 
characteristic, Wagnerism, is described by Eric Tucker as “a specific model of collective 
labour rights” that includes the institutionalization of trade unionism, the establishment of 
       
38 “Between the Lines: Brinkmanship,” Cape Breton Post, November 1, 1969.  
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penalty clauses within contracts, and clear bargaining and organizational guidelines.39 As 
part of the bureaucratization of labour relations that occurred during the postwar period, 
the Co-operative Wage Study (CWS) was introduced.40 Robert Storey writes: 
Under this programme, jobs were graded and ranked according to 12 ‘factor 
requirements:’ Pre-Employment Training; Employment Training and Experience; 
Mental Skill; Manual Skill; Responsibility for Materials; Responsibility for Tools; 
Responsibility for Operations; Responsibility for the Health and Safety of Others; 
Mental Effort; Physical Effort; Surroundings; and Hazards. In turn, each of these 
factors was assigned a range of ‘point values’ […] To determine the level of 
classification, the point values were simply added together.41    
 
Thirdly, Sydney Steel existed firmly within the ideational and economic landscape of 
postwar Keynesianism. The nationalization of the Sydney Works is an entirely Keynesian 
approach to industry; state actors believed that targeted intervention could promote 
development and help to stabilize the business cycle.42  
 Skill and work control are central aspects of the Fordist paradigm. In examining 
these factors, we must – as Christine Wall and John Kirk caution – pay close attention to 
the subjective assessments of skill and quality of work that emerge from the people who 
are most directly implicated – workers on the shop floor.43 The notion of skilled work is 
complex. Braverman writes: 
For the worker, the concept of skill is traditionally bound up with craft mastery – 
that is to say, the combination of knowledge of materials and processes with the 
practices manual dexterities required to carry on a specific branch of production. 
                                                
39 Eric Tucker, “Should Wagnerism have no dominion?” Just Labour: A Canadian 
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40 Co-operative Wage Study Manual for Job Description, Classification and Wage 
Administration,” 6 May 1957, Box 133, File 15, Dosco Papers, BI. 
 
41 Robert Storey, “The Struggle for Job Ownership in the Canadian Steel Industry: An 
Historical Analysis,” Labour / Le Travail 33 (Spring 1994): 86.  
 
42 See Craig Heron and Robert Storey, “On the Job in Canada,” in On the Job: 
Confronting the Labour Process in Canada, eds. Craig Heron and Robert Storey 
(Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986), 19. 
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The breakup of craft skills and the reconstruction of production as a collective or 
social process have destroyed this traditional concept of skill and opened up only 
one way for mastery over labor processes to develop: in and through scientific, 
technical, and engineering knowledge.44  
 
This definition of skill has been critiqued; Wall and Kirk, for example, write that it 
defines work skill specifically through the output of individual workers, which can result 
in the exclusion of work traditionally associated with femininity.45 Craig Heron 
challenges the notion of uniform deskilling in the Canadian steel industry during the early 
20th century; “the assumption that mechanization inevitably means deskilling is too glib,” 
he writes before exploring the emergence of new skills as the result of mechanization.46 
There is some common understanding among Sydney steelworkers that the nature 
of “skilled work” is not defined within job classifications and collective agreements, but 
in the ways that workers frame their knowledge of the shop floor and their position 
within production. Heron describes a 1903 newspaper article from Sydney wherein blast 
furnace workers express frustrations regarding the importation of professionally trained, 
skilled chemists. They felt that these men lacked the practical experience of the Sydney 
Works shop floor that defines truly skilled work.47 This concept has remained in evidence 
through oral history accounts of work at Sysco throughout the 20th century. Charles 
Anderson describes an interaction in the Open Hearth Department:  
We had a fellow right out of college . . . he was a chemist, and he went in and told 
the fellow that the heat was wrong. The old fellow called his friend and he said, 
“Don’t you tell me how to make steel.” He says, “I’m telling you, that’s not right” 
[…] The fellow says, “Okay, we’ll listen to you.” We’ll make it the way you want 
it.” So the old gentleman did. He went over to the furnace, and he’s firing this in 
and firing that in. “Is that what you want? That’s what you got. You come back in 
                                                
44 Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, 443.  
 
45 Wall and Kirk, Work and Identity, 42.  
 
46 Craig Heron, Working in Steel: The Early Years in Canada, 1883-1935 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 54.  
 
47 Heron, Working in Steel, 56-57.  
 
 142 
four hours time and we’ll have it poured for you” […] They poured the heat, and 
when they went to roll it, it was way off specifications. It wasn’t right at all!48  
 
Adrian Murphy also refers to this type of specialized skilled knowledge. He says:  
The only thing we found after the government took over, there was an awful lot of, 
I don’t know what you’d call it, people were parachuted in here and there and 
they kind of didn’t know. They didn’t know how to run the thing. And they didn’t 
have faith in the men . . . even if you had the metallurgical . . . you don’t have the 
moxie of how this is run. And all of the sudden, you come over and there’s a guy 
mounting on the furnace for the last 25 years, and you decide to say ‘oh no Joe, 
we’re going to do it this way.’ Well it won’t work this way on this furnace.49 
 
Through the examination of this type of testimony, we might imagine another more 
inclusive definition of skill. This could include not only technical proficiency, but also 
the ways that work is characterized within life-story narratives. Such an approach would 
appeal to groups who have been marginalized by narrower considerations of the term, 
while also revealing how work-identities shift in correspondence with broader social and 
economic trends. It might be useful to imagine skill in terms of its psychological value 
among those who consider themselves capable and skilled workers within an internalized 
narrative, rather than as an individual attribute of labour power within production.  
Alongside Fordist managerialism, workers at Sysco engaged in traditional forms 
of resistance. But official grievances and walk-outs could only go so far; in the next 
section, we see how Local 1064 sought assurances from the provincial government that 
production would be maintained and the workforce stabilized. Here, a tension exists 
between the desire for continued operations and a growing awareness that some forms of 
modernization would result in significant downsizing. Meanwhile, early attempts at re-
structuring represented a threat to employees through the expansion of managerial control 
and the reduction of product lines. Resistance to some of these actions was less formal. 
On the job misbehaviour, such as drinking or playing pranks, can be considered both 
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forms of resistance and expressions of work identity.50 This is important to keep in mind 
as we examine the changing work-processes at the plant, the importation of new 
technological and productive capabilities, and the significant cuts to employment after 
1989. 
 
Managerial Missteps: Planning for Modernization in the 1970s 
 
Sydney Steel posted more than $35 million in profit during its first three years of 
operations. This was the combined result of the frantic pace of production, local tax 
breaks, and the subsidized cost of Devco coal. In February 1970, G.I. Smith announced 
$84 million in upgrades to the mill. He assured provincial taxpayers that public funds 
would not be required; rather, between Sysco’s profits and predicted growth, Smith 
believed that the company could fund its own modernization. Facility upgrades included 
new vacuum degassing facilities and an upgraded rail mill (Phase I) coupled with two 
basic oxygen furnaces (BOF) to replace the aging open hearth furnaces (Phase II).51 The 
BOF process was the heart of this re-development. With these furnaces, the time required 
for the conversion of iron to steel could be significantly reduced.52 Although Smith was 
voted out of office on October 13, 1970, the incoming Liberal premier - Gerald Regan - 
re-iterated support for the modernization.53 
Cracks were beginning to show in this plan by the fall of 1972, when Regan 
revealed that $35 million of Sysco profits had already been allocated to other budget 
items associated with operating the mill. This meant that between 1971 and 1973 – rather 
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than posting any further profits – the company had borrowed more than $11 million.54 
This ballooned into $12.7 million in losses by May 1973. Any further modernization 
would require extensive borrowing – backed by federal and provincial loan guarantees.55 
Complicating this picture was the depreciation of existing facilities. In 1972, the No. 1 
blast furnace suffered a breakdown that required a $50 million replacement, bringing the 
full cost of the planned upgrades to approximately $144 million – to be assumed by 
Sysco in the form of debt.56   
In this midst of Phase I of the modernization, management suddenly pivoted to 
another set of organizational principles. Haysom announced in June 1972 that the BOF 
upgrades had been scrapped. Instead, bewilderingly, Sysco would adopt a brand new 
technology to increase productivity in the Open Hearth Department. R.P. Nicholson, the 
development officer at Sydney Steel, describes this decision:  
Original plans had called for a conventional BOF shop […] Early in 1970 […] a 
new steelmaking technique was brought to SYSCO’s attention. Called the 
Oxygen Bottom Metallurgy process (OBM), it differed from the BOF in that the 
oxygen was delivered through the bottom of the vessel directly into the bath […] 
SYSCO was sufficiently impressed with the potential of the new process to 
initiate research to test the system […] and subsequently, to change plans, 
substituting OBM for BOF.  
 
While initial engineering work was being done […] SYSCO was experimenting 
further. The German tuyeres were placed in the bottom of the open hearth furnace 
and the effects were astounding. Production time was drastically reduced, oxygen 
efficiency was increased, and furnace yields went up […] Dubbed the 
‘Submerged Injection Process’ (SIP) the technique […] has recently been 
acclaimed in steelmaking journals and financial papers as the ‘saviour of the open 
hearth.’ 
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When the open hearths are fully modified […] one furnace will theoretically be 
able to produce as many as much as the five former ones. SYSCO will effectively 
triple its production capacity for only a fraction of the capital cost required for an 
equivalent BOF.57 
 
The SIP would provide more than $12 million in savings over the BOF model – an 
attractive option for the indebted mill. Nicholson does not mention, however, that Sysco 
President Haysom and Vice President, William Wells, held the North American patent 
for this new technology.58  
 This decision, a crossroads in the early history of Sysco, is remarkable for its lack 
of oversight. Historian Joan Bishop remarks on the strangeness of this decision:  
It is striking that a marginal operation like SYSCO felt qualified to break new 
ground in steel-making technology. The decision to abandon the proven [BOF] 
technology was based on a short period of experimentation. There is no evidence 
that the province demanded any independent evaluation of the new technique. The 
Regan government left management free to spend the modernization funds as they 
wished.59 
 
Harry Collins, a former steelworker, describes the immediate failure of this process: 
Everything would burn up, it would drive everyone crazy . . . we were at that a 
good six or nine months […] [Haysom] said it worked in other places, in 
Germany and others, but it certainly didn’t work for us. It was the worst damn 
thing there ever was!60  
 
Not only did SIP not work, its adoption meant that other portions of the planned 
modernization were now untenable and the money that had gone into its implementation 
had simply been wasted.  
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Drawing further condemnation from steelworkers were attempts to streamline 
production. The Sysco nail mill had been sold to Sivaco Wire and Nail Company and 
moved to Dartmouth in 1971, and on July 12, 1972, Haysom announced that the bar mill 
would also be sold.61  Nearly 2,700 of the plant’s 3,411 employees walked out two days 
later. Winston Ruck – now 1064 president - demanded that Premier Regan reverse the 
decision.62 The province promised to keep these departments open for at least 90 days 
while other options were explored.63  
The bar mill remained, but the steelworkers’ soon found themselves in another 
conflict. Contract negotiations were going badly. On September 20, 1972, Local 1064 
called the first legal plant-wide strike since 1946.64 The bungling of the plant’s 
modernization was a major issue. Ruck told the Post, “Too much money is wasted on a 
plant administration, over-loaded with individuals describable as anything but steelmen 
[…] Ridding the plant of these incompetents is almost as important as the wage 
questions.”65 The community soon got involved. On October 13 – five years to the day 
after Black Friday – citizens marched in another protest, this time calling on the 
government to fast-track modernization in the best interests of the city.66 Although 
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steelworkers’ voted to approve a new contract on October 23 – after more than a month 
on strike – issues surrounding the modernization went unresolved.67  
Robert Storey argues that Canadian steelworkers developed a sense of “job 
ownership” between 1945 and the 1970s. He writes, “A complete picture of this 
relationship must encompass the understanding that job ownership originates not only in 
the defensive desire of workers to end forms of employer discrimination, but is at once an 
affirmative right that informs and sparks various types of worker resistance – from the 
formation of unions to their unwillingness to support technological change or larger and 
different forms of work organization.”68 Emboldened by the achievement of public 
ownership in 1967 and the “Sydney miracle” of profitability in 1968 and 1969, 
steelworkers sought not only to achieve wage parity, but also to challenge the perceived 
mishandling of modernization. Walkouts occurred in response to restrictions on the 
product line, even when this would not come at a cost to employment figures. Workers 
began to consider workplace rights not only in terms of shop floor production, but also in 
reference to decision-making within the firm. Such a notion defies the basis of capitalist 
production, and it – along with job ownership – was soon under attack.   
Sysco was in crisis by the mid-1970s. BOF funds had been allocated elsewhere, 
the product line was quickly diminishing, and the company remained unprofitable. 
Backed by loan guarantees, Sydney Steel was now more than $150 million in debt. In 
1974, the Canadian government unilaterally embarked upon a study, working closely 
with Stelco management, to examine the viability of a new finished steel mill in Cape 
Breton.69 The CANSTEL proposal considered the establishment of a mill in Gabarus – 
just over 40 km from Sydney – through a series of tariff and tax breaks to entice private 
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investment.70 The Regan administration, searching for an option to escape responsibility 
for the ballooning Sysco debt, saw this as an opportunity to provide jobs in Cape Breton 
without the further investment necessary to complete the modernizations at Sydney Steel. 
CANSTEEL, a provincial crown corporation, was created in 1975 to further explore this 
option.71  
Concurrently, the province examined the possibility of closing Sydney Steel 
should the CANSTEL plan find success. A series of confidential reports reveal the 
options: the first explores an immediate cessation of all activities at the Sysco plant, the 
second details a slow shutdown coming to a conclusion by 1984, while the third option 
would leave the majority of the Sysco mill in operation until 1983, when the CANSTEL 
proposal called for the beginning of operations.72 Any hopes that CANSTEL or 
CANSTEEL would be implemented were dashed in late 1976, when a significant 
downturn in world steel markets effectively destroyed any possibility that private firms 
would be interested in such a scheme. PC and NDP opposition within Nova Scotia, who 
had called upon Regan to offer a concise timeline for modernization, were proven correct. 
The CANSTEL interlude had been a waste of time, and Sysco was no closer to 
modernization – let alone profitability. In February 1977, Regan announced a renewed 
commitment to the Sysco modernization. Steelworkers again lauded this decision, as they 
recognized the strain placed on aging equipment by continued operations.73   
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 Tom Kent, a Liberal party stalwart and former advisor to Lester Pearson, was 
appointed as President of Sydney Steel in August 1977. It was hoped that Kent’s federal 
connections would prove an asset, and he immediately announced intentions for a 
wholesale re-organization of operations.74 Despite receiving $20.4 million from the 
federal government in December for business planning and a capital works program, the 
turnaround failed to materialize in 1978.75 By 1979, with Sysco losses now approaching 
$1 million per week, the Nova Scotia Department of Development starkly warned: 
“Sysco is, in effect, bankrupt […] A primary government objective should be to 
transfer ownership and management of Sysco to non-government hands [and] all 
thought of building Sysco into a major steel plant […] should be abandoned.”76   
 
Another recommendation, which would have been met with considerable protest had it 
been made public, was for Sydney Steel to reduce the workforce to approximately 950 
personnel by 1982.77 These were not simply local hardships; throughout the 1970s, firms 
throughout Canada, the U.S., and Europe suffered from the impact of low-cost, high-
quality steel from Japan, South Korea, and Brazil.78 
 
Save Sysco: Lean Production and Labour Flexibility, 1980-1989   
 
The highest levels of management downplayed the full impact of the steel slump, 
although Kent resigned in August 1979 and R.B. Cameron was re-appointed as interim 
Chairman of the Board. In December, Cameron announced that production had increased 
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by 15 percent and the monthly operating loss had been halved.79 This time, the problems 
facing Sysco could not be stemmed by increases in production. The mill’s debt-load was 
approaching $300 million when Cameron announced a program of layoffs in July 1980. 
In terms of total employment, the workforce at Sysco would have been reduced from just 
over 3,000 workers to approximately 2,150.80  
The community responded with anger; letters to the editor of the Post called for a 
renewed Save Sysco campaign in the days following the announcement.81 One employee 
placed responsibility with R.B. Cameron:  
Let’s ask ourselves a few questions. Who closed the rolling mill? Who closed the 
wire and nail mill? Who tried to close the bar mill? Who has shut down the bar 
mill? Who put the plant on strike in 1972? Who hired D.W.C. Haysom? Who 
scrapped plans for a BOF when the money was allowed for it and wasted money 
instead on the SIP process? […] Who has decided to lay off over 900 workers? 
[…] May I suggest that everyone in this area knows who made those decisions.82 
 
Cameron, a blustery man with a penchant for cigars, was an unsympathetic character for 
many in Sydney. Living in a Spanish-styled villa on Kings Road, just yards from where 
Arthur Moxham had built his mansion in the early 1900s, he cut the figure of a 
stereotypical capitalist. Many blamed him for the decision. At a two-hour community 
rally on August 19, one young woman told the crowd:  
I’m not anyone important. Just a steelworkers’ wife […] My man wants to work, 
not raise a family on $147 a week unemployment […] Why [should we leave]? 
Why should we have to raise our kids somewhere where they’ll never know their 
grandparents or their aunts and uncles?”83  
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Others drew historical comparisons; “I lived through Black Friday and I’ll live through 
this. They can’t close her, they can’t get rid of us all.”84 The provincial government, now 
under PC Premier John Buchanan, responded by replacing Cameron with two new 
officials, John McCarthy as President and Michael Cochrane as Chairman. These men 
doubled down on the layoff, arguing that it was necessary for the firm to become 
competitive.85 
A federal and provincial cost-sharing agreement ignited hopes that modernization 
would finally be achieved in June 1981, when $96.25 million was announced for the 
revitalization and stabilization of the Sydney plant. Phase I involved costly repairs to one 
of the blast furnaces and the aging coke ovens.86 This decision conforms largely to the 
Sysco business plan developed in 1980 between management, the Nova Scotia 
Department of Development, and the federal Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion (DREE). Designed to “secure basic operations, reduce operating costs, and 
improve productivity,” Phase II outlined the implementation BOF steelmaking and the 
use of an idle continuous caster that had been added in 1975. This strategy recognized the 
need for economic diversification. Modernization should be developed towards “forward 
integration into additional finished products” - but the plan ultimately concluded that, 
should this occur, it would be too far into the future to make any specific 
recommendations.87   
Although these reforms were initially welcomed, they also reflect the movement 
towards post-Fordism at Sysco. Corresponding with similar transitions throughout 
Canada, the United States, and Europe, workers were asked to accept the implementation 
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of lean production, flexibility in job classification, and even job losses in order to remain 
competitive in the “new” global economy. If Fordism comprises Taylorism, Wagnerism, 
and Keynesianism, then post-Fordism is the process of challenging and removing these 
structures. According to David Harvey, this transition is characterized by the emergence 
of flexible accumulation, which relies on “flexibility with respects to the labour process, 
labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption . . . [and] above all greatly 
intensified rates of commercial, technological and organizational innovation.”88 The 
language of one 1979 Sysco managerial information systems study reveals the early 
shape of this transition. The report recommends greater attention to time-study, 
characteristic of Fordism, but it also highlights the importance of improving performance 
based on predicted market needs and re-training a team of on-site craftsmen to take on 
new inter-departmental planning responsibilities.89  
The renewed federal and provincial commitment to modernization led workers to 
believe that greater bargaining leverage was also a possibility. This was a miscalculation. 
Storey writes: 
Unlike the case during the 1950s and early 1960s, the new technologies and 
processes now being put in place [across the Canadian steel industry] were not 
intended to add to productive capacity. Instead of output, the focus shifted to 
‘competitiveness’ – a goal which has as its primary management objective the 
reshaping and reclaiming of jobs from their workforces.90  
 
As a result, with just $700,000 separating the positions of management and the 
steelworkers’ union, an agreement over wages could not be reached and the union 
declared another strike in April 1982. More than 2,000 steelworkers walked off the job, 
leaving a skeleton crew of a few hundred to bank the blast furnaces and maintain the coke 
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ovens.91 “We’re not trying to catch up [to other Canadian firms],” said union president 
Paul Grezel, “but the men are entitled to a living.”92 Just hours after a new contract was 
signed on May 7, 1982, management notified Local 1064 that the plant would not reopen 
to capacity and 1,270 union members would be laid-off as of the following Sunday. 
Management blamed the union, the union believed workers were being punished for the 
strike, and the provincial government placed the blame on “the sick Canadian 
economy.”93 In the following days, nearly 1,500 steelworkers, office employees, and 
tradespeople put in for unemployment.94  
With the majority of staff laid-off, attention turned to a prospective order from 
Canada National Railways (CN). The company was expected to announce a major 
purchase, which would allow the mill to re-open. Throughout the late 1970s, Allen J. 
MacEachen worked closely with management of CN to ensure orders for Sysco rails.95 
The 1982 order was no different; in June, Premier Buchanan confirmed that a substantial 
rail order had been received.96 Forty workers were recalled on August 2. The majority of 
the 1,500 workers were not recalled until September – after nearly four months on EI. 
Local 1064 also acquiesced to austerity measures; executive pay was cut, and the 
workload of the union secretary was reduced to only two days per week.97   
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Precarity increased between 1982 and 1986 as work was scaled to market demand. 
In February 1983, another major layoff was narrowly averted when CN renewed their 
order.98 This corresponded with a number of cost-saving actions, described by Cochrane 
as improved man-hour control, restrictions on purchasing supplies, inventory reductions, 
and energy conservation.99 Sysco was once again phased-down for the summer months 
and operating at only half-capacity with approximately 700 workers on the job.100 Even 
after the plant returned to full capacity, management announced that the coke ovens 
would be temporarily shut down. Sixty-six employees were laid-off until coking facilities 
were re-opened in November 1985.101  
Facilities had now been through two major attempts at modernization. By 1985, 
some significant changes had taken place. The No. 3 blast furnace was entirely re-built in 
1984, although its heightened capacity could not be put to use until the open hearths were 
upgraded.102 BOF steelmaking had still not been put into practice, and the older open 
hearth furnaces remained in operation. The product line now consisted of ingots, rolled 
blooms, cast blooms, slabs, rails, and tie-plate – although rails were the firm’s primary 
product.103  
Just three days after Christmas in 1985, Buchanan and federal minister of 
industrial expansion, Sinclair Stevens, called a press conference in Sydney. “Good news 
for Sydney,” is how they described a new agreement reached between the federal and 
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provincial governments. Phase II of modernization negotiations were underway, and it 
was expected that an agreement would be signed regarding another $150 million upgrade 
to Sysco facilities.104 Although one newspaper editorial remarked that the Premier was 
curiously “soft on Sysco workforce size,” Local 1064 President John Callaghan “was 
confident that the widely predicted slashing of the workforce could be avoided with 
cheaper steel production and the new product lines that will be possible.”105 The plan 
again scrapped the notion of BOF production – instead recommending a new electric arc 
furnace operation.106 
Electric arc furnaces use a mix of iron and scrap to produce hot metal. In a fully 
electric operation, this replaces the need for blast furnaces. Adrian describes the process: 
They had a 100 ton electric arc furnace, they make the steel in that, bring it up, 
pour it into this casting moulds, and by the time that heat finished they’d have 
another one going up. They’d keep it continuous. Of course, that was the name of 
it, continuous, and if they had have got it working properly, it probably was a 
good thing. But I mean, it eliminated the blast furnace, it eliminated all the 
blooming mills, you know? So, it eliminated all the open hearth from six furnaces 
to one. So you could imagine the downsizing that was done there.107   
 
There were fears that this would eliminate more jobs at the plant, but the province 
assured the union and the community that the plan was to use both electric arc and blast 
furnaces to produce hot metal – even though this was not the recommendation that had 
been offered by the province’s steel consultants.108 
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In 1986 and 1987, some provincial politicians began calling for a re-assessment of 
the commitment to Sysco. Although the modernization agreement had been signed, Nova 
Scotia finance minister Greg Kerr spoke to newspapers in October of 1986 and called 
into question the efficacy of the Sysco deal.109 The plant’s debt was of major concern, 
and he feared that modernization would not render the mill profitable. In the following 
months, a public relations battle began to take shape. Members of the provincial business 
class spoke out against the nationalized mill. Sydney mayor, Manning MacDonald, was 
vocal in his support of Sysco and the steelworkers; in 2015, MacDonald recalled that his 
opposition to planned shutdowns was based upon economic value. If Sysco were to 
disappear, he believed, Cape Bretoners would be left worse off.110 
Meanwhile, Tippins Incorporated, an American company based in Pittsburgh, was 
awarded the contract for Phase II. The company would supply expertise in the installation 
of an electric arc furnace, bloom-casting facility, ladle-refining station, upgraded rolling 
mill facilities, and a universal mill. The universal mill would broaden the product line of 
Sysco to include “mine arch bars.”111 According to steel engineers Fumio Tomizawa and 
Edward C. Howard, electric arc furnace production – the keystone piece of this portion of 
the Sysco modernization – allows for significant improvements in productivity while 
“reducing labor cost by use of labor saving equipment.”112 Dravo Automation Services of 
Pittsburgh were subcontracted by Tippins to explore the automation of production at 
Sysco through the introduction of specialty computer software, which would allow for 
greater “flexibility” among both steelworkers and salaried employees.113  
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Figure 4.4: Coke Ovens, SYSCO, 1987 
Source: Photograph by Gerry Langille, Reference 90-255-19687, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
In the midst of contract negotiations in February 1988, Sydney steelworkers again 
announced a plant-wide strike. At issue were wages, compensation for coke ovens 
employees, and improved retirement plans for any workers laid-off as the result of the 
modernization process. Callaghan remarked that the steelworkers were not seeking wage 
parity with other Canadian steel concerns, but that a wage increase of 65¢ per year would 
prevent Sysco workers from falling even further behind.114 Conflict over wage-rates is 
revealed in the collective agreements; between 1976 and 1984, each contract included: 
“The Company recognizes the principle of the parity of wages within the Steel Industry 
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and will attempt to achieve this […] The Company intends to embark upon a complete 
modernization of the whole plant which it is expected will achieve an economic base 
comparable to competitive companies. When such productivity is achieved, such wage 
increases can be contemplated.”115 After 1984, Sysco contracts no longer included this 
language.  
Breaking from common practice during other strikes, coke ovens workers walked 
off the job in 1988 and refused to provide a skeleton crew. Callaghan told the press, “The 
coke ovens workers feel that they’ve been led down the garden path. They’ve told the 
executive, don’t ask us to go in because we’re not going.”116 These employees did not 
only feel alienated from management, but also from Local 1064 - as is further examined 
in Chapter Five. On February 5, Sysco management announced that the coke ovens 
would not re-open. More than 120 workers were left unemployed, and although a 
contract agreement was soon reached, demolition of the coke ovens was scheduled to 
begin immediately.117  
Closing the coke ovens was a major indicator that the new mill would not be an 
integrated plant in any respect. Promises of a dual electric-arc/blast furnace operation 
would require coking facilities, and many viewed this closure as an early indication of a 
major layoff.118 It was only one year later that PC cabinet minister Donald Cameron 
announced a 100 percent electric arc operation at Sydney Steel.119 The blast furnaces and 
open hearth were scheduled for closure and more than 800 employees received layoff 
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notices.120 This “upgrade” was completed in 1989, and by 1991 there were only 
approximately 700 employees remaining at Sysco.  
Figure 4.5 Steelworkers, 1989 
Source: Photograph by Owen Fitzgerald, Reference 5-26.36,  
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University. 
Consecutive PC and Liberal governments oversaw an uneven modernization 
campaign that placed Sysco hundreds of millions of dollars in debt with little to show for 
it until 1989. With compound interest, the debt figure was approximately $785 million by 
1991, and decades of unprofitability had firmly positioned the mill as an “industrial 
dinosaur” in the minds of many provincial voters. In 1991, ostensibly offering Sysco an 
opportunity to bounce back after the extensive modernization, Premier Donald Cameron 
announced that the province would forgive the entire Sysco debt. Steelworkers celebrated, 
as many believed it signalled a fresh start.121 But the announcement did not symbolize a 
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renewed commitment to public ownership – it preceded a plan to privatize the mill, 
which was revealed by Cameron on January 24, 1992. He described:  
Over the last few years, real progress has been made. Today, in Sydney Steel, 
Nova Scotians have a world-class mill with the potential to produce a range of 
speciality products at competitive process. But the Government and Board of 
Directors of SYSCO are convinced that now is the best time to sell Sydney Steel. 
We believe that the private sector can manage this facility better than the 
government can.122 
 
When the Liberal Party once again regained control of the Nova Scotia Legislature in 
June 1993, they retained this policy position. Between 1993 and 1999, several private 
firms were courted in the attempt to unload the modernized mill. Manning MacDonald, a 
Liberal MLA during the 1990s, describes these years as a sort of status quo ante bellum. 
The Liberals agreed to support the plant until such time that a private buyer could be 
found. This state of affairs collapsed in 1999, when the Tories again came into power 
with a mandate to close the mill if privatization was not an immediate option.   
 
Epilogue: Post-Fordism at the Electric Arc Mill 
 
Operations at Sysco were significantly different during the 1990s. In electric arc 
production, scrap metal is fed into the furnace and a high-voltage electrical current is 
applied to melt down the raw material. This creates hot metal that can be re-worked to 
production requirements. Limestone is used in this process, and serves a similar purpose 
as in an integrated mill– to absorb some of the impurities of the melted steel and form a 
thick slag to be sloughed off during transfer. According to a Sysco skills adjustment 
study, “There are very few men working on the furnace while the heat is being made […] 
The operators of the electric arc furnace sit in a cab or pulpit above the furnace and 
constantly monitor computer displays. Adjustments, if not automatic, are done through 
inputs to the computerized controls.123 The hot metal is fed through the continuous caster 
to create blooms, before proceeding to the universal mill.  
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At the universal mill, the steel blooms are rolled into rails. They are re-heated 
using the reheat furnace before being moved through the rolling furnaces. The main 
process at the universal mill occurs while the rough blooms are transformed into rails; 
this required two “universal roughing passes,” two “edging passes,” and one “semi-
universal finishing pass.” This process shapes the rail to the size and specifications 
dictated by the production order. Unlike the electric arc furnace employees, workers at 
the universal mill have jobs that correspond to their former employment in the rolling 
mills. The skill study notes, “The big transformation of the production work here […] has 
been the introduction of computer control […] if the technology is working according to 
design, operations are mostly automated.”124 The automation of production, with workers 
employed largely in a maintenance and organizational role, was central to modernized 
operations at Sydney Steel.  
“It’s a new start with a product that will be a lot lower priced. We’ll be leaner,” 
promised Sysco President John Strasser in a 1989 interview with Atlantic Business 
Magazine.125 In the words of one magazine editor, “There’s a new attitude that exists [at 
Sysco], and the new ‘buzzword’ is profit!”126 Along with a new process of work based 
upon automation and computerized production, workers at Sydney Steel had to come to 
terms with an entirely new organizational structure. Full production was forecast at 
219,000 tons of steel, with an operational workforce of 709 employees.127 With the 
transition in the labour process came a firming up of managerial commitment to post-
Fordist organizational strategies; Dave Ervin recalls the attempted merger of job 
classifications after modernization: 
Unfortunately, like I say some of the problem’s with the union, but unfortunately 
some of the jobs on the steel plant . . . they’re so, bound up in history. Like, okay, 
if I’m an electrician, I need an electrician helper to help me do a job. No matter 
how simple the job is. The helper goes with me. Same with the millwrights, same 
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with the plumbers […] I took a course on this at Dal (Dalhousie University). CLC, 
Canadian Labour Congress, put on this course, on basically combining jobs. The 
modern workforce […] They were just too – caught up in history. And history 
changes. And a lot of them couldn’t realize that. And that’s the main reason the 
plant closed. That last contract they signed could have solved a lot of those 
problems . . . going from 22 pay rates down to about, 5 or 6 . . . but a lot of the 
guys there were against it.  
 
In the new configuration, production could quickly be started or halted to 
correspond with global steel markets. As with other post-Fordist firms, this would 
involve employing only a small core of full-time maintenance workers, while a larger 
number of flexible employees could be hired on or laid off as dictated by demand. While 
this transition came at a cost of more than 800 jobs, the adjustment study notes: “For 
those who will be continuing to work at the plant, technological changes have mean [sic] 
that much of the knowledge and skills accumulated over the years will no longer be of 
direct practical use, and new skills and expertise have had to be acquired by a group of 
mostly middle-aged workers.”128 
These changes required re-training. Employees had the option of signing up for 
evening courses, while the company sent another small group to Germany to experience 
production in a modern plant. New automatic systems, computerized controls, and 
methods of steelmaking created a situation where generations of skill and knowledge 
were suddenly out-dated.129 While Braverman postulates that Fordism strips workers of 
both craft skills and workplace control, the development of post-Fordism and flexible or 
lean production has lead to a further re-thinking of skill in the modern workplace. 
Bennett Harrison describes a new economic world, characterized by contingent 
employment, stagnant wages, and the threat of capital flight.130 Yuko Aoyama and 
Manuel Castells take a different approach, arguing that the “new economy” reflects an 
up-skilling of the labour market to correspond with the developments of an information 
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and knowledge-based economy.131 Oral history testimony allows us to move beyond this 
debate to reveal workers subjective experiences of shifts in skill and identity that 
occurred alongside the changing labour process.  
Workers’ accounts of Sysco between 1967 and 1989 refer extensively to the 
active characteristics of work. Workers from the blast furnaces, open hearth, and rolling 
mills explain production in sense-based and active terms. From freezing on the high 
cranes to sweating in the open hearth or stick-handling a crane overtop of a crowded 
shop-floor, work was dialectically produced and felt by workers’ bodies. On the job 
practice is viewed as essential for the development of the skills and know-how that were 
required, and workers’ often questioned the applicability of outside training to the 
specific work process at the mill. Leslie MacCuish, a Sysco employee who was re-trained 
after the modernization, spoke unfavourably about the transition: 
Us fellows should have been taken when the furnace was being built, the furnace 
guys go with the furnace guys, and the L.R.F. fellows and caster fellows. We 
should have been taken and put on them jobs where they were building the 
furnace. Different parts of the furnace. We'd know where to go if there was 
trouble. We'd know what to do. We got computers there, sure. Stuff like that.  
Half of us guys don't know anything about computers.132 
 
Others reflected on the new skills required: 
John Murphy: This new mill is all computerized and where we used to go up with 
wrenches and bars and hammers and work our butts off to make these tolerances, 
they just press a button and the computer does it now.133  
 
Barry Brocklehurst: It's more efficient, I think and it's good quality steel product. 
That's about it, I guess […] You have to watch out, watch the water supply, make 
sure no alarms come off.  You have to make sure you can get them back on right 
quick, before losing your steel or breakouts or something like that […] It's every 
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man for himself, now.  There is no carrying on or anything like that. Very little of 
it.  Everybody is scared of everybody else, cutting each other's throat.134  
 
Labour Process Theory has traditionally focused on skill and control as reflections 
of organizational structures; Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars argue that post-Fordism 
has masked the continuation of deskilling and increased managerial control endemic 
within the capitalist mode of production, while the liberal position views work in the new 
economy in terms of flexibility, teamwork, and efficiency. Duncan Gallie charts a middle 
ground in his study of work in Britain. Drawing upon K.I. Spenner’s definition of skill as 
“the substantive complexity of job tasks in terms of the level, scope and integration of 
mental, manipulative, and interpersonal tasks,” Gallie argues that the British labour 
market since the 1990s has witnessed a broad trend of upskilling along with a 
corresponding loss of workers’ control over the labour process.135 If we accept this 
definition, the same conclusion broadly holds in the analysis of work processes at Sysco 
through the late 20th century. Steelworkers were re-trained after 1989 to develop skills 
associated with a technical modern steel facility. Despite this, the threat of 
deindustrialization and job losses contributed to a sense of lost control over the process of 
production. 
Oral histories of work at the plant reveal how such a narrow definition of skill and 
control cannot be fully applied to workers’ subjective understandings of changing work 
process. Workers’ accounts reveal a deeply held belief that the new labour process 
represented a fundamental break from the skills and sentiments associated with 
steelmaking at an integrated plant. This does not simply mean the decline of physical 
labour or “bull work,” but the perceived end of active participation in production. As E.P. 
Thompson wrote, “It is quite possible for statistical averages and human experiences to 
run in opposite directions.”136 Although shop floor employees at Sysco were re-trained in 
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work methods more appropriate to the so-called flexibility of the new economy, the loss 
of traditional practices of work, training and older forms of camaraderie – to borrow 
again from Thompson – felt like an immiseration.  
In identifying the disjuncture in labour processes and understandings of skill and 
control at Sydney Steel, this chapter does not seek to contribute to an idealistic or 
nostalgic representation of Fordist production or a “Golden Age” of capitalism. Sysco 
employees also remember industrial employment as dangerous, sometimes unhealthy, 
and oftentimes unpleasant. It should also be noted that oral history testimony in this 
chapter is drawn from interviews conducted in both 1990 and 2014; interviews conducted 
in 1990 occurred at a moment of profound trauma at Sysco, with the massive shift in 
work processes having resulted in hundreds of lost jobs. Although many of those who 
were interviewed in more recent years continued to view the final modernization as 
moment of profound disconnection, those who remained employed at the plant after 1989 
spoke of steelwork as a shared experience that continued to hold meaning.137 As Tim 
Strangleman argues, scholarly claims regarding the “end of work” and the de-centring of 
employment from identity have been greatly exaggerated.138  
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Fighting for Compensation at the Sydney Coke Ovens, 1986-1990 
 
 
From the ‘re-born’ environmentally conscious politicians to the tourist dollar oriented 
civic administrators – to the sterile medical community. To the ivory tower of the 
academic community and the comfortable pews of the clergy, the men, women and 
children cry out for justice – Who will answer? Who will answer?1 
 
- Don MacPherson, Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice 
 
The plumes of smoke that billowed from the local steelworks have been woven into the 
collective memory of steelmaking in Sydney. Former coke ovens employee Joe Legge 
recalls, “It was part of your everyday living. People that lived [in the working-class 
neighbourhood surrounding the plant], depending on which way the wind was blowing 
didn’t hang their wash up on certain days. Because they knew it would either come in red 
from the blast furnace or black from the coke ovens. And this was a regular thing . . . 
people lived their lives like that.”2 The smell, described as sulphurous – similar to rotten 
eggs – is another frequent sensory recollection of those who worked at the provincially 
owned Sydney Steel Corporation. Residents of Ashby and Whitney Pier, the two 
neighbourhoods immediately adjacent to the plant, remember closing their windows 
when the wind changed direction; this was to prevent the smoke from leaving ashy 
deposits on floors and countertops.3  
The multi-coloured smoke, present in oral narratives of Sydney’s former life as a 
steel town, is often positioned as a character in its own right. It plays many roles; 
sometimes it is framed as a silent killer, bringing carcinogenic dustfall to the unwitting 
community surrounding the plant, while in others it is a nuisance – something to be put 
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up with for the sake of jobs and the local economy.4 However the smoke is represented, 
in each case it arrives to signal a description of the way things used to be; Sydney, in 
these stories, was a very different place in the years prior to the plant’s modernization in 
the late 1980s and final closure in 2001. Although the dirty air of the steelmaking past is 
often contrasted with the community green space that now rests on the Sysco site, several 
interviewees remarked upon the continued relevance of industrial pollutants to life in the 
city. Sysco’s smoke has not soiled residents’ laundry for decades, but its material effects 
continue to loom large over concerns about environmental justice, workers’ 
compensation and the public health impact of deindustrialization in the city.  
As early as the mid-1960s, researchers began examining the effects of industrial 
dustfall in Sydney. In 1965, a report commissioned by the Canadian Department of 
National Health and Welfare found that air pollution levels in the neighbourhoods 
surrounding the plant were significantly higher than normal, and that the levels of fine 
particulate matter could possibly result in respiratory problems for residents.5 These 
findings were replicated in the 1970s, when further studies on air pollutants found that 
the half-mile surrounding the coke ovens tested especially high for dustfall.6 The Nova 
Scotia government restricted public access to many of these early reports until the late 
1980s, when a group known as the Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice challenged 
the province, their union, and management on the issue of workers’ compensation for 
occupational illness. Their resistance, and their insistence upon the damaging effects of 
shop-floor exposure to coke ovens emissions, would result in an overhaul of 
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compensation practices relating to workplace illness in Nova Scotia. So, too, did their 
efforts inform public attempts to find accountability for the environmental aftermath of 
deindustrialization. 
Figure 5.1: Pollution from the Sydney Steel Plant, 1955 
Source: Photographer unknown, Reference 97-439-28287, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
An Emerging Consensus:  
Hazardous Working Conditions in North American Coking Facilities 
While the early scientific research focused on possible links between respiratory illness 
and fine particulate matter resulting from steel production in Sydney, elsewhere 
researchers began to take note of heightened rates of certain cancers among coke ovens 
employees who were exposed to airborne toxins within the workplace. In 1970, an 
occupational health study of 58,828 American steelworkers conducted between 1953 and 
1961 found that coke ovens employees suffered from heightened risk of “malignant 
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neoplasm of the respiratory system” – lung cancer. This was especially pronounced for 
those workers employed on top of the battery, where exposure to gas and coke fumes was 
more frequent. Such a finding, the authors’ conclude, “[is likely] due to factors in the 
coke plant environment.”7 Studies of this nature were conducted in steel-producing 
regions of the world throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and each noted the correlation 
between occupational exposure to coke ovens emissions and bodily illness.8 
In Ontario, the nascent Injured Workers Movement challenged the provincial 
government on issues of workplace illness and compensation as early as 1974.9 The Elliot 
Lake uranium workers’ wildcat strike in that year, largely over issues surrounding 
compensation and occupational disease, prompted the provincial government to appoint a 
Royal Commission to explore the ongoing health crisis.10 The result of these struggles 
was the 1978 passage of Bill C70: An Act Respecting the Occupational Health and Safety 
of Ontario Workers. Robert Storey writes, “For the first time, Ontario workers had the 
statutory right to know about the substances they worked with, could help promote and 
ensure safe and healthy workplaces through their participation in joint health and safety 
committees, and had the right to refuse work they believed was unsafe.”11 
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Members of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) started to recognize 
occupational illness resulting from coke ovens work in the United States even earlier, by 
the late 1960s in some cases. Dan Hannan, an employee at the Clairton Works in 
Pittsburgh, was instrumental creating this awareness. Coming from a steelworking family, 
Hannan’s older brother was a labour activist who had been involved in the struggle to 
organize Clairton for the USWA.12 Hannan was a coke ovens worker and served as 
president of his union local; in 1967, U.S. Steel began a series of modernizations to his 
workplace. Hannan helped to put together a list of colleagues who had become seriously 
ill or died as the result of issues with lung capacity or cancers, which would later be 
presented to federal regulatory agencies. Recognizing an apparent connection between 
employment in the coke ovens and occupational illness, he formed a Steelworkers Air 
Pollution and Black Lung Committee and started lobbying politicians and union leaders 
for a solution. Following the passage of the U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Act in 
1970, he testified before the OSHA Standards Advisory Committee on Coke Ovens 
Emissions. Hannan’s speech is compelling, and foreshadows many of the arguments later 
put forward by the Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice in Sydney:  
Each name there identifies a man who worked at a hard job, in the heat of the 
coke ovens, in the valley of the Monongahela River. Their labor made possible 
the steel we have used as automobiles or refrigerators, or pins and needles, or 
brides, or nails to hold our houses together. When we bought our cars we thought 
nothing of paying an extra $10 or $15 to have a cigarette lighter on the dashboard 
– but we didn’t pay the extra one or two dollars per car it would have cost to clean 
up the coke ovens and save some of these men’s lives.  
 
These men are not statistics. They were human beings, like you and me. And as 
they worked they, too, had their dreams – perhaps of retirement to enjoy the fruits 
of their labor. They had wives, and families and homes. They had friends to visit 
with, and children to advise, and grandchildren to spoil – and no doubt they 
looked forward to devoting their later years to such pleasures.  
  
[Through OSHA] the American people have spoken. We, the people, are no 
longer willing to be accomplices to industrial murder.13 
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After this testimony, OSHA released an upgraded set of health and safety standards for 
American coking plants. These included a series of engineering controls on older plants, 
designed to reduce emissions and create a safer, healthier workplace. Jack Sheehan, a 
spokesman for the USWA, said that the union was pleased with the result.14  
The international union was quite willing to share information back and forth with 
Canadian locals. In 1976, representatives from Local 1005 at the Steel Company of 
Canada (Stelco) contacted the union international offices for information on American 
compensation claims for occupational illness among coke ovens workers. The Hamilton 
union sought compensation for the widow of a coke ovens worker, “L. Skuranec,” who 
passed away from cancers of the rectum, lungs, and bone.15 Her claim had been denied in 
Ontario; the provincial Workers’ Compensation Board writes that, despite 37 years 
working on top of the coke ovens batteries, “Mr. Skuranec’s death resulted from non-
industrial condition and was not related to nor characteristic to the type of work he 
performed while in the employment of Stelco.”16 The union provided Lennie with 
information drawn from the research of William Lloyd - an epidemiologist who worked 
closely with the union on coke ovens claims – as well as American guidelines for coke 
ovens compensation, USWA health and safety statistics, and articles detailing the 
emerging health concerns stateside.17 Newspapers in Hamilton soon picked up the story, 
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with headlines in The Spectator proclaiming, “Killer Coke Ovens” and “Coke Oven 
Death Alarm Ignored.”18 
These events did not immediately prompt a reaction in Nova Scotia, although a 
1976 op-ed piece in the Cape Breton Post laments, “sadly . . . the information appears to 
have made no noticeable impact on those who should be concerned about it here: Sysco 
itself, Local 1064 of the United Steelworkers Union, and the Nova Scotia Workmen’s 
Compensation Board.”19 Concern surrounding occupational and community exposure to 
steelmaking emissions continued to grow as more local reports were released. In 1977, 
the “Report of the Sydney Respiratory Health Survey” revealed that coke ovens 
emissions exceed the “maximum desirable level of . . . sulphur dioxide over one hour” by 
more than 45 percent, and the maximum level of “suspended particulate matter” by 97 
percent. The authors of this survey concluded that these statistics were likely to “[have] 
some measurable negative effect on respiratory function for the residents of Whitney Pier 
and Ashby” – not to mention those employed on top of the coke ovens batteries.20  
The reluctance among some members of Local 1064 to challenge the province 
and company on issues of environmental justice was related to the precarious situation at 
Sysco during the early 1980s. The union had taken some steps to bring issues of health 
and safety to the attention of management in 1979, when officials presented a document 
to Sysco asking “that the Coke Ovens Department Management take a closer look at 
Safety in the Department regarding […] emissions.” The document also describes the 
heightened rates of cancer found within coke ovens employees, but remarks “We realize 
that with a plant as old as ours it is very hard to implement engineering a pollution 
machinery right away, but we feel there are some areas where improvements can be made 
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immediately.”21 With the importation of new technologies and the industry-wide turn 
towards lean and flexible production, labour relations were strained even before the 
wildcats and strikes of the 1980s.  
Figure 5.2: Whitney Pier, 1989 
Source: Photograph by Owen Fitzgerald, Reference 5-26.31,  
 Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
Following the 1982 strike, Sydney union leaders sought to stabilize the continued 
operations of the plant before focusing on issues of occupational illness and 
compensation. A two-year shutdown of the coke ovens between 1983 and 1985 caused 
some to worry about the future of that department. In this climate, it was difficult for 
workers who were concerned about the health impacts of the coke ovens to have their 
voices heard. Several employees grew concerned with the apparent higher probability of 
cancer or other illnesses developing among current and former coke ovens workers, and 
tried to bring the issue to the attention of union officials and plant management. Dan 
       
21 Dave MacLeod, 26 February 1979, Box 3, Files 7-8, Steel Project, MG, 206, Beaton 
Institute Archives (BI), Sydney, NS.  
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Yakimchuk, a former steelworker and city councillor in Sydney, describes accessing two 
restricted provincial studies relating to industrial pollution: 
D. Yakimchuk: I mean the worst of course was the studies done [in 1973 and 
1974] on pollution […] I got a hold of a study that was sent to the 
union office. It was supposed to be passed around the membership 
and it was never done. On the effects of pollution, the coke ovens 
pollution particularly.  
 
M. Earle:  But the union, just to go back to that, the union had this, had got 
hold of this but they never distributed it to the members. 
 
D. Yakimchuk: No.  It was in the officers' office.  And I got it, I think it was 
Gramps Kiley [a former union president], when he was in there, he 
passed it along to me, because him and I were very good friends 
[…] He just passed me a copy, "Don't say where you got it," type 
of thing. Before that I started wondering why guys were dying, you 
know . . . I mean to me it didn't make sense.  I mean how come the 
teachers when they retired didn't die two or three months later? 
And I seemed to be a voice in the wilderness, because everybody, 
not everybody, but my members of council, didn't even know what 
I was talking about […] Because people were really scared of their 
jobs.22 
 
According to Yakimchuk, the ability of Sydney steelworkers to challenge the provincial 
government on issues of workplace health – specifically on the subject of occupational 
illness in the coke ovens – was stymied by the constant threat of job loss and 
unemployment. 
Meanwhile, scientific studies were undertaken to ascertain the health impacts of 
coke ovens emissions on employees and residents of industrial communities. Between 
1982 and 1985, three federal research studies examined the public health impact of 
carcinogenic “polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons” (PAH) produced during the coking 
process in Sydney. These reports all made explicit reference to increased levels of PAH 
found adjacent to the coke ovens site; Lawrence Hildebrand, writing in 1982, concluded 
                                                
22 Dan Yakimchuk, interview by Michael Earle, April 20, 1990, Steel Project, Box 5, File 
7, transcript, BI.  
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that “the plant does not have environmental controls that meet todays standards.”23 The 
health impact of these findings were described in 1984, when Atwell et. al. confirm: 
 
Epidemiological findings among coke oven workers [in the United States] show 
that coke ovens emissions can also lead to the development of non-malignant 
respiratory disease such as chronic bronchitis and emphysema . . . workers 
exposed to relatively high levels of coke oven emissions develop cancer, 
especially of the respiratory tract, at rates significantly higher than those reported 
for other workers.24  
 
The most controversial of these three reports was released in August 1985, when 
J.R. Hickman argued in a federal study that the continued operation of the Sydney coke 
ovens – barring the implementation of an emission-reduction scheme – would result in 
heightened levels of cancer among workers and the general public.25 In addition to this 
report, Hickman penned a letter to the Attorney General of Nova Scotia to illustrate his 
concerns regarding public and occupational health and the Sydney coke ovens. The 
attorney general admitted receiving this letter during the discovery portion of an ongoing 
lawsuit relating to Sysco’s environmental impact, but denied that Hickman’s findings 
could be extrapolated to the residents in areas surrounding the plant. “Whether an actual 
risk exists depends on the degree of exposure,” he writes, “Hickman admitted that there 
were no PAH environmental guidelines at the time. It was not known what exposure 
levels to PAH ‘s were considered acceptable.”26 
 
‘We’ll Go Down Fighting or We’ll Win’: Sysco Workers’ Battle for Compensation  
                                                
23 Lawrence P. Hildebrand, Environmental Quality in Sydney and Northeast Industrial 
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Prior to the release of the Hickman report, with the Coke Ovens Department scheduled to 
re-open in December 1985, the public was becoming more aware of the environmental 
and possible public health impacts of coke production at Sysco. In May, provincial 
epidemiologist Pierre Lavigne attempted to assuage concerns during an interview with 
Betsy Chambers of the Cape Breton Post. Lavigne admitted that coke emissions 
contained heightened levels of PAH, and that the areas surrounding the plant did have 
much higher rates of lung and stomach cancer; any link between these two facts, he 
cautioned, was “highly speculative.” He also pointed to high rates of smoking among 
workers in Cape Breton; “the fact that it’s an industrial area might not have anything to 
do [with the cancer rates],” Lavigne argued, though he did recommend the 
implementation of cautionary emission controls upon the re-commissioning of the 
ovens.27 
Only a few weeks before the re-opening, several articles in the Sydney newspaper 
began questioning the decision. “Sysco ignoring studies, will reopen coke oven,” read the 
Post headline on November 4; “this . . . will expose workers and nearby residents to 
carcinogenic chemicals at levels which scientists have concluded are dangerous.” 
Company officials refused to comment, aside from reminding the public that the start up 
“would create about 50 new jobs at the plant itself, as well as badly needed jobs in Cape 
Breton coal mines.”28 The new president of Local 1064, John Callaghan, and the Liberal 
leader of the provincial opposition, Vince MacLean, each released statements supporting 
the company’s decision to re-open the ovens. MacLean remarked that the complete 
closure of the ovens would amount to “putting a gun to the head” of unemployed 
steelworkers, while Callaghan cryptically mused on a possible “conspiracy by someone 
to try and stop the second phase of the Sydney Steel modernization plan.”29 
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The plant’s existence as a public corporation fed into the notion, expressed by 
Callaghan, that there were powerful political forces aligned against continued operations 
by the late 1980s – both provincially and nationally. This idea remains visible in oral 
history testimony, and is perhaps not without merit; as General Office manager Fred 
James reflects, mainland voters in the province were tired of supporting Sydney Steel 
debts with their tax dollars.30 This idea was further cemented in 1999, when John Hamm 
– a Pictou County MLA – was elected as premier. Several informants recall the ‘Sysco 
postcard’ released by the Hamm campaign; this is described as an image of the plant 
marked “closed”, juxtaposed with a series of empty hospital beds marked “open.”31 As a 
result, this idea is much more firmly asserted in interviews conducted since the closure of 
the plant; while Callaghan hints at a conspiracy, former employees interviewed in recent 
years are much more explicit about perceived back-room efforts to close Sysco. 
These suspicions, and the tensions they created between workers, their union, the 
corporation, and the provincial government are also reflected in the testimony related to 
the release of confidential emissions studies during the 1980s. Yakimchuk describes the 
clandestine retrieval of documents revealing the extent of pollution at Sysco; according to 
Yakimchuk, the union was in full knowledge of this material but kept it from the rank 
and file.32 Charlie MacDonald, a member of the union executive, believes that the 
company had access to these scientific reports but kept the information from the union 
until the end of the decade.33 Don MacPherson, an electrician at the plant and later a 
founding member of the Coke Ovens Workers United For Justice, described being passed 
the documents from an anonymous source.34 In each case, the retrieval of these reports is 
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presented as a ‘eureka’ moment’ when the full extent of coke ovens illness and risk 
finally became clear. Indeed, Steven High writes that stories of “liberating” documents 
from recalcitrant corporations can also represent “an act of defiance in the face of […] 
erasure.”35 
While the secreting of confidential documents out of the plant under the watchful 
eyes of security and management presents an interesting narrative structure for the 
emergence of resistance among the coke ovens workers, it is likely that this resistance 
sprang from the material processes of industrial decline. As Arthur McIvor argues, 
worklessness and deindustrialization each have a direct impact on workers’ bodily 
health.36 In these instances, deindustrialization is a visible agent in the unfolding 
contradictions of capitalism. David Harvey describes how workers’ bodies dialectically 
exist both as active agents within, and bodily receptacles of, productive forces.37 
Industrial capitalism demands healthy bodies for production, but produces unhealthy 
bodies. In Sydney, emerging understandings surrounding the physical impact of industrial 
pollution combined with local knowledge of the health effects of the shop floor – as 
expressed by Yakimchuk above – to result in bottom-up resistance from outside of the 
traditional institutional structures of the workplace. 
These pressures were not new. Workers have long agitated for protection in the 
industrial workplace, and for good reason. More than 300 men have been killed at Sysco 
during its century of production. Workplace accidents, explosions, mistakes, and unsafe 
conditions continue to prompt countless injuries and traumas across Canada. These often 
result in drawn-out applications, rejected claims, and labyrinthian application processes. 
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Robert Storey writes that these workers “have taken on the task of constructing the 
passageway even as they move through it.”38 In Sydney, many attribute a gas explosion 
that occurred in the coke ovens on August 25, 1977 as a key event that inspired a 
renewed focus on health and safety within the department in later years.39 
Figure 5.3: Joe Legge, 2015 
Source: Photograph by Steve Wadden, Sydney, NS 
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This explosion is recalled clearly by Joe Legge. When we met at his home on 
Rockdale Avenue in Sydney, it was obvious that he had thought extensively about the 
circumstances surrounding the accident. Tommy McCarron gave me Joe’s name; he told 
me that Joe had been involved in an accident on the Sysco site, and that he had – in the 
years since – worked extensively with occupational health and safety. I later learned that 
Joe often speaks to Work Safe Nova Scotia and to patients at the IWK children’s burn 
unit in Halifax about his experience. On August 25 1977, at 29 years of age, Joe was 
burned on 65 percent of his body in the Sydney coke ovens. He describes: 
They were changing a valve in the gas main that took the vaporized gas away 
from the coking process […] The safety process at the time called for a back 
pressure of steam six times greater than the flow rate of the gas […] So they put 
the steam on, the gas was shut off, and the safety people took their tests – no gas 
in the area. But the valve that they were replacing was being taken out and 
cleaned up because tar had gotten into the key-way […] But what they didn’t 
know was that the shut-off valve that was supposed to be directing the gas the 
other way had the same problem. […] So it’s August 25th, 80 degrees, you’re in a 
room about the size of this, sweating bullets. Somebody says, “Shut the steam off 
a little bit” . . . Next thing you know, the steam was shut off […] The maintenance 
guys take their bolts out, they just opened the top up […] So it sucks in 80 degree 
air, hits 2,200 degree gas in the pipe. [claps hands]. Just that quick.  
 
I was standing with one hand on the chain hoist, that was supporting this valve, 
and there was two mechanics taking the bolts out […] And I heard [snaps fingers]. 
And that was the ignition point within the pipe. Within seconds the flame came up 
through the top […] I was standing right above it. It hit me in the chest and tossed 
me about 15 feet through the air. And the flame went straight up, and hit the roof, 
and came back down – so the initial concussion – there was 17 people there – the 
initial concussion knocked everybody down. So when the flame came back down 
[…] most of them got burnt on the back of their neck, the backs of their arms, the 
backs of the ears.  
 
With the exception of me. Who got, right in the chest. I got the full blast of it. I 
landed in the middle of the doorway. So sixteen guys, in panic, ran right over top 
of me in their efforts to get out. And, uh, I . . . managed to get myself out by 
myself. […] And Ray Drohan, the electrical foreman at the time, had his car 
nearby. He had just bought a brand new Buick, with leather upholstery, and he 
grabbed me by the arm and he said, “Joe, get in the car.” And I opened the door 
and I said, I’m going to ruin all your upholstery!” Because, you know, I had skin 
all hanging off me everywhere. And he said, “Get the . . . in the car!”  
 
I got in the car and he drove me up to the hospital […] He pulled up to the 
ambulance entrance, there were two double doors, and I pushed them open. And 
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stepped inside and there was a Doctor and two nurses who were standing there, 
they had charts in their hands, and when I pushed open the door the three of them 
looked at me, and made a run for me. And after that I remember waking up two 
weeks later in the burn unit in Halifax […] There was eight of us, eight of the 
seventeen, up to Halifax […] Wish I could forget […] 
 
Thirty-seven years ago. I’d like to forget it. Unfortunately, that’s never going to 
happen. The good thing is that I have very few nightmares anymore. For the 
longest time, I’d wake up two or three o’clock in the morning, going through the 
whole thing over again. Seeing that ball of fire coming at me. And [pause]. It 
upsets the whole household. I mean, nobody’s going to sleep after that you start 
screaming. That went on for the longest time. Now, if I’m caught off guard – like 
I don’t watch movies that have explosions or things like that. And sometimes, it’s 
only every now and then you get caught not being aware of something and all of 
the sudden Bang-o, it’s there and you’re, ‘Oh, shit,’ you know? Your 
subconscious starts working and the next thing you know, there’s a nightmare 
coming.40 
 
Joe went back to work at the plant five years later, and stayed with Sysco until the 
final closure. Although his case was quickly adjudicated by workers’ compensation, as he 
explains, “there was no way they were going to look at me and say, ‘you’re faking this,’” 
legislation at the time covered only physical disabilities that would prevent someone from 
working. He received 18 percent disability. One of the maintenance men injured in the 
same accident had burns on his arms; he received 35 percent disability. While Joe’s scars 
are more visible than those that remain with workers suffering from occupational illness, 
both experiences reveal the shortcomings in the Nova Scotia compensation system during 
the late 1970s and 1980s.  
In December 1985, the Coke Ovens Department re-opened after a two-year 
furlough, but by the end of the month the future of the integrated mill was once more in 
question. Alongside an announcement of significant modernization funding (Phase II), 
John Buchanan and Sinclair Stevens revealed plans to clean the Sydney “tar ponds” site – 
located next to the steel mill.41 The circumstances of these clean up efforts are discussed 
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41 “Sysco, tar pond projects announced,” Cape Breton Post, December 28, 1985; “Sysco 
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in Chapter Six, but emerging environmental concerns, coupled with the possibility of an 
electric arc operation that would negate the need for coking facilities, meant that 
employees were again plunged into uncertainty.  
By the summer of 1986, workers’ fears were beginning to be realized. On August 
31, Premier John Buchanan and federal Environment Minister Tom McMillan announced 
that work on the tar ponds clean up would begin immediately, but also that the coke 
ovens would be closed down in July 1988. The department was quickly becoming linked, 
in the minds of the public, with ongoing issues of pollution and environmental damage to 
the lands surrounding the mill. The government promised the union that nearly 200 jobs 
would be created, to offset the 120 positions lost at the coke ovens, and that coke plant 
workers would have the right of first refusal to these positions.42 Workers were 
immediately sceptical of this; Don MacPherson explains his position in an open letter to 
Premier Buchanan: 
The general view of most steelworkers is that we are in the final throes of a 
complete phase-down, if not indeed a phase-out of steel operations at Sysco […] 
Now we face, under the pretext of the tar ponds clean up, closure of the Sysco 
coke ovens […] Steelworkers would consider continuous iron production without 
a coking plant laughable, were it not so tragic […] Mr. Premier, a policy of “keep 
them in the dark on a diet of horse manure” is fine for growing mushrooms but it 
does nothing to alleviate the spectre of further mass unemployment at Sydney 
Steel.43 
 
Local 1064 accepted the plan with cautious optimism. On July 24, Buchanan promised 
Callaghan a feasibility study on the construction of a new coke ovens operation. Such an 
operation would implement necessary emissions controls and offset concerns over lost 
jobs.44 The proposed closure of the coke ovens and the union’s tacit acceptance of the 
plan lead to the creation of the Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice – a “vigilante 
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committee” composed of steelworkers Don MacPherson, David MacLeod, John Rocket, 
and Bernie Sharp.45 
Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice emerged as the result of three concurrent 
issues related to the coke ovens closure. Firstly, workers did not believe claims that the 
modernization and tar ponds remediation would create enough quality jobs for former 
coke plant employees. Secondly, there were a number of issues relating to seniority 
among coke ovens workers that would have to be resolved for the purposes of workers’ 
pensions.46 The issue that garnered the majority of the committee’s attention, however, 
was related to workers’ compensation for current and former coke ovens employees. The 
Nova Scotia Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) did not designate the coke ovens as a 
hazardous workplace, despite decades of evidence, and the system for illness 
compensation was largely dedicated to dealing with pneumoconiosis – black lung – 
among the island’s coal miners.47  
 Deindustrialization provoked a set of circumstances wherein a longstanding “high 
threshold culture” in the Coke Ovens Department was subverted by bottom-up protest. 
Arthur McIvor, writing of British asbestos workers, describes:  
Men were habituated to undertaking dangerous work, to accepting a high-risk 
threshold, and to being part of a fiercely independent working class culture that 
frowned upon anyone who complained or ‘made a fuss.’ A dominant (or 
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hegemonic) form of ‘hard man’ masculinity was forged in such heavy industry 
workplaces.48 
 
Facing the possible closure of the coke ovens and the spectre of occupational disease, the 
men in Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice stepped beyond the bounds of industrial 
masculinity to demand recognition. Local 1064, wary of economic instability wrought by 
job losses, were slower to act. Some on the executive felt that MacPherson and the others 
were acting out of turn, and that compensation for the coke ovens workers was one of 
many issues facing the Sydney steelworkers. Nonetheless, trade unionists did eventually 
come to challenge the high-risk work culture at the mill. By 1988, Local 1064 had joined 
forces with the coke ovens activists to challenge the province on workplace health and 
occupational illness.    
In his keynote speech at the Deindustrialization and Its Aftermath conference in 
2014, Robert Storey spoke of workers’ compensation in Ontario “starting from no.” This 
was also the modus operandi of the Nova Scotia WCB in relation to claims of 
occupational disease.  In 1986, a Sysco employee named Joseph Louis Assoun applied to 
the WCB for industrial bronchitis. In a letter from W.J. Penney of Sysco Personnel 
Services to the WCB, Assoun’s work history is described: 14 years at the coke screening 
plant and “around the battery operations,” with an additional year labouring in other 
departments before returning to the coke plant. Nonetheless, Penney writes, “We are not 
aware of any hazardous environmental exposure Mr. Assoun would have been in contact 
with.”49 Assoun’s claim was denied. “It was felt that his long history of smoking was the 
main etiological factor,” explained R.J. Allen of the WCB, “his industrial exposure did 
not significantly contribute to his particular medical problem.”50  
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Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice organized a concerted letter-writing and 
media campaign surrounding the compensation issue in 1987. As the result of this 
pressure, Cape Breton Liberal Member of Parliament Dave Dingwall became involved in 
the discussion. In a letter to Sysco President Ernie Boutilier, Dingwall cautions Sysco to 
act as a good corporate citizen and behave in the best interests of the community it serves. 
“Furthermore,” he writes, “could you also indicate to me as to why the Sydney Steel 
Corporation is repudiating statements made by some of the workers who have been 
affected negatively by the emissions coming from the Coke Ovens?”51  
Political attention from local MLA’s and MP’s made both the company and union 
officials uncomfortable. Boutilier explained that the company was “concerned for the 
welfare of all . . . employees,” and that they were exploring assistance options for coke 
ovens workers. Any changes to the pension structure for former employees was related to 
negotiations with the steelworkers’ union and, according to Boutilier, could not be 
discussed publicly. He also writes that the WCB denial of coke ovens workers’ 
compensation claims was the result of “a medical examination, and a review of medical 
evidence, not on the basis of any statement by the company.”52 Such a claim is at odds 
with the content of W.J. Penney’s 1986 letter to the WCB in the Assoun case. Charlie 
MacDonald largely supports Boutilier’s position on the pension issue; in a 2015 interview, 
he describes how MacPherson and the Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice were 
unaware of ongoing negotiations between Local 1064 and Sysco management.53  
The existence of an ad-hoc, extra-union committee organizing around issues of 
workers’ health and compensation was unpopular among some of the other members of 
Local 1064. Many felt, as MacDonald did, that the union was already addressing these 
grievances through the proper channels and that MacPherson’s efforts were simply 
playing into efforts to smear Sysco. The actions of Coke Ovens Workers United for 
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Justice did have some other tangible effects; in April 1988, a letter on behalf of the 
committee was cited in the Assoun appeal to the WCB. The board found that industrial 
exposure did likely play a role in Assoun’s illness; they awarded him “a 10% partial 
disability” payment.54 By the summer of 1988 MacPherson and MacLeod were asked to 
join the Compensation, Health and Safety Committee of Local 1064 to add their expertise 
regarding the coke ovens issue. The men were asked to study employee records held in 
the steelworkers’ hall to find evidence of occupational illness among coke ovens 
workers.55 
The convergence of Coke Ovens Workers United for Justice and Local 1064 was 
a partial response to the sudden closure of the coke ovens in the winter of 1988 – six 
months prior to the scheduled end of operations. The union announced a plant-wide strike 
in early February over wages and retirement packages; contrary to common practise in 
earlier strikes, however, coke ovens workers left work en masse and refused to provide 
the coking plant with a skeleton crew.56  During this strike, the province announced that 
the coke ovens would not re-open – and that 125 workers would be laid-off. Although the 
bitter strike ended five weeks later, by the end of March only 22 coke ovens workers had 
been re-hired in other sections of the plant – far fewer than the promised 95 percent of 
those who were without work.57 With these workers displaced, it became imperative that 
the union produce the names of employees who might appeal for an early pension or 
workers’ compensation based on industrial exposure to hazardous materials. 
MacPherson and MacLeod created a cursory list of coke ovens workers who had 
passed away during the 25 years prior by September 1988. With similarities to Hannan’s 
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56 “Steelworkers Strike,” Cape Breton Post, February 1, 1988; “Management needs union 
help in maintaining coke battery,” Cape Breton Post, February 3, 1988. 
 
57 “Heavy voter turnout wants back to work,” Cape Breton Post, March 17, 1988; Don 
MacPherson to Dave Dingwall, March 25, 1988, Box 3, Files 7-8, Steel Project, BI. 
 
187 
efforts in Pennsylvania years earlier, these did not include employees killed as the result 
of industrial accidents, automobile deaths, or surgical deaths of a non-occupational nature. 
Eighty-five names are listed; of these, 48 are marked as having passed away as the result 
of cancer.58 With these numbers in hand, MacPherson and the union felt empowered to  
Figure 5.4: Last quench at the Coke Ovens, SYSCO, 1988 
Source: Photograph by Henry Lalondais, Reference 90-1214-20646, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
bring the issue to the attention of the federal government. In a letter dated October 3, 
1988, MacPherson writes to the federal Minister of the Environment, Tom MacMillan: 
       
58 Occupation, Health and Safety Committee, Local 1064, “Coke Ovens Workers and 
Retired Employees Who Have Died During the Past 25 Years,” 16 September 1988, Box 
3, Files 7-8, Steel Project, BI.   
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A preliminary survey […] show[s] a 60% cancer mortality rate, or four times the 
national average […] One might ponder the reaction of the New York Times, 
Washington Post, and World Health Organization when they receive copies of the 
documentation. The inability of […] Sysco, the Nova Scotia Department of 
Labour, the Federal and Provincial Departments of the Environment, to come to 
grips with this disaster, leave us no choice but to take the issue to a National and 
International level.59 
 
Over the next three months, members of the union sent letters to national and provincial 
politicians in an attempt to draw attention to the plight of the coke ovens workers. Federal 
and provincial NDP leaders Ed Broadbent and Alexa McDonough were supportive of the 
steelworkers’ efforts, pledging to broach the issue with the respective ministers, while the 
federal Minster of Energy, Mines and Resources Jake Epp reminded MacPherson that the 
issues at hand were provincial responsibilities.60 
On March 15, 1989, Nova Scotia Minister of Labour Ron Russell announced 
several possible reforms to the Workers’ Compensation Act; these included reformulating 
the benefit calculation from 75 percent of gross salary to 90 percent of net salary, 
although workers’ groups believed that this could result in fewer payments overall. 
Russell also implied that the government might make it easier for workers to apply for 
compensation as the result of lung cancer, but not other types of occupational illness 
related to coke ovens employment.61 MacPherson immediately released a statement 
proclaiming that the proposed changes were a “lukewarm” effort at drawing attention 
from the ongoing coke ovens workers’ dispute. Local 1064 reiterated their demands: 
We’re demanding full, comprehensive coverage for all affected coke ovens 
workers, provisions that would exceed coverage granted to ovens workers in 
Ontario […] We don’t think that the workers here should have to suffer because 
of government inaction that borders on criminal negligence.62 
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The proposed changes would do little for those on the union rolls of coke ovens claimants, 
which by July had reached 32 claims by bereaved family members and 335 claims by 
living workers.63 It also appeared that Russell was preparing Sysco workers for 
disappointment, cautioning petitioning workers, “What’s fair to me may not be fair to 
you. Unfortunately that’s the way the world works.”64 Nonetheless, two coke ovens 
widows – only named in the local newspaper as “the widows of Wilfred Piercy and Joe 
Magee” - received approval for their compensation claims in November. This decision 
was hailed as a possible test case for the majority of workers’ claims, as the women’s 
husbands were not employed on top of the coke battery, but in other sections of the 
coking plant.65  
The coke ovens workers won a series of small victories early in 1990. On January 
2, the front page of the provincial newspaper – the Halifax Chronicle Herald – 
announced that the WCB had upheld the decision in the Piercy / Magee cases. This 
decision recognized that all major sections of the coking plant could be considered a 
“hazardous workplace,” not simply the top of the batteries.66 Although the WCB quickly 
asserted that these decisions did not set a precedent for the cases still under review, 
MacPherson was buoyed by the terms of the finding - though he remarked that of the 100 
claims already processed, only 25 had received partial disability awards.67  
It was also in January that MacPherson was contacted by producers of CBC’s 
television program, The Fifth Estate. They were interested in producing an episode 
devoted to the workers’ fight for compensation at Sysco. Only a week before the episode 
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went to air, the WBC crafted another press release; the board had been waiting for 
employment records from Sysco before adjudicating cases, but as of March 14 they 
decided to move ahead with claims processing.68 In addition, the labour minister invited 
those workers who had already been denied – numbering around 70 – to reapply. The 
WCB would now be applying “the benefit of the doubt,” meaning, “if the factors in 
favour of a worker’s claim are just as likely as the factors against, the matter is resolved 
in the worker’s favour. MLA Paul McEwan pointed out that this was nothing to 
celebrate; the benefit of the doubt was already supposed to have been applied to every 
application.69 
By April, the steelworkers’ union and former members of the Coke Ovens 
Workers United for Justice had obtained a series of important concessions from the 
reluctant Nova Scotia government. Aside from announcing the re-examination of 
formerly denied applications, Russell had also agreed that the WCB would not only be 
compensating workers suffering from lung cancer, but also from other diseases associated 
with coke ovens employment. These included industrial bronchitis, lung collapse, chronic 
respiratory ailments, and non-cancerous disease.70  
Although Local 1064 and Don MacPherson would never achieve their goal of 
“full, comprehensive coverage for all affected coke ovens workers,” they did make gains 
on behalf of workers and families suffering from industrial disease in Sydney. Further, 
their fight for compensation had a lasting impact within the community; the 
popularization of a public discourse surrounding issues of ill-health and industrial loss 
would result in the emergence of localized protest and collective action through the next 
decades. The coke ovens workers’ response to deindustrialization provided a platform for 
resistance that was eventually adopted by other residents in the city.  
 
Epilogue: Rejecting the “Health or Jobs” Dichotomy 
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[The coke ovens were] pretty good to me . . . I brought up a family there. Bought 
a home, bought cars, so I guess I can't complain . . . but by the looks it might be 
pretty ugly for me, too.71 
 
- Joe Keller, Sysco Coke Ovens Worker, 1990 
 
In 1995, amidst an ongoing epidemiological study in Sydney, Nancy Robb published an 
article on the health impact of the Sysco coke ovens in the Canadian Medical Association 
Journal. “Were jobs more important than health in Sydney,” was her organizing question; 
yes, essentially, was her conclusion.72 This question, often considered fundamental in 
public discourse surrounding deindustrialization and public health, obscures more than it 
reveals. As McIvor has noted elsewhere, to offer the notion of a binary opposition 
between “jobs” on the one hand and “health” on the other presents a false dilemma – it 
ignores the power differentials that exist between workers, government, and 
corporations.73   
To present “jobs” and “health” in a dichotomous relationship overlooks the long 
history of working-class environmentalism that sprouted from shop-floor experiences 
since the 19th century. Chad Montrie has effectively dismantled the notion that the 
environmental movement only found purchase after Rachael Carson’s 1962 Silent Spring; 
rather, he skillfully describes workers’ efforts to challenge environmental degradation 
from the earliest days of industrialization in the United States.74 Nonetheless, as Andrew 
Hurley notes in his study of environmental inequalities in Gary, Indiana, there was a 
fundamental shift in the American popular perception of environmentalism dating to the 
mid-20th century. At that point, he argues, three competing strands of environmentalism 
emerged: middle class suburban, urban workplace oriented, and urban African 
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American.75 As a result, industrial workers and middle-class environmentalists are often 
perceived among the general public as possessing uniquely disparate goals and 
objectives; such a view is sometimes underscored by workers’ attempts to challenge 
industrial flight and the material dispossession of deindustrialization.  
 The Environmental Justice Movement, a term coined by Robert Bullard in the 
early 1990s, began exploring the intersections between environmental degradation and 
the social conditions experienced by subaltern populations as early as 1982.76 In the 
United States, this often meant exploring issues of environmental racism and the 
marginalization of working-class African American neighbourhoods facing issues 
relating to pollution or environmental decline.77 Internationally, there has been attention 
paid to the class dimensions of environmental activism; notably, Joan Martinez-Alier 
explores grassroots resistance to environmental exploitation in impoverished areas of the 
global south in her book, The Environmentalism of the Poor.78 Rarely do these 
international studies examine shop-floor environmentalism; more often, they position 
ecological activism as a community-based social response to the immiseration and 
exploitation of global capitalism.79 
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Canadian research into environmental justice often focuses on the layers of racial 
peripheralization that are experienced by indigenous peoples and First Nations groups as 
the result of ecological destruction.80 When environmentalism in industrial communities 
is explored, shop-floor experiences are often ignored for community-based perspectives. 
In S. Harris Ali’s discussion of political economy and toxic pollution in Sydney, for 
example, environmental remediation efforts are only considered to have begun in 1991 
with the emergence of the provincial Crown corporation “The Sydney Tar Ponds Clean 
up Inc.”81 Working-class environmentalism must be incorporated into the study of 
environmental justice through an intersectional framework; the efforts of the Coke Ovens 
Workers United for Justice and Local 1064 were directed explicitly towards resisting 
both deindustrialization and bodily harm resulting from industrial pollution. Their 
resistance continued beyond the loss of the workplace to directly inform an emergent 
community-based environmental movement in the 1990s, which is the focus of the next 
chapter. With cases remaining before the courts in 2016, the organization of Sydney’s 
coke ovens workers against economic erasure and ill-health remains an important part of 
deindustrialization’s “aftermath” in the former steel capital of Atlantic Canada. 
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Bury it, Burn it, or Truck it Away: 
Remediation and the Toxic Legacy, 1986-1999 
 
 
    Cancer 
    Ocean pollution 
    Killing 
    Enormously terrible 
 
    Outstandingly awful 
    Vicious 
    Evil 
    Nasty 
 
     - Protest Sign, Sydney. 19991 
 
 
The smoky air of the integrated mill was only a memory when the city turned its attention 
to another by-product of its primary industry – this time, emerging from underneath the 
feet of its residents. In late April 1999, dark orange ooze was found seeping into the 
basements of homes along Frederick Street in Whitney Pier – just a few hundred yards 
from the site of the former coke ovens and the Cape Breton Regional Municipality 
landfill.2 Two weeks later, after receiving news that the material had tested positive for 
nearly 50 parts-per-million (ppm) of arsenic, four families of the 17 on the street were 
asked to leave their homes and given the option of staying at the Delta Hotel “until more 
appropriate accommodations could be arranged.”3 When three more families left the 
following day, packing what little they could, locals could not help but draw comparisons 
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to the incident at Love Canal, New York in 1978 when hundreds of families were 
relocated as the result of toxic pollution.4  
The Frederick Street re-location – and the eventual demolition of homes - was the 
culmination of more than a decade of community concern and protest relating to the 
contamination of Muggah Creek, known locally as the tar ponds, which flowed alongside 
the Sysco site into Sydney Harbour. State-funded “remediation” efforts began in the mid-
1980s, but the failure of consecutive clean up plans and a growing literature documenting 
the health impacts of pollutants found within the site provoked a crisis within the 
community.  
Figure 6.1: Juanita McKenzie holds a photograph of her home on Frederick Street 
Source: Photograph by Steven Wadden, 2014 
       
4 “Province moves three more families out of Pier homes,” Cape Breton Post, May 15, 
1999; Thomas H. Fletcher, From Love Canal to Environmental Justice: The Politics of 
Hazardous Waste on the Canada-U.S. Border (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003), 16. 
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Corresponding with the coke ovens workers’ fight for compensation during the 
late 1980s, public awareness began to build relating to a possible threat – invisible but 
deadly – emanating from the grounds of the former coking plant and the adjacent tar 
ponds. As Katrin MacPhee writes of labour environmentalism in Canada, “working class 
concerns about industrial pollution bled into a wider environmental consciousness outside 
the bounds of the workplace.”5 Despite the working-class basis for local 
environmentalism, the notion that the Sydney steel plant could be characterized wholly 
by its “toxic legacy” also began to gain traction. Elizabeth May and Maude Barlowe give 
voice to this perception in their book Frederick Street: Life and Death on Canada’s Love 
Canal. They write:  
For 66 years the plant had polluted the 500 acres it had been given. It had 
indiscriminately dumped huge amounts of toxic waste on the entire community 
and any area downwind. Owners and acronyms had come and gone – from 
DISCO and DOMCO to BESCO and DOSCO  […] but the pollution remained 
[…] In 1968, the steel plant should have closed. If each worker had received a 
million dollars in compensation, the cost would have been less than the subsidies 
poured in to keep the mill afloat. More important, many lives would have been 
spared. But this was a steel mill that would not die, even if it killed everything 
around it.6 
 
The concept of a toxic legacy, remaining long after the direct causes of pollution have 
disappeared, reveals another iteration of the city’s identity - one that is correlated with the 
uncertainties triggered by deindustrialization. By the mid-1990s, the illusion of industrial 
permanency had begun to slip; rather than “the steel city of Atlantic Canada,” Sydney 
became synonymous with the health and environmental aftermaths of industrial 
production – home to “the worst toxic waste site in Canada:” the Sydney tar ponds.  
This shift, and the public health crisis that it revealed, produced an acute sense of 
fear among residents living alongside the tar ponds and former coke ovens. People began 
to feel unsafe in their own homes as they became more aware of the possible threat of 
pollution; the sense that unseen toxins were impacting the bodies of residents and their 
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families preyed upon the mental – as well as the physical – health of community 
members. One former resident of Frederick Street describes: 
The “Fear” I speak of began in the spring of 1998, as [planned remediation] began 
on the coke ovens site […] I remember it being around the first week of April. I 
woke up not feeling so well […] I had a severe headache, felt nauseated, and was 
a little dizzy. Shortly after, my mouth began to feel really dry, my eyes were 
burning and my whole body was aching. […] I gathered enough energy to leave 
my home to run some errands […] Upon returning home […] I began feeling all 
the symptoms again.7 
 
After the provincial election in 1999, when the PCs were elected under a promise to close 
or sell Sydney Steel, many also feared an abdication of governmental responsibility. This 
reflects a common anxiety within post-industrial communities; when private corporations 
depart, sometimes being split-up and made into subsidiaries of other, larger companies, 
whose responsibility is the environmental damage that remains?  
  The relationship between these fears, the deindustrialization of Sydney Steel, and 
proposed remediation options for areas of the former integrated plant and the tar ponds 
are the focus of this chapter. The first section examines a provincial plan to incinerate tar 
ponds contaminants between 1986 and 1996. Although many steelworkers were 
supportive of a clean up effort, occupational knowledge revealed the likely existence of 
additional undetected contaminants that would prove a logistical problem for the proposal. 
This knowledge was not taken into consideration, and by 1996 – with the project over 
time and nearly $15 million over budget – the incineration plan was abandoned.  
When locals rejected another top-down remediation option – encapsulation of the 
contaminants – the federal and provincial governments created a mandate for a 
community-based organization to consider options and offer proposals. The disparate 
interests at play within this organization, the Joint Action Group (JAG), reveal the 
challenges of maintaining cross-class environmental activism, made more visible by 
provincial attempts to privatize Sysco during the 1990s.  
In the final section, oral history accounts of two women who were re-located from 
Frederick Street in 1999 provides stark evidence of the continuing costs of industrial 
production and de-industrial remediation. Debbie Ouellette and Juanita McKenzie, who 
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had no direct connection to Sysco aside from living next-door, continue to suffer the 
bodily aftermath of these processes - more than 17 years after they left their homes. Their 
activism provides insight into the intersections of class and gender that exist among 
grassroots community protest groups. So, too, do their efforts illustrate how the types of 
knowledge produced by working-class people are called into question by state and 
institutional actors. That there has been no official recognition of the damage done to 
these women and other residents is shameful; their experiences reflect the bodily violence 
done to working-class people during deindustrialization – with mental and physical scars 
remaining long after industry disappears and brownfield sites are ‘remediated’ into green 
fields.  
 
Occupational Knowledge and Incineration, 1986-1996 
 
Scientific reports detailing Sydney’s heightened levels of polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAH) were used by steelworkers in their fight for compensation; although 
the government was initially unwilling to deal with their claims, some of these early 
studies did prompt a state response. Testing conducted by the Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans in 1980-1981 concluded that lobsters within the south arm of the Sydney 
Harbour contained much higher levels of PAH than did other coastal crustaceans.8 This 
resulted in a moratorium on lobster fishing in the area and, as J.H. Vandermeulen writes, 
“subsequent environmental surveys of various potential PAH-sources in the area 
indicated the Sysco coking facility and nearby “tar pond” in Muggah Creek as the likely 
sources of hydrocarbon contamination.”9  
It was clear by the early 1980s that contaminants were negatively impacting the 
environment around the plant. This prompted the provincial government to contract 
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Acres International to “conduct a drilling program to obtain samples of the contaminated 
sediments and underlying strata in the Tar Pond” and propose possible solutions.10 In four 
phases, Acres assessed the extent of PAH contamination in more than 700,000 tonnes of 
soil and sediment surrounding the coking plant and organized a series of 
recommendations designed to stem the flow of pollutants from the tar ponds into the 
harbour. The company offered three options: in-situ encapsulation of contaminants, off-
site disposal, or incineration; burning the material, Acres argued, was “by far the most 
attractive” option.11
Figure 6.2: Illustrated Plan of the City of Sydney, Nova Scotia, 1934 
Source: Map by Arthur N. Wallace, Map 216,  
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
On the basis of this study, federal and provincial governments proposed a clean 
up of the tar ponds site in December 1985. The decision was formalized on November 7, 
       
10 Acres Consulting Services Limited, Sydney Tar Pond Remediation: Phase I Report: 
Final, 4 May 1984, Bras d’Or Collection, 6283, Cape Breton University Library, Sydney, 
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11 Acres Consulting Services Limited, Sydney Tar Pond Study: Final Project Report, 
Volume I, June 1985, Bras d’Or Collection, 5709, Cape Breton University Library. 
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1986, when representatives from each signed a $34 million agreement.12 Coinciding with 
Phase II of the Sysco modernization, the clean up was expected to occur over a 10-year 
period.13 Acres was awarded the contract for project management, and they outlined a 
multi-faceted remediation program:  
The dredging will proceed in a step-wise fashion beginning at the south end of the 
Tar Ponds […] The dredged material will either be trucked or moved by slurry 
pipeline to a prepared site on the adjacent Sysco property. The sediment will be 
de-watered, blended if required and combusted to produce electric power which 
will be fed into the provincial power grid.14 
 
Superburn Systems Ltd. of British Columbia was sub-contracted to design and construct 
the necessary incinerators in 1989. They agreed to construct a “300 T/day revolving 
fluidized bed incineration plant” at an estimated capital cost of $16.5 million; these 
incinerators were promised to destroy PAH “with an efficiency of 99.99 percent.”15 
The problem with this plan, which steelworkers were quick to point out, was that 
it failed to account for other possible contaminants. A 1984 study by Ocean Chem had 
found heightened rates of the carcinogenic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) at the mouth 
of Muggah Creek and in other areas.16 These compounds, invented in 1929 to make 
plastics, pesticides, and hydraulic fluids, were banned in Canada since 1977 – but they 
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had been in regular use within transformers at the steel plant since the 1930s.17 PCB 
required exposure to a much higher temperature than did PAH to ensure their destruction. 
In addition, Acres drilled and analyzed 32 bore holes throughout the tar ponds site in 
1987; of these, varying levels of PCB contamination were identified – though they were 
under the 50 ppm threshold.18 Don MacPherson, former leader of Coke Ovens Workers 
United for Justice, argued in 1990: 
They talked about the tar ponds situation, what it contained was PAH material, 
benzopyrene […] that sort of thing, sludge. Now, being an electrician on the steel 
plant for twenty-six years, I knew that PCBs were . . . for many years, for 
generations, [the tar ponds] was the dump site of this transformer coolant when it 
was being changed […] If it was 40 or 50 gallons, they used to dump that in the 
sewer system. And it would end up in the tar pond. If it was 300 or 400 gallons, 
they used to save that.19 
 
Charles MacDonald reflected upon a similar experience:  
Charles: We used to go working […] down on the big transformers three or four 
days at a time, mucking out the old sediment and stuff.  
 
 Michael: The PCB’s? 
 
Charles: Yes, of course, PCB’s […] People used to take it home and rub it on 
their arthritis20 […] We used to take that stuff and just dump it in the sewers after 
a change. If it was a lot, like if we changed a big transformer […] they had a little 
wagon […] But if you had a small amount, 10 or 20 gallons, you just dumped that 
down the sewer. That went out in the harbour. They didn’t tell anybody anything 
in that vein.21 
                                                
17 Laurel Sefton MacDowell, An Environmental History of Canada (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2012), 195-6. 
 
18 JWEL-IT, Report on PCB Delineation and Remedial Options for the Muggah Creek 
Containment Project, 31 May 1996, Bras d’Or Collection, 5158, Cape Breton University 
Library.  
 
19 Don MacPherson, interview by Michael Earle. January 1990, Steel Project, MG 14, 
206, T-2590, transcript, Beaton Institute Archives (BI), Sydney, NS.   
 
20 Some steelworkers would use the PCB-containing fluid as a curative remedy for 
arthritis and joint pain. This came up in several interviews. 
 
21 Charles MacDonald, interview by Michael Earle, January 9, 1990, Steel Project, Box 6, 




With these common occupational experiences, it is unsurprising that some steelworkers 
were sceptical of the incineration plan. In fact, plant welder Leon Colford directly relates 
the ongoing tar ponds clean up efforts with the earlier campaign of the coke ovens 
workers:  
There is a move by the people, and they’re going to the city alderman and they’re 
telling them that they are not going to put up with PCBs being burnt in that 
Superburner. They are not […] The word is: ‘What they didn’t finish at the coke 
ovens, they’re not going to finish it down in the Pier’. They’re not going to dump 
it on us and finish us off […] They did harm in the coke ovens, they’re not going 
to do it again […] They’re going to their Alderman and the next thing it will be in 
the news media because we certainly don’t want to see PCBs bunt in the Pier 
area.22 
 
Steelworkers’ responses reveal a set of local and global solidarities that influenced how 
the planned incineration was perceived within the community. Richard Newman, writing 
of the protest movement at Love Canal, argues that there were two broader trends that 
influenced working-class activism: “Americans’ rising environmental consciousness and 
deindustrialization.”23 These trends also influenced the early tar ponds clean up, but they 
cannot be divorced from the specific local conditions created by the coke ovens workers’ 
public fight for compensation and an increasing popular awareness of the health impact 
of the pollutants found within the site. These experiences, combined with an occupational 
understanding of the types of contaminants involved, allowed for a particular form of 
cross-class agitation to develop.  
Awareness of environmental concerns was strong in Canada by the late 1980s; the 
Department of the Environment, the Clean Air Act and the Canada Water Act had been in 
existence for nearly two decades. International events such as the Bhopal disaster in 1984, 
Chernobyl in 1986, and the PCB fire in Ville de Sainte-Basile-le-Grand in 1988 had 
                                                
22 Leon Colford, interview by Michael Earle, September 18, 1990, Steel Project, Box 6, 
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turned the world’s attention to the impact of environmental disaster.24 In Sydney, 
newspaper coverage of the coke ovens’ workers struggle and the circumstances 
surrounding the final closure of the ovens in 1988 also prompted an increased 
understanding of the site’s potentially harmful pollutants. Additionally, the clean up was 
intended to “generate 1,400 direct and in-direct person years of employment in Nova 
Scotia over the ten-year duration.”25 As a result, Sydney steelworkers were less hostile to 
clean up efforts than might otherwise have been the case; this contrasts with the Love 
Canal case study, where deindustrialization pitted workers directly against middle-class 
environmentalists.26 
  While removing contaminants was not a controversial proposition, the means by 
which this would be accomplished continued to provoke reaction. The location of the 
incinerator, near the site of the Sysco blast furnaces, was only a short distance from a 
Whitney Pier elementary school. This prompted concerns regarding whether the sludge 
could be safely burnt, and gave a sense of urgency to steelworkers’ recollections of 
dumping PCB-laden hydraulic fluids into the sewer system. Others suspected that the 
proposed methods by which contaminated sludge would be transported to the incinerator 
would be insufficient. Coke ovens employee Bill Graham remarked:  
As a matter of fact I don't think they've even come to a concrete decision as to 
how to extract the material from the Tar Ponds itself.  I hear them discussing 
dredgeline and trucking, and I've heard them discussing a pipeline and pumping.  
I don't think that after this two years of study, and the facility actually being in the 
construction stage, that they've even made a decision on that, which I find very 
surprising.27 
 
                                                
24 Sefton MacDowell, An Environmental History of Canada, 255; Suroopa Mukherjee, 
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Graham’s remarks are prescient, but steelworkers’ occupational knowledge was not taken 
seriously; the incineration plan was plagued with cost over-runs and missed deadlines. By 
the mid-1990s, problems relating to both the incineration and transportation of the sludge 
had manifested. These would call the viability of the entire operation into question.  
Part of the problem was that there were no formal mechanisms by which local 
knowledge, occupational or otherwise, could be effectively communicated to project 
organizers. Although some steelworkers had reservations, as did other community-based 
environmentalists, the only means of communication available were letters to the editor 
of the Post, private correspondence with project organizers, or discussions with local 
politicians. While some took this route, as Colford describes, others outlined their 
concerns informally – in the interviews with the Beaton Institute “Steel Project,” for 
instance. Recognition of these shortcomings would, in the second iteration of the clean up, 
result in the creation of the community-based Joint Action Group in 1996.  
Figure 6.3: Sydney Tar Ponds Cleanup public information display centre, 1988 
Source: Photograph by Raytel Photography, Reference 88-594-18104,  
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
 205 
 
On March 26, 1991, the Provincial Government of Nova Scotia established 
Sydney Tar Ponds Clean up Inc. – a crown corporation created to oversee the processes 
of remediation. Its board of directors included John Strasser, president of Sysco, and Ray 
Martheleur – a steelworker with decades of experience at the mill.28 Just six months after 
the organization issued its first annual report, Acres revealed that PCB tests found several 
“hot spots” throughout the tar ponds; these had not been visible throughout the earlier 
randomized testing.29 According to the report, a 1.2-hectare area of the south pond 
contained more than 50 ppm of PCB material– qualifying as a hazardous waste. One of 
the boreholes, located outside a Sysco sewer pipe on Ferry Street, revealed a staggering 
measurement of 2,066 ppm of PCB within the soil – more than 40 times higher than the 
limit. As a result, this material could not be incinerated.30 
Meanwhile, residents and steelworkers alike pressed for information on 
heightened rates of cancers and other illnesses throughout Ashby and Whitney Pier. Dave 
Ervin, former president of Local 1064, recalls working to promote “Act! For a Healthy 
Sydney” as early as 1991, as well as the Atlantic Coastal Action Program after its 
formation in 1992. Act! was a community-based project, initially proposed by Dalhousie 
University epidemiologist Judith Guernsey, which sought to promote healthy lifestyles in 
Cape Breton and examine possible environmental factors of ill health.31 The province 
funded this project after 1993, when another steelworker – Don Deleskie – went on a 
                                                
28 Sydney Tar Pond Clean Up Inc., “Annual Report,” 1991-1992, Bras d’Or Collection, 
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31 Dave Ervin, interview with author, August 8, 2013; ACT! For a healthy Sydney, Final 
Report: survey of community opinions of health needs, 1997, Bras d’Or Collection, 6197, 
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public hunger strike demanding an epidemiological study of residents.32 ACT! was 
officially launched in 1994 as a “health-protection, health-promotion community 
intervention trial,” and its data provided a basis for further studies by Guernsey and other 
public health specialists.33 
Another major problem soon emerged. In 1994, R.V. Anderson Ltd. was 
contracted to explore the delivery system through which the sludge was to be transported 
to the incinerators. The seemingly contradictory conclusions reveal:  
The equipment and unit processes installed are considered to be appropriate for 
the intended functions […] There is, however, some concern that the installed 
dredging and pumping system is not capable of delivering the contaminated 
sediment to the fuel cells in the required quantities.34 
 
This admission, coming nearly 10 years after the clean up was initially announced, 
prompted outrage within the community. That $55 million had been spent with nothing to 
show for it did not go unnoticed; after defeating Donald Cameron and the Tories in the 
1993 provincial election, the new Liberal government under John Savage sought an 
inexpensive path forward for the remediation process. These efforts led them to propose 
another solution for the tar ponds problem, which was announced to residents in Sydney 
on January 15, 1996: encapsulation.  
 
“If we don’t watch out, we’ll be studied to death”: 
Environmental Activism and Public Health in ‘Canada’s Love Canal,’ 1996-1998 
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Steelworkers and community members alike grew increasingly frustrated through 1995 as 
the clean up failed to proceed.35 Compounding this was the apparent levity with which 
some provincial Liberals treated the tar ponds issue. The following exchange occurred on 
January 10, 1996 in the Nova Scotia legislature between George O’Malley, the Minister 
of Supply and Services, and Alfie MacLeod, a PC MLA from Cape Breton: 
MacLeod: On December 14, 1995, in this House I asked the status of the plan 
regarding the clean up of the Sydney tar ponds. The minister responded, "It is in 
the very near future. In the very near future" that the government would be 
announcing its plan. Well, it is almost a month later and I was wondering if the 
minister is any closer to the future now than he was then? 
 
O’Malley: Mr. Speaker, that is a very philosophical question, whether I am any 
closer to the future now than I was then. I would presume I am just about as close 
to the future as I was then […] In serious answer […] it is my hope that this time 
next week we will have gone to Cape Breton and made the appropriate 
statements.36 
 
Despite his mirth, O’Malley faced a raucous crowd of angry community members when 
he arrived in Sydney on the morning of January 15. 
Arriving at 500 George Street in downtown Sydney for a 10:30 a.m. press 
conference, O’Malley announced a new $20 million dollar commitment to the 
remediation effort. The incineration plan was to be entirely abandoned. Rather, the tar 
ponds were to be “encapsulated” using leftover slag from Sysco steelmaking operations, 
while the sludge containing the highest levels of PCB was to be transported out of 
province. “We’re going from a clean up to a cover up,” shouted Bruno Marcocchio, a 
local environmentalist.37 Victor Tomiczek, a member of the Canadian Auto Workers, 
interrupted O’Malley, “Because it’s in Cape Breton, you don’t care about our jobs, you 
don’t care about our health, you don’t care about our future. You’re just going to cover it 
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up. Well it’s not going to go away, and we’re not going to allow you to do it.”38 
According to Sydney mayor John Coady, O’Malley had told him “it was this or nothing” 
just prior to the announcement.39 
The next afternoon, the province backed off from that position. Instead, provincial 
Environment Minister Wayne Adams announced that he would send the plan to an 
environmental assessment board where the public would have an opportunity to offer 
input. Marcocchio, who lost his wife and fellow activist Roberta Bruce to cancer in 1992, 
welcomed the news – but demanded a full federal investigation.40 Adding their voices to 
those of unionists and local activists were the youth members of the Sydney 4-H club, 
who organized a letter-writing campaign seeking support for alternative options to 
encapsulation. In response to one of these letters, Elizabeth May pledged the support of 
the Sierra Club of Canada; May’s involvement helped to place the Sydney tar ponds in 
the national spotlight and her account of these events form the basis of Frederick Street.41 
Global and national contexts influenced the community’s outrage. Andrew Hurley 
describes the period between 1985 and 1994 as the “incinerator interregnum,” in which 
the renewed appeal of [incineration as a waste-disposal method] coincided with […] 
technological advancements facilitating the conversion of heat into steam and electricity, 
thereby restoring profitability to the method.”42 While the popularity of this method of 
disposal declined as the result of public opposition and legal constraints, its failure in 
Sydney was also related to the local landscape and types of pollutants that were involved. 
After a decade of inaction, followed by the failure of incineration, residents feared that 
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burying the waste would simply be leaving the problem for another generation of Cape 
Bretoners to deal with.  
Figure 6.4: Tar Ponds 
Source: Photograph by Owen Fitzgerald, Reference 89-795-18989, 
Beaton Institute, Cape Breton University 
The emergence of a concerted community-based effort to influence the tar ponds 
clean up is also related to changes in how the Canadian state dealt with social movements. 
Catherine Corrigal-Brown and Mabel Ho argue that the governance style of Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) prompted the federal state to work more closely with 
community groups as part of an appeal to “ordinary citizens” instead of “interest groups.” 
This was in contrast to these relationships under former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
(1984-1993), when the legitimacy of social movements was sometimes openly attacked.43 
       
43 Catherine Corrigal-Brown and Mabel Ho, “How the State Shapes Social Movements: 
An Examination of the Environmental Movement in Canada,” in Protest and Politics: 
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The federal position on the Sydney tar ponds reflects this change; although federal 
Environment Minister Tom MacMillan had been in the city to sign the 1986 agreement, 
clean up operations had been entirely under the purview of the provincial government 
throughout the early 1990s. By the summer of 1996, the federal Liberals became 
considerably more involved in the clean up process.  
  When Environment Minister Sergio Marchi traveled to Sydney in August 1996 to 
tour the tar ponds, he met with representatives from several community groups. Charles 
MacDonald, the president of Local 1064, was present, as were several former 
steelworkers, Elizabeth May on behalf of the Sierra Club, Shirley Christmas of the 
nearby Mi’kmaq community of Membertou, a number of economic development 
personnel, and Ron Deleskie of a local citizens liaison group.44 Greg MacLeod of the 
Tompkins Institute at UCCB, who was also present at the meeting with Marchi, explicitly 
connected the ongoing environmental problems with deindustrialization:  
The old [company] from England took out the coal, making profits for investment 
in England and New York. It left us with environmental problems. It kept the 
profits and made no investment in Cape Breton. 
 
Again, we have outside companies that want to solve the environmental problems, 
and make profits, but they will not reinvest in Cape Breton.45 
 
The community message was loud and clear, Marchi told the Chronicle Herald; on the 
basis of the minister’s urging and the community protest, the province announced that it 
would not be moving ahead with the encapsulation. Rather, he reported, “We’ll have a 
joint action committee” to recommend solutions.46 
Marchi’s announcement was the first step towards the Joint Action Group – a 
government-funded community organization with a mandate to examine and influence 
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the tar ponds clean up efforts. JAG, billed as “one of the first times that citizens are being 
given a lead role in an environmental cleanup [sic],” was comprised of a main roundtable 
of 55 members and several smaller working groups such as: governance, site security, 
environmental data gathering, health studies, and public education and participation. The 
organization was initially funded by a $300,000 grant, which drew upon municipal, 
provincial, and federal sources.47 JAG was comprised of representatives from the 
steelworkers, concerned residents, local politicians, and economic development staff.  
Cracks soon began to show within the organization; although initially intended as 
a space for each of the effected groups to have their voices heard, sometimes members’ 
positions were at odds with one another.48 The first meeting of the steering committee 
devolved into a shouting match, when Marcocchio – the vice-chair of the committee - 
confronted representatives from JWEL-IT – the company that had initially proposed 
encapsulation as a solution. According to the Cape Breton Post, “Marcocchio approached 
the two JWEL-IT representatives […] and after referring to them using a slang word for 
prostitute, ripped the [paper] handout in half.”49 Despite these growing pains, 
representatives from the federal, provincial and municipal governments gathered in 
Sydney at the end of January 1997 to announce $1.67 million in funding for the JAG 
program. This included funding for a secretariat, a review of all previous health studies, 
and environmental monitoring.50 
Circumstances at Sysco also made it difficult for labour environmentalists to 
remain united with other partners in the clean up process. In 1993, the China Minmetals 
Corporation arranged a deal with the Nova Scotia government wherein they would co-
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manage the plant for three years; this arrangement was organized with the intention that 
Minmetals would purchase the plant at the end of this period. Manning MacDonald took 
over the Sysco file in 1996. He recalls:  
I found out that – when dealing with Minmetals – I wasn’t dealing with 
Minmetals in China, because when they came on board with Sydney Steel they 
formed a company called ‘Min-Canada.’ There was an office in Toronto. […] 
And so Minmetals China, the corporate giant, wasn’t really responsible. It was 
this ‘Min-Canada.’ And they had no assets. So I soon realized that we were taking 
all the risk, and [they] weren’t putting anything up.51 
 
Minmetals announced in 1996 that they were no longer interested in pursuing a purchase 
agreement and the province began exploring other options for privatization.  
Even though the Sydney steelworkers had been at the forefront of combatting the 
environmental impact of industry for years, some felt that they were increasingly 
perceived as outsiders within these discussions. The uncertainty surrounding Sysco 
combined with an increasingly popular narrative that consigned industrial work wholly to 
the ‘dirty’ past meant that some within Local 1064 grew wary of the JAG process 
altogether. 
This narrative consisted of two primary motifs: economic and environmental. 
Economically, Cape Breton’s industries were positioned as perennial-losers within the 
language of an emergent neoliberalism. As is examined further in Chapter Seven, 
political discussions surrounding regional economic development began to focus on the 
promise of tech-incubators, entrepreneurialism, and fiscal austerity; coal and steel, within 
this framework, were passé. Steelworkers grew wary of environmental narratives that 
viewed the operation of the mill as an ongoing problem, one that could only be solved by 
immediate closure. Pollution had decreased dramatically since the closure of the 
integrated mill, and some resented the notion that they clung to their jobs to the detriment 
of their community. Dave Ervin reflects: 
I don’t have any use for the ‘rabid environmentalists.’ You know? “There’s only 
one answer,” and it’s their answer. There’s lots of answers to every problem […] 
By the [mid-1990s], nobody on the steelworkers’ executive wanted to be involved 
                                                
51 Manning MacDonald, interview with author, July 27, 2015.  
 
 213 
with them. Well, I said, the place is going to get cleaned up one way or another. 
It’s best we be on the inside, you know, tempering what they’re doing.52 
 
Others felt that “outsiders” were using the tar ponds to advance their own careers, and 
would not pay any more attention to Sydney or its residents once the issue left the 
national spotlight. Several respondents, speaking anonymously, held this view of 
Frederick Street. As one reflected, “It was great when the Sierra Club first got involved 
[…] they brought media attention that would get things moving […] but Elizabeth May 
hasn’t been back to Sydney in awhile . . .” 
This is why the impact of labour environmentalism must be taken into account 
within popular treatments of environmental and community activism; not only is it 
disingenuous to ignore workers’ contributions – as Chad Montrie, Andrew Hurley, and 
others have shown – but the imposition of a wholly-exclusionary “toxic legacy” narrative 
of industrial history actively dis-incentivizes industrial workers from further participation 
in community-based environmental activism.53 This should not be read as a claim that the 
bodily and environmental impact of industry is overstated, but as a reminder that workers, 
too, bear these scars alongside those wrought by the economic displacement and 
marginalization of industrial capitalism. 
While Local 1064 participated in JAG and other discussions surrounding the 
clean up, particularly as these related to possible on-site jobs for laid-off steelworkers, by 
the end of the 1990s the employees at Sydney Steel were also facing economic threats. 
Disagreeing with the tactics of other local environmentalists, described by one former 
steelworker as “marching into an office and screaming for the head of the person in 
charge,” some stepped back from the process. Others, such as Eric Brophy, Don and Ron 
Deleskie, and Dan Yakimchuk remained staunch in their working-class 
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environmentalism; these steelworkers would not only fight for environmental justice on 
the shop floor and within the union, they would become vocal supporters of the Frederick 
Street residents as the extent of pollution within the community became clear.54 
Despite the crosscurrents emerging within JAG, Sysco and Local 1064 remained 
invested in the clean up. In July 1998, JAG officially signed a memorandum of 
understanding with municipal, provincial, and federal governments. This formally 
outlined a mission statement: “To educate, involve, and empower the community, through 
partnerships, to determine, and implement acceptable solutions for Canada’s worst 
hazardous waste site and to assess and address the impact on human health.”55 The 
mandate included a “Study and Assessment Phase,” wherein health and environmental 
studies would be conducted on-site, and a Recommendation phase, when JAG would 
present official recommendations of remediation options to government stakeholders.56 
Even prior to the signing of the MOU, work had begun on the assessment phase – 
provoking an immediate crisis for the working-class residents of Whitney Pier who lived 
closest to the former coke ovens site.57 In two accounts of these events, the continuing 
spectre of de-industrial remediation becomes terribly visible.  
 
‘I live with it every day. It’s not something that goes away:’ 
Debbie Ouellette, Juanita McKenzie, and the Aftermath of Remediation 
 
Although the homes on Frederick Street have been demolished and the landscape of the 
former coke ovens has since been transformed into a community green space, the 
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memory of spring 1998 remains rooted in place for former residents. It was at this 
moment when Debbie Ouellette describes her “Fear,” and nearly two decades of personal 
and legal struggles, as having truly began. Steven High writes, “Oral history provides us 
with an invaluable opportunity to see ruination from the point of view of those most 
directly affected.”58 In the case of two former Frederick Street residents – Debbie 
Ouellette and Juanita McKenzie – the ruin wrought by decades of industrial production, 
the fraught political processes coinciding with deindustrialization, and the contentious 
community-based efforts to solve the tar ponds problem remain as relevant in 2016 as 
they were in 1998.59 For these two women – neither of whom have a personal or 
occupational connection to Sysco – the psychological scars of de-industrial remediation 




In June 2016, I met Debbie outside of what was once her home on Frederick Street. Over 
the next hour, we talked about her experience as we drove to a number of locations: 
nearby streams, the now-empty spaces that used to be filled with the homes of her friends 
and neighbours, and – finally – the site of the former coke ovens. It was Debbie who 
proposed conducting the interview in this manner; most of the interviews for this project 
took place across tables in the kitchens and living rooms of participants. As recent 
literature on “new mobile methodologies” describes, the mobile interview can offer 
special insight into the connections between place, space, time, and memory.60 Although 
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the distance between sites precluded us from walking, Debbie’s control over the location 
of the interview at different points of her story offered what Mimi Shelley and John Urry 
have referred to as “atmosphere of place.” Her spoken memories of life on Frederick 
Street were contrasted with the now-empty landscapes before us.61   
Figure 6.5: Debbie Ouellette, 2005 
Source: Photograph by Steven Wadden 
“These are new trees. These are all new trees that were planted. This is a new 
brook. When we were here, nothing looked like that,” she says, gesturing to the altered 
landscape that was once her front yard. Looking across the grassy expanse towards where 
the Sysco coke ovens once stood, she describes the symptoms that began to plague the 
street’s residents as the earth was disturbed during the JAG assessment process: “severe 
headaches, nausea, sore throats, burning eyes . . . The headaches were so bad, I thought I 
                                                                                                   
61 Sheller and Urry, “The new mobilities program,” 218.  
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had a brain tumour […] So that’s when we decided to get together as a group.”62 Debbie 
and I drove away from Frederick Street, towards an exposed bit of water trickling 
through the newly constructed ditch-work. Here, we got out of the car and the 
conversation turned to her changing perceptions of the environment: 
[After we started getting sick], I looked up here and started seeing this yellow, 
this yellow goo coming over the embankment. And I said, ‘Oh my God, what’s 
that – where’s it coming from?’ And I said, ‘this brook this year . . . Everything 
was different. The colour was different. Everything. The trees were turning 
orange. Everything looked different to me that year […] My concern, at that time, 
was getting my kids out of there safely. I didn’t care about money. I just wanted 
them out of there.63 
 
After residents brought their concerns to the media, politicians, and JAG in 1998, the 
provincial government contracted CANTOX Environmental Inc. to “conduct an 
independent human health risk assessment of the Frederick Street area.”64 On August 12, 
1998, this report was released to residents; although tests identified “elevated 
concentrations of several heavy metals (lead, copper, molybdenum) and some PAH 
(including naphthalene),” the authors’ concluded, “No measureable adverse health effects 
in local residents are predicted to result from long-term exposure to chemicals in the 
Frederick Street neighbourhood.”65 As an “additional issue,” the report notes, “the signs 
posted on the coke ovens perimeter fence [erected in 1997, reading Human Health 
Hazard] are a considerable source of anxiety,” as is the fact that “when environmental 
work is conducted on the coke ovens site, the individuals wear protective gear (ranging 
from a dust mask to a full protective suit).66 
                                                




64 “Move us or we’ll sue, says Sydney Resident,” Chronicle Herald, July 8, 1998.  
 
65 Cantox Environmental Inc., Human Health Risk Assessment of Frederick Street Area: 






Chain-link fences marked “human health hazard,” located just yards away from 
residents’ front doors, and nearby workers in “moon suits” have indeed become part of 
the collective memory of Frederick Street and the remediation process. As Debbie 
recalls: 
I lived on Frederick Street for 13 years and there was never a fence around the 
coke ovens site [until 1997]. People used that site as a short cut. The kids played 
over where. And when the fences did go up, signs were posted with these words 




I remember driving on the overpass and noticed a man cutting the grass on the 
Coke Ovens site covered from head to toe in a white-suit. Why were we treated 
differently than the guys in white-suits? 67 
 
These occurrences contributed to a sentiment expressed succinctly by another former 
resident: “somebody knew something we didn’t.” 
Evidence continued to build; Frederick Street residents experienced a variety of 
symptoms through the fall of 1998. Judith Guernsey, who had initially been involved 
with Act! in the early 1990s, published some of her epidemiological findings: men and 
women in Sydney suffered far higher rates of various cancers than did their counterparts 
in mainland Nova Scotia.68 By January, the International Institute of Concern for Public 
Health released a study challenging the conclusions of the CANTOX study; the Sierra 
Club of Canada commissioned this report, which identified several significant 
methodological limitations of the earlier study. Through all of this, Juanita, Debbie, and 
other Frederick Street residents continued to attend JAG meetings and lobby government 
officials for a solution.69 
                                                
67 Debbie Ouellette, e-mail message to author, June 20, 2016. 
 
68 “Cancer risk acute in Sydney,” Cape Breton Post, October 21, 1998; Guernsey’s 
research was published in 2000, see Judith Guernsey, Ron Dewar, Swarna Weerasinghe, 
Susan Kirkland, Paul Veugelers, “Incidence of Cancer in Sydney and Cape Breton 
County, Nova Scotia 1979-1997,” Canadian Journal of Public Health 91, 4 (July – 
August 2000): 282-92.  
 
69 Juanita and Rick McKenzie, e-mail requesting seat on JAG roundtable, RTBL 2003-
011, Box 10, File 114, JAG Project, BI.  
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Debbie recalls what happened next “as though it was yesterday.” She related the 
story to me as we stood next to a watery ditch, alongside what is now Spar Road – a 
section of highway running along the former Sysco site, watching a piece of machinery 
clear left-over slag away from the nearby railway tracks: 
We had another heavy rain […] And our son Steven happened to go down the 
basement. And the orange stuff seeped up through one of the pipes on the floor 
[…] We had never seen that before. And I figure now that the coke ovens were 
the source […] Of course, I wasn’t home when [Environment Canada] came, it 
was pouring down rain. And they knocked at the door and my husband let them in. 
And he didn’t know anything about this [chuckle] it was me that was doing the 
talking […] They took samples [and the next week] They said, “Yes, arsenic was 
found in your basement […] I got off the phone, and I headed out to Juanita’s [...] 
and she said “What’s wrong?” […] I said I just got the arsenic results back from 
my basement and they’re really high. She said, ‘do you want to go to a JAG 
meeting?’ I said sure […] And before I walked out [of the JAG meeting] I said . . .  
  
At this point in the interview, 17 years after the events described, Debbie begins to cry.  
 
If my kids get arsenic poisoning . . . From living in their own home. There will be 
hell to pay. And I walked out . . . Emotionally and physically, I was totally 
exhausted […] I didn’t know what was going to happen next […] I came back 
home [one afternoon] and I walked in the house, no word of lie, and I still don’t 
remember who passed me the phone. And I said ‘Who is it?’ And it was [MLA] 
Michel Samson. And he said, ‘Debbie, we have a room at the hotel for you and 
your family to move into.’ And I said to Michel […] Thank you very much, but I 
will never be coming back to Frederick Street.70  
 
As we returned to the car and began to drive back towards the area of Frederick Street, 
Debbie told me about the aftermath of the re-location. They had stayed in the Delta until 
after the provincial government announced a purchase offer to residents living alongside 
Frederick Street and the nearby Curry’s Lane.71 According to the provincial government, 
“Offers for homes [were] based on the value of a similar home away from the Coke 
Ovens site […] [This offer] is voluntary and is not being made because of a health risk. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
70 Debbie Ouellette, interview with author, June 20, 2016.  
 
71 Ibid.  
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Residents may remain in their homes if they wish.”72 The refusal to admit any fault, offer 
any compensation, or provide alternative homes for Frederick Street residents has 
continued; a shameful response, this has meant that former residents have continued to 
make sacrifices.73 In Debbie’s case, this meant moving to a small home in Glace Bay 
with a brothel operating next-door. Although she has since moved again, Debbie has 
continued her fight to force the province to recognize that the toxins found around the 
Frederick Street area and in the basement of her former home were the direct result of the 





Juanita was also among the original six Frederick Street residents who began agitating for 
information and action on the environmental issues. In addition to Juanita and Debbie, 
there was Louise Deveaux, Ronnie and Debbie MacDonald, and Rick McKenzie. I met 
Juanita in her apartment in Ashby for our interview. She was born in Newfoundland, 
although she grew up in North Sydney until the age of 16. The ever-present smoke of 
Sysco surfaces early in our discussion; she relates, “I always remember seeing the plume 
of orange smoke. And Sydney, to me, back then, was a dirty place. I didn’t know [the 
city]. I just knew that orange smoke.” She eventually moved to Sydney, and in 1984 her 
family moved into a home on Frederick Street.  
Her memories of the events leading up to the Frederick Street re-location are 
nearly identical to those described by Debbie. Along with Debbie and four other residents, 
Juanita helped to lead the fight against toxic pollution in her neighbourhood. Juanita’s 
entry into environmental activism occurred when the fencing and “human health hazard” 
signs were being erected around the coke ovens site:  
                                                
72 Nova Scotia Department of Transportation and Public Works, news release, “Province 
offers to purchase homes on Frederick Street and Curry’s Lane,” 28 May 1999, in 
author’s possession.   
 
73 Barry McCallum to Debbie Ouellette, Secretariat Correspondence, December 2001, 
RTBL 2003-011, Box 10, File 123, JAG Project, BI.  
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I came home that day […] and they were putting a fence up. And there was this 
guy there in the white [Haz-mat] suit, and anyone that knows me knows I always 
have my camera with me […] And I took out my camera and I took a picture of 
this guy […] And I went over to him and there was a sign. It said, “Human Health 
Hazard,” and I said, ‘What’s going on?’ He said, ‘Well, you can’t come over here.’ 
And I said to myself, ‘If he’s dressed like that, and I’m dressed like this . . . If 
something’s toxic, how can it just stop at the fence? So I went to a meeting they 
were having for JAG and the mayor, that night. And I was really upset […] So I 
went up to the mayor, and I was getting nowhere with him, he was kind of 
brushing me off. And I just stuck out my hand, for him to shake my hand, and I 
said ‘My name is Juanita McKenzie and you’re going to be hearing a lot from me.’ 
And I turned around and walked out. And my husband wanted to kill me. 
[Chuckles].74 
 
As in the case of Lois Gibbs at Love Canal, Debbie and Juanita became leading 
voices among their neighbours in challenging popular conceptions of the tar ponds 
issue.75 This is not radically distinct from other cases throughout Canada and the United 
States, where working-class women have turned to environmental activism to challenge 
threats to their health and the health of their families. As Phil Brown and Faith Ferguson 
write, “In their efforts to understand the hazards and to draw attention to the 
consequences of toxic exposure, these women activists come up against power and 
authority in scientific, corporate, and governmental unwillingness to consider their claims 
or address their concerns.”76 In accounts of their early activism, both Juanita and Debbie 
speak of challenging authority at the JAG meeting – in Juanita’s account, this meant 
responding directly to the mayor’s indifference.   
As we have seen in the response to Black Friday, Sysco’s male steelworkers often 
marshalled popular conceptions of traditional masculinity in their resistance to 
deindustrialization. This is not uncommon; as Ronnie Johnston and Arthur McIvor 
describe, workers in the U.K. have also challenged deindustrialization in terms of the 
                                                
74 Juanita McKenzie, interview with author, June 20, 2016.  
 
75 Barbara Epstein, “The environmental justice/toxics movement: Politics of race and 
gender,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 8, 3 (September 1997): 63-87. 
 
76 Phil Brown and Faith I.T. Ferguson, “Making a Big Stink: Women’s Work, Women’s 
Relationships, and Toxic Waste Activism,” Gender and Society 9, 2 (April 1995): 146. 
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corrosion of traditional masculinity.77 In similar ways, female toxic waste activists have 
sometimes centred their resistance upon a perceived threat to traditional femininity – 
based within the home, the family, and the body. Standpoint feminist analysis may also 
be applied to the Juanita and Debbie’s undertaking of leadership roles in their fight for 
the residents of Frederick Street. The ways in which these women have constructed 
epidemiological and environmental knowledge from their own experiences of class and 
gender – and how this knowledge was expressed to neighbours, family members, and 
authorities – reveals a particular form of “front porch politics” that emerged in response 
to the refusal of the state to take citizens’ health concerns seriously.78  
Both women discussed the role of popular epidemiology in oral interviews about 
their activism; Juanita describes purchasing the first computer on the street for the 
purposes of studying the health impacts of PAH, PCB, and Arsenic. Debbie was kind 
enough to forward me dozens of documents related to the tar ponds, coke ovens site, 
Frederick Street, and public health in Sydney. These included all of the state-funded 
environmental reports dating back to the 1970s, as well as newspaper articles, her written 
recollections, and photographs of the coke ovens and tar ponds sites. In studying the 
problem in this way, both women felt more authoritative in their efforts to challenge the 
recalcitrance of the state, offer unique and informed insight at JAG meetings, and argue 
their position against efforts to discredit their experiences.79 
                                                
77 Ronnie Johnston and Arthur McIvor, “Dangerous Work, Hard Men, and Broken 
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79 Phil Brown,  “Popular Epidemiology and Toxic Waste Contamination: Lay and 
Professional Ways of Knowing,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 33 (September 
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“Motherhood” played an important role as a mediating identity throughout this 
process. Debbie and Juanita’s stories are centred upon their children; in Debbie’s account, 
it is when her children are first mentioned that she becomes visibly emotional. The notion 
that her children would be directly harmed by exposure to toxic material, and that nobody 
in power seemed particularly interested in immediately resolving the problem, is 
described as a flashpoint for her activism. Juanita identifies a tension between the 
perceived safety of the home for her children and their friends and her own growing 
awareness of the dangers posed by the soil beneath their feet. This is fairly commonplace 
in narratives of white, female, working-class toxic waste activists. As Celine Krauss 
describes: 
The traditional role of mother, or protector of the family and community, served 
to empower these activists […] from the beginning, their view of this role 
provided the motivation for women to take risks in defense of their families and 
overcome their fears of participating in the public sphere.80 
 
Through this re-articulation of power relationships, drawing upon power in the private 
sphere to inform resistance in the public sphere, these women began reaching out to form 
activist relationships with other groups in the community.  
Juanita reflected upon receiving both support and condemnation when they took 
their concerns public; some residents in Whitney Pier believed that she was harming 
property values and that her health issues were overstated. Critiques were often gendered 
in nature. She recalls, in the early days of Frederick Street activism, being told that the 
group was “making a mountain out of a molehill,” or that they were un-necessarily 
emotional. Throughout, state and environmental officials had their accounts positioned as 
“objective” and “factual,” while the Frederick Street women were constantly questioned 
about their recollections and symptoms. Others in the city offered solidarity. In a story 
reminiscent of the coke ovens workers’ earlier accounts, she remembers: 
I woke up one morning and there was papers on my […] step, and I have no idea 
to this day where they came from. And it was all these . . . had been some kind of, 
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something that had been done back in the 60s, I believe, they had done a study on 
all of the poisons and toxins on the Sydney steel plant. And they hid it. But this 
person had this and gave it to me. And, like I said, I don’t know where it came 
from.81 
 
As with Dan Yakimchuk’s earlier description of receiving the secret documents – air-
quality studies from the 1970s - there is an indication that somebody was attempting to 
keep secret the full scale of toxicity, environmental degradation, and ill-health. In 
expressing her experience in this same way, Juanita reveals a sense of solidarity with 
Sysco workers – particularly those suffering illness or disease resulting from exposure to 
on-site toxins. Later in our interview, this comparison is explicitly stated.   
The majority of steelworkers, Juanita explains, were supportive of the Frederick 
Street protesters. She believes that this was the result of their own struggles with 
occupational illness and disease – though she understood that they were unable to 
explicitly join the protest movement over fears relating to deindustrialization. She notes, 
many steelworkers were also residents of the Pier:  
The majority of them knew the truth. And they were on the plus side of things. 
They knew that they were – they were sick. A lot of them were sick, too. […] 
They were just another statistic and they knew they were going to be gone. They 
[knew they] had to work and they had to shut their mouths, that’s just my opinion 
on it anyway […] But you know what? The local people in the Pier who worked 
on the coke ovens, worked on the steel plant, are some of the finest people in the 
world. And, and they were taken as much advantage of as . . . as the rest of us. 
[…] They knew it.82 
 
Juanita, like many others within the community, recognizes a particular form of 
working-class solidarity that existed between Sysco employees and those who lived in the 
neighbourhoods around the plant. This was not simply the result of coinciding economic 
interests, as the steelworkers’ efforts to maintain production at the plant were sometimes 
unappreciated by other local environmentalists, but they emerged from a shared sense of 
having been victimized by an extractive industry that relied on local labour and resources 
for decades before leaving residents and workers to deal with an environmental and 
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health disaster. The fear expressed by Harry Waisglass and Andrew Hogan to the Atlantic 
Development Board in 1966 proves prescient more than thirty years later; Cape Bretoners 
– steelworkers and Sydney residents alike – were left “with nothing but ashes in their 
mouths and carbon dioxide in their lungs.”83 
 
Conclusion: A Double-Sided Coin 
 
Just as deindustrialization is a constituent part of unfolding global capitalism, so are its 
aftermaths continually experienced by the affected in the years and decades after decline 
or closure. The proposed remediation of the tar ponds and coke ovens sites during the 
final 14 years of production at Sysco reveals several concurrent lessons that relate to local 
and global experiences of deindustrialization.  
Firstly, occupational knowledge should not be discarded in favour of scientific 
proposals for remediation; although steelworkers had asserted for years that PCB-
containing materials had been disposed on the site and that the methods proposed for 
transferring the sludge to the incinerator were likely insufficient, it was not until more 
than $55 million had been spent that the state officially recognized these realities. Not 
only were workers in the midst of being de-centred from their economic (and physical) 
place within the city by deindustrialization, the dismissal of their voices during the early 
phases of the remediation process also reflects a deep institutional antipathy to working-
class ways of knowing and proposed solutions. This antipathy was in further evidence 
during O’Malley’s contentious press conference, when incineration was rejected and 
encapsulation was proposed as a fait accompli.  
While the JAG process reveals the growth of a community-focused effort at the 
remediation process, prompted in part by the Chrétien administration’s comparatively 
accommodating attitude towards social movements, the seemingly endless political 
discussions, conflicts between interested parties, and bureaucratic wrangling contributed 
to a popular association of industry and its aftermath with wastefulness and incompetency. 
The notion that environmental remediation contracts were being offered to off-island 
companies for work that continually ran over-time and over-cost caused some to 
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speculate that the period was simply another stage in the region’s exploitation by “come 
from away” capital. The simultaneous collapse of the Minmetals purchase agreement and 
the emergence of a toxic legacy narrative that sometimes obscured the contributions of 
steelworkers and their families also meant that some became reticent to maintain cross-
community solidarities. Each of these factors would become fertile ground for 
politicization, and by July 1999 the question of Sysco’s future featured promptly in the 
ongoing provincial election.  
Finally, the processes of de-industrial remediation holds a profound and terrible 
impact for residents. Debbie and Juanita’s accounts reveal the connections that remain 
between place, memory, and deindustrialization within the framework of the 
environmental remediation process. They describe a transformation from complacency to 
toxic waste activism, prompted – in part – by the official rejection of their accounts, their 
perception of bodily health, and their lay understanding of the connections between their 
symptoms and the disturbance of the tar ponds and coke ovens sites. In their stories, the 
processes of deindustrialization represent economic violence – but its violence is also 
markedly physical. This reality remains certain and inescapable, and it will continue 
throughout the lives of former residents. The violence, and the reprehensible “plausible 
deniability” maintained by the province in relation to the site’s toxins and health effects, 
is powerfully expressed in the following exchange between Juanita McKenzie and myself 
in 2016: 
 Lachlan: So were you glad to have gotten out of there? When you did? 
 
Juanita: . . . [audible sigh] . . . That question kills me . . . I lost my daughter . . . 
seven years ago. She died of colorectal cancer . . . 
 
Lachlan: I’m sorry. 
 
Juanita: She was 33 years old. And the day before she died, she said to me. She 
said, ‘Mom, did Frederick Street do this to me? And I said I don’t know. And I 
don’t know. I can’t say for 100 percent certainty […] Frederick Street is like a 
double-sided coin for me. I have a lot of good memories of Frederick Street. 
Frederick Street will always be my home. That was my home. My . . . my 
children grew up there. My grandchildren. I have all my memories of my 
daughter that passed . . . are there. And . . . how? How does a 33 year old die from 
colorectal cancer? You know? I lost my kidney. A couple of years after we moved 
from there I had kidney cancer. I have problems now, with other things […] My 
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husband had a heart attack. My youngest daughter has it too. But she ended up 
having a hysterectomy last year. She’s unable to have children. She has a lot of 
health issues […] Frederick Street has a lot of good and bad memories for me. We 
had a beautiful home there. We had a pool in the backyard. The water might have 
been bad, but I mean, my . . . my house was where the kids came […] And I have 
a lot of good memories of Frederick Street. Yet Frederick Street, you know, 
turned out to . . . to be a bad thing for me too. I think it took a lot from me. It took 
a lot mentally from me. It took a lot physically from me. And it took my daughter 
too, I think. And it took my other daughter’s future […] I live with it every day, 
it’s not something that goes away . . .   
Fig. 6.6: Juanita McKenzie and daughter, Michelle McGuigan, with photo of Juanita’s 
late daughter, Tonya Kelley-Lepe 
Source: Photograph by Steven Wadden, 2014 
Lachlan: So what do you think now when you, you know, look at everything 
that’s been done there and . . .  
Juanita: I go down there a lot. I find peace down there, actually. I find my . . . I 
find my daughter there, which is strange enough . . . I drive by it a lot and I think 
of Ronnie and I think of Louise and I think of my daughter. I think of what we 
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gave up . . . to save other people, as far as I’m concerned. […] We fought for 
what we thought was right and, you know, our names might not be over there on 
the steel plant but by Jesus we deserve it […] We were the most unassuming 
people you’d want to meet in the world. But you know, we fought for what we 
believed in […] I think back on Frederick Street and I think back lovingly on it . . . 
because we’ve just moved around ever since. And I’ve never really been content 
since […] Like I said, I drive down there every now and again […] And it’s just 
sad. When I look at it it’s a sad street to me […] I drive by there and I see Ronnie 
leaning on his fence, having a beer, Friday night […] what a man. I see Laurie, 
our next-door neighbour, sitting on her step. I see the kids at the pool. […] I see 
Debbie’s kids, out playing […] I see, I see things as they progressed until we were 
taken away from there. And Debbie, God love her, she’s fighting […] But I lost it. 
I don’t like fighting for it any more. Because it took everything from me. And 
people don’t realize that. I might have started the fight, but I lost the fight – even 
if in some ways we might have won. So that’s about it.84 
 
On May 12, 2004, nearly four years after the final rail was rolled at Sydney Steel, the 
federal and provincial governments announced a $400 million dollar renewed clean up 
plan. This was to be accomplished through:  
 
• The removal and destruction of PCBs from the tar ponds […] with a 
proven technology such as high temperature incineration in a single use 
dedicated facility 
• The in-place treatment of the remaining contaminated material using 
proven technology such as bioremediation, solidification or other 
appropriate technology 
• The subsequent engineered containment of both sites 
• Site restoration and landscaping compatible with the natural surroundings 
and future use.85 
 
This plan would ultimately destroy and solidify the remaining toxic material, before 
designing and constructing a community park – named “Open Hearth Park” – on the site 
                                                
84 Juanita McKenzie, interview with author, June 20, 2016.  
 
85 Sydney Tar Ponds Agency website, “Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of Nova Scotia, respecting Remediation of 
the Sydney Tar Ponds and Coke Ovens Sites,” 12 May 2004. 
http://www.tarpondscleanup.ca/index.php?sid=3&cid=9&pid=126&lang=e. 
 229 
of the former steel plant and tar ponds. The creation of this park and its role in the 
community’s collective memory of steelmaking is explored in another chapter. Today, 
after thirty years of remediation proposals – the site exists as a green space. But for 
former steelworkers and residents such as Debbie Ouellette and Juanita McKenzie, the 
bodily and environmental impact of deindustrialization and the remediation process will 






From Dependence to Enterprise: 
Economic Restructuring and the End of the Steel City, 1984-2001 
 
 
We do not want to work on remediation. We want to make steel. 
 
- Murdoch McRae, 1064 Recording Secretary, April 6, 1999.1 
 
 
I had made a very firm commitment that the budget we introduced in the spring of 
2002 would be balanced. […] In my mind, I had decided that [Sydney Steel] was 
never, ever going to be not subsidized. I could see no way forward that it would 
not be subsidized. And I said, ‘Shouldn’t we be putting our money in something 
else? That has a possibility of return?’ 
 
  - John Hamm, July 29, 2015.2 
 
 
On the morning of July 28, 1999, employees of Sysco awoke to the news that the 
province’s Progressive Conservatives (PC) had won a majority government with 29 seats 
in the legislature. Liberal and New Democratic Party (NDP) contingents had only 
mustered a combined 23 seats throughout the province.3 The Tories did not fare as well in 
Cape Breton, with only two PC members elected out of the island’s 11 seats.4 In these 
two districts, Inverness and Guysborough-Port Hawksbury, the PC and Liberal races 
were extremely close – only separated by 327 and 134 votes respectively. The NDP also 
picked up a significant number of votes throughout Cape Breton. With their electoral 
victory, the new government under premier-elect John Hamm was well positioned to 
implement its campaign promise to privatize or close Sydney Steel.  
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The Tory position on Sysco evolved from an announcement made earlier in the 
year by John Hamm. A Liberal minority government, elected in 1998, had announced a 
$44 million line of credit for the mill. While the Liberals had committed to selling the 
plant since taking power in 1993, several purchase agreements had fallen through during 
the decade. Unwilling to close the plant, Sydney Steel continued operating indefinitely. 
On March 23, 1999, Hamm revealed that he had examined the newly tabled Sysco 
business plan and found it to be seriously lacking. “Now is not the time to be sinking 
millions more into capital expenditures. Now is the time to close the book on Sysco . . . 
and to open a new book – one which promises a real future for Cape Breton.”5 This 
marked the first time since nationalization that the leader of a major party in Nova Scotia 
officially called for the closure of the Sydney steel plant.6 
Political commenters framed the decision as a political gambit. The mill had not 
achieved profitability after the electric arc installation. That reality, coupled with the long 
history of failed modernizations, subsidies, and losses throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
had soured voters in mainland Nova Scotia on the notion that the mill could one day be 
profitable. Parker Donham writes: 
Conventional wisdom holds, incorrectly, opposing Sysco would carry an onerous 
price […] Even if you assume all parts of Cape Breton love Sysco equally, the 
mainland, where Sysco is despised, still has four times as many seats […] In any 
case, Hamm’s Conservatives placed last in all but one of Cape Breton’s ridings 
last year and they aren’t expected to be a factor here next time. So there is little 
downside in Hamm’s adopting a policy position most mainlanders regard as 
blindingly obvious common sense.7 
 
Hamm’s announcement was also perceived as a sign that the Tories would either 
withdraw their support from the Liberal minority or Premier Russell MacLellan would 
call a snap election sometime in the spring or early summer.8  
                                                
5 Nova Scotia House of Assembly, for immediate release, “Hamm Urges Premier to 
Close Sysco,” 23 March 1999, in the author’s possession.  
 
6 “It’s Over,” The Daily News, March 23, 1999.  
 
7 Parker Barss Donham, “On your mark . . .” The Daily News, May 12, 1999.  
 
8 Don MacDonald, “Psst! Have you heard about the election?” Chronicle Herald, May 21, 
1999.  
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 In May, Manning MacDonald – now in charge of the Sysco file under the Liberals 
– revealed the government’s plans for the mill. Defending continued operations while 
privatization was explored, he writes: 
Sysco has nothing to hide. Sysco wants to show its wares. Sysco and its workers 
want to show off what it is. Not what people think it is. Let’s, once and for all, 
bury the folklore that paints Sysco as a belching dinosaur. Let’s see it for what it 
is – an opportunity for Nova Scotia to make jobs, not make-work; an opportunity 
to replicate at Sysco the successes of the Halifax Shipyards and Trenton Car 
Works. Sysco is a modern facility – an asset to be exploited, not closed.9 
 
The Liberals were defeated on June 18, after the PCs refused to support a budget that 
included nearly $600 million in healthcare spending. “Fiscal responsibility,” from 
healthcare to Sysco, was the primary electoral campaign issue – and Hamm had 
established himself as the sole candidate willing to close the mill.  
Although the Tory victory concerned union members and others in the 
community, there was not the same sense of looming civic devastation and shock that 
characterize Black Friday more than 30 years earlier. Nowhere in the days following the 
election were the concerted calls for community resistance that emerged in 1967. While 
one letter to the Post laments the “bleak” future for Sydney Steel, the author expresses 
larger concerns over the high cost of university education and the partisan nature of 
provincial politics. In this letter, the fate of Sysco is simply one among many issues 
facing Cape Breton and Nova Scotia.10 According to Fred James, the community 
response was quite distinct:  
Lachlan: When you were talking about Black Friday, you said you remember 
exactly where you were […] Do you remember where you were when John 
Hamm was elected, on the promise to close the steel plant? 
 
Fred: Well it’s not really the same kind of thing, because we saw that coming – 
you know? […] It didn’t surprise me. You’ve been living with the axe over your 
head for all those years, so you kind of prepared for anything. Although it’s 
                                                                                                                                            
 
9 Manning MacDonald, “Private sector family Sysco’s key,” Cape Breton Post, May 26, 
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always a jolt when it comes. But still, you hang on to the hope that it will be . . . 
Because so many steelworkers had that doom and gloom prophesizing for their 
whole life. You can’t put your life on hold because the plant’s going to – you 
think the plant might close. You have to just live your life, and do the best you 
can. And so I think that was the general feeling with most of the people. […] You 
hear what’s going on, and you just continue on and you hope for the best. And 
deal with whatever comes out of it and do what needs to be done when the time 
comes.11 
 
Manning MacDonald highlights the sense of resignation that had settled into the 
community by 2000: 
Lachlan: When that election happened, and they said they were going to close 
Sydney Steel, was that similar to, like, in ’67 when they said they were going to 
close it, or? 
 
Manning: No, no. Quite the opposite. People were resigned to the fact. The only 
people that cared about it after all the machinations about losing money and 
everything were the steelworkers themselves and people like me who put a lot 
into it, and our government did, to try and keep it open. The general public here 
were conditioned to the fact that it was going to close under a new government. 
They knew it was coming. And the workforce was down to 800 at that time. 
 
Lachlan: So, less of an impact? 
 
Manning: Yeah, well it was 4,000 when ’67 was there. Or probably a little bit 
more than that […] And the guys running for office said, you know, we’re going 
to shift direction down here. We’re going to create all kinds of other economic 
activity to take the place of Sydney Steel. Well, Sydney Steel’s gone and the 
government, to my knowledge didn’t create a thing. But they got rid of the 
plant.12 
 
The long, slow decline in employment at the Sydney Works reflects a reality first 
articulated by Daniel Bell in his 1973 The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. Bell 
describes how the industrial era would follow the same broad contours first charted by 
pre-industrial societies. Advances in technology allowed humans to supersede their 
reliance on labour-intensive agriculture, which prompted fewer workers and higher rates 
of production. With technological advances in modern industry, workers would similarly 
                                                
11 Fred James, interview with author, August 16, 2013.  
 
12 Manning MacDonald, interview with author, July 27, 2015. 
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vacate positions within the factory – leaving production unaffected – for jobs within the 
“post-industrial” service and knowledge sectors.13 While the first point is reflected 
through the re-structuring and modernizations at Sysco, the second has not come to pass. 
Frank Webster, expanding upon Bell’s vision of post-industrialism, writes: 
As productivity soars, surpluses are produced from the factories that enable 
expenditures to be made on things once unthinkable luxuries: for example, 
teachers, hospitals, entertainment, even holidays. In turn, these expenditures of 
industrial earned wealth create employment opportunities in services, occupations 
aimed at satisfying new needs that have emerged, and become affordable, 
courtesy of industrial society’s bounty.14 
 
Instead, a set of economic, and ideological axioms – broadly termed “neoliberalism” 
infected our political discourse with the fantasy of market objectivity.15 As industrial 
employment declines, workers are asked to do more with less; under neoliberalism, the 
state, its functionaries, and the wider public are expected to do less with less.  
According to David Harvey, the economic character of this myth is based upon 
the tenets of financial and industrial deregulation, the privatization of state-held industries, 
and the withdrawal of the state from traditional areas of social responsibility.16 But 
neoliberalism is more complicated than simply the direct implementation of a political 
and economic plan of governance. As Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen, and Gisela 
Neunhöffer offer, “neoliberal hegemony must be understood not as a fait accompli, but 
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rather as an ongoing process of struggle and compromise through which the meaning of 
neoliberalism is both re-examined and reaffirmed.17 
This chapter positions the final closure of Sydney Steel within this shifting 
intellectual landscape. It reveals how perceptions of political economy and the state can 
restrict local forms of resistance, and examines the rhetoric of the “new knowledge 
economy” in these stages of deindustrialization. The first section considers the changing 
role of the local university in response to dominant regional development paradigms. 
Prior to 1984, the University College of Cape Breton was envisioned as a supplement to 
industrial society; for blue-collar, middle-class coal miners and steelworkers, it 
represented an opportunity for the next generation to receive an education and achieve 
class or social mobility. This shifted after the 1984 federal election, when the PC party 
under Brian Mulroney achieved a landslide victory over the incumbent Liberals. At this 
point, with the establishment of various federal development agencies, the University 
College of Cape Breton became firmly embedded within a neoliberal strategy designed to 
actively push the island towards a post-industrial economy. In this new framework, the 
university did not complement industrial society, but came to act as a mechanism for its 
supplantation. 
 The circumstances surrounding the Sysco closure are examined in the second 
section. A series of factors in place by 1999 meant that the mill no longer held the 
economic and cultural value to the city that it once commanded. The failure to achieve 
profitability and ongoing reductions in the workforce meant that other institutions, such 
as the university and hospital, were now comparable in terms of their economic impact. 
Concerns relating to the environmental and health impacts of steelmaking, and the 
unfolding disaster on Frederick Street, created further divisions. Nor had the more than 
$700 million dollars in Sysco debt assumed by the province in 1991 enticed private 
firms– such as Minmetals – to seriously consider a purchase. These factors, combined 
with a North American steel market in crisis, meant that Sydney steelworkers were in a 
poor position to offer any significant resistance to closure. With closure presented as a 
                                                
17 Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen, and Gisela Neunhöffer, “Introduction: Reconsidering 
Neoliberal Hegemony,” in Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique, eds. Dieter Plehwe, 
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certainty, and barring the last-minute intervention of a private buyer – steelworkers 
turned to what Steven High has referred to as “effects bargaining;” they asked that the 
province at least furnish them with pensions in return for taking away their jobs, their 
economy, and the once-centre of their community – the Sydney steel plant.   
 
“Devco University” and Neoliberal Development, 1984-1999 
 
The growth of the public sector in the postwar period is inseparable from 20th century 
political economy. Public institutions provide a critical backdrop to the 
deindustrialization process, and they have sometimes been referred to as “safety valves” 
for cities suffering from high unemployment, high poverty rates, and low tax-bases. As 
Ira Harkavy and Harmon Zuckerman describe, public sector employers provide both 
short and long-term employment and can help to facilitate the turn towards alternative 
economic drivers.18 In 2007, for example, American hospitals were the top employer in 
five of the top ten cities with the highest rates of poverty. In Philadelphia, education and 
health services together accounted for a full 26 percent of the city’s total employment in 
2002.19  
Universities play an important role in these processes. They are gateways into 
local and regional labour markets, and in working-class cities they are sometimes viewed 
as a means of escape from the factory, mill, or mine; this point is reflected in Christine 
Walley’s Exit Zero, where she reflects personally upon the transitions in identity 
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undergone by a working-class university student.20 In Cape Breton, the university has 
been a major part of the island’s economic fabric since its earliest iterations. Its 
contributions can be broken into two periods, each reflecting a particular set of 
institutional and political pressures. In the first, encompassing the years between 1952 
and 1984, the institution existed as a compliment to the “free industrial society” 
envisioned by its founders. After 1984, corresponding with a national turn towards 
neoliberalism and the designs of various federal agencies involved in Cape Breton, it 
became a local instrument in the rhetorical shift towards entrepreneurialism, self reliance, 
and the promises of the “new” economy. As Fuyuki Kurasaw writes, Canadian 
universities were soon positioned as “a major platform for the generation of territorial 
wealth and corporate profitability […] simultaneously cast in the role of innovation 
incubator, engine of economic growth, and source of corporate profit.” 
Higher education in Sydney was closely tied to the fortunes of heavy industry 
since Xavier Junior College, an affiliate of St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, 
held its Grand Opening in January 1952. Students came from Sydney and the surrounding 
mining communities; education, for these men and women, represented an opportunity 
not afforded by the coal mines or steel plant.21 Moses Coady, a Roman Catholic 
clergyman and notable cooperativist, described the importance of educational institutions 
for industrial communities: 
[The founding] proves that there is still very alive in our people the possibility of 
progress within the democratic framework of society and, what is more important, 
the conviction that [Cape Bretoners] must have adequate instruments for the 
achievement of their full destiny. The past history of Cape Breton is proof that 
people of many races and cultures can come together for the development of a 
free industrial society.22 
                                                
20 Christine Walley, Exit Zero: Family and Class in Post-Industrial Chicago (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013), 113-15 
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 238 
 
The notion that a local educational institution could provide the bedrock for economic 
diversity and the establishment of a “free industrial society” remained visible into the 
1960s. In 1961, religious leaders wrote an open letter to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker 
and Nova Scotia Premier Robert Stanfield on the subject of the ongoing coal crisis. They 
argued for the establishment of a “modern progressive trade school,” and demanded that, 
“the Department of Education put on a compulsory course on the Maritime Economy in 
Grades 11 and 12 as an experiment for the next ten years.”23 The college’s promoters 
believed that the history of industrial Cape Breton and its relation to capitalist production 
was necessary to understand in light of the contemporary problems facing the island’s 
industries. One course offered in 1965 devoted an entire semester to the historical 
analysis of capitalism - including “the theory of competition as opposed to its apparent 
reality.”24 
On July 1, 1974, Xavier Junior College merged with the Nova Scotia Eastern 
Institute of Technology to create a new institution: the College of Cape Breton (CCB). 
The number of students taking credit-courses in Sydney numbered 1,068. With long-term 
growth predicted, the suitability of the small downtown campus came into question.25 
Early plans to purchase more property downtown from the Department of Defence fell 
through, and the institution instead bought a large plot of land approximately 10 
kilometres away from the city centre – between Sydney and Glace Bay. Residents would 
come to view this decision as a mistake; the city’s downtown core and the surrounding 
neighbourhoods would never experience the economic benefits that are associated with 
spatial proximity to a university or comparable institution.  
 The federal government, through its role in the Cape Breton Development 
Corporation, was directly implicated in these events. In 1971, Tom Kent – then-President 
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of Devco - announced a $500,000 loan to compliment a pre-existing $500,000 grant to 
support the initiative. Robert Morgan writes, “DEVCO realized [early on] that the higher 
education of the local population was an essential component of any economic 
expansion.”26  
Some mainlanders reacted negatively to perceived federal favouritism towards 
industrial Cape Breton. Irene Henry, a town councillor in Antigonish, derided CCB as 
“Devco University” in a May 25, 1974 interview:  
[Antigonish is] on our own. We’re outside of DREE, we haven’t factories so we 
have always had to struggle to exist and we are not going to quit. St. F.X. is our 
big employer. We have to pay for everything we have.27 
 
Another concerned citizen, Peggy MacDonald, penned an editorial drawing attention to 
the ongoing state intervention: 
CJCB [radio host] Earl Smith came on strong to piously chastise Antigonish for 
its ‘vested interest’ opposition [to the planned campus expansion in Sydney]. 
Somehow, it was quite respectable for Sydney to fight for its ‘vested interest’ in 
the steel plant . . .28 
 
Despite the opposition, CCB was granted the ability to offer BA degrees in 1982. In 
recognition of this change, the institution added “university” to its title, officially 
becoming the University College of Cape Breton (UCCB). Soon, the scope of federal 
involvement in UCCB would expand dramatically; by the end of the 1980s, the 
institution was poised as a major actor in a renewed development strategy for “post-
industrial” Cape Breton.  
Hopes for the island’s coal industry were temporarily bouyed by the second 
global oil shock in 1979-80, but – as is examined in earlier chapters -Sysco continued to 
bleed jobs. It was also at this time that federal involvement in industrial Cape Breton 
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began to shift away from the Keynesian strategies employed in the postwar period.29 
During the lead up to the 1984 federal election, Progressive Conservative (PC) candidate 
Brian Mulroney promised a re-consideration of regional economic development methods. 
Business interests had expressed concerns that the Department of Regional Industrial 
Expansion was too centralized and focused too extensively on sectoral growth.30 
Mulroney and the Tories were voted into office on September 4, 1984; with this, Canada 
joined in the neoliberal revolution underway in both the U.S. and the U.K.  
The language found within the Tories economic planning documents reveals the 
contours of this transition. Michael Wilson, the new Minister of Finance, described the 
renewed interest of the government in establishing bottom-up aid for small business and 
entrepreneurship.31 In Canada, this would take the form of tax cuts – designed to facilitate 
the “re-allocation” of resources to the most productive ends possible.32 In Cape Breton, it 
meant the withdrawal of federal support from two heavy water plants, which employed 
approximately 700 workers.33 The impact of this decision, James Bickerton argues, 
“could not have come at a worse time: 700 jobs would be lost when the Island was 
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suffering a 25% unemployment rate.”34 Federal cabinet was also almost immediately 
looking towards the possible privatization of Sysco, although this was an unofficial 
position.35 As a planning document reveals:  
The Cabinet Decision required that the provision of federal funding be subject to 
the Province of Nova Scotia agreeing to seek a private sector investor for SYSCO 
and that the steel making technology employed be such as to attract a private 
sector partner.36 
 
The Mulroney administration soon moved to decentralize regional development. 
Sinclair Stevens, the newly appointed Minister for Regional Economic Development, 
announced a plan to relieve some of these economic pressures that had been pushing 
Cape Breton towards crisis. Enterprise Cape Breton was created to administer and 
oversee a tax credit to promote the growth and expansion of local businesses. Governor 
General Jeanne Sauvé also announced during the 1986 speech from the throne:  
An Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) will be constituted to facilitate 
and coordinate all federal development initiatives in the area. This agency will make 
fuller use of the expertise available in the Atlantic region and invite the maximum 
participation of other governments and organizations in the area.37 
 
Enterprise Cape Breton merged with ACOA in 1987, although the following year the 
industrial development wing of Devco was turned into another crown corporation – 
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Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC).38 UCCB was soon embedded within these 
processes as a local partner; in 1990, the institution received $200,000 in ECBC funding 
for the creation of a laboratory devoted to the ongoing tar ponds remediation efforts. This 
was the beginning of an extensive relationship between the university and the federal 
“alphabet soup” development agencies.39  
 An official Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between UCCB 
and ECBC in 1991. The purpose of this agreement, write Paul Patterson and Susan Biagi, 
was to seek the beginning of a new era in Cape Breton – “the first steps toward creation 
of a technological and entrepreneurial culture on the island and to rebuild a devastated 
economy.”40 This new cultural mindscape, intended to supersede the old industrial 
ortgeist, would be built upon the basis of university partnerships with private firms.41 
With this, the university took on a new role within the deindustrializing city; rather than 
the “free industrial society” that Moses Coady envisioned during the institution’s earliest 
years, the university would now serve as an instrument for moving beyond the trappings 
of industrial society altogether. 
Very quickly, the language used to facilitate these changes identified the working-
class cultures and practices on the island as a problem. One ECBC planning document 
describes Cape Breton as a region where “public demonstrations [are seen] as an 
acceptable response to change;” an “assumption exists that outsiders will solve the 
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island’s problems;” and that “lacks an entrepreneurial culture.”42 Such ideas continue to 
be widely expressed, and they draw upon deeply rooted stereotypes about Maritimers that 
eclipse the role of political economy in favour of cultural explanations for disparity. 
Maritime “folk,” in these readings, are simply not suited to the globalized, 
entrepreneurial economy – but they must be made to accept its new realities.  
There stereotypes are not new; as Ernie Forbes describes, they have been 
marshalled as explanatory apparatuses for circumstances as disparate as regional support 
for prohibition, the apparent conservatism of Maritimes suffragettes, and the purported 
tardiness in developing social welfare programs. In castigating these explanations as 
unsatisfactory, Forbes writes: 
One should be under no illusion that myths disappear simply because their basic 
inaccuracies are exposed by a scholar. Myths become popular when they serve the 
purposes of those transmitting and / or receiving them. They will tend to endure 
as long as they are useful.43 
 
And endure, they have. Development groups within Nova Scotia also adopted the 
language and ideals of neoliberal restructuring, an impulse that remains visible today. As 
recently as 2014, the “Ivany Report” warned:  
This lack of solidarity as a province undermines constructive dialogue about our 
future and makes us a more difficult and risk-averse place to do business and built 
communities. It seems apparent that if Nova Scotia is to find ways to meet its 
current challenges, there will need to be change on the cultural level as much as in 
economic structures and government policies and programs.44    
 
The bold strategy identified in the Ivany report does not differ in intent from those 
employed 25 years ago by Voluntary Planning – another provincial advisory group 
comprised of regional business people, labour organizers, and community activists. This 
document identifies seven core values and articulates an overall goal designed to guide 
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Nova Scotia’s economic strategy. The “core values” of this system are: private sector 
driven, outward looking, value added, technologically advanced, performance oriented, 
environmentally sustainable, and regionally sensitive. The stated goal is “to build an 
economy that is based on competitive success so we will be able to sell more goods and 
services in the global marketplace.” The authors remark: 
We must develop in Nova Scotia a competitive culture, a shared sense that we are 
all competing with each other and with those in other parts of the world to be the 
best at whatever we do.45  
 
The Voluntary Planning document recommends that the province re-focus their attention 
towards the promising future of high-tech enterprise. Key to this notion is the idea that 
“the structure of higher education in Nova Scotia today is inhibiting the establishment of 
strong linkages between academic science disciplines and engineering.”46 UCCB, with its 
combination of academic and trades education, was positioned advantageously in light of 
these proposals. The agreement with ECBC allowed the university to cooperate with 
federal agencies in charting a new way forward not only for industrial Cape Breton, but 
also for the Maritime Provinces. The desire for the university to play such a role is further 
expressed within the early ACOA assessment, From Dependence to Enterprise, which 
recommends: 
Reshaping and rebuilding of the Cape Breton economy must come from within, 
through the efforts of Cape Bretoners. There must be a concentrated effort to shift 
from dependence to enterprise and to nurture entrepreneurship. We must 
recognize the vital role that education and training, and, in particular, the 
University College of Cape Breton, must play in effecting this shift.47  
 
Federal and provincial strategies began to hinge upon the language and intent of 
an ascendant neoliberalism by the 1980s. Cape Breton, a region already suffering from 
the dual shocks of deindustrialization in steel and coal, seemed ready-made as a case 
study for the implementation of these strategies. Interestingly, and counter to neoliberal 
orthodoxy, the state played a significant role in the proposed transition. Development 
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agencies in collusion with the local university directed funding towards chosen private 
sector actors in the “new economy.” This was intended to foster a transition away from 
reliance upon state-owned industrial firms, such as Devco and Sysco, which would 
ultimately allow for their disintegration. While ACOA remains in place at the time of 
writing, Devco, Sysco, and ECBC have since closed – and the promised post-industrial 
economy has not emerged to take their place. 
By May of 1992, the MOU had already resulted in nearly $700,000 of additional 
federal funding allocated to UCCB. This included $500,000 dedicated to the creation of a 
Chair in the Management of Technological Change, and an additional $182,000 towards 
further research in the technology sector. The university worked closely with ECBC to 
encourage the establishment of high-tech companies in Cape Breton and a “Technology 
Advisory Group” was created to help members of the community and other entrepreneurs 
with the planning and execution of tech start-ups. As Patterson and Biagi write, “in 
creating TAG, one of ECBC’s original goals was to encourage partnerships between the 
University College and the private sector.”48 The development of closer relationships 
between universities and private firms, Harvey argues, was a fundamental aspect to the 
spread of market ideology. That these ideas would take root in the modern university is 
not surprising; “Business schools at prestigious universities like Stanford and Harvard, 
generously funded by corporations and foundations, became centres of neoliberal 
orthodoxy from the very moment they opened.”49 
Jacqueline Scott, appointed as President of UCCB in January 1993, sought to 
expand upon this strategic impulse. Scott was a staunch supporter of neoliberal 
restructuring in the Cape Breton economy and within the university. Between 1996 and 
2009, she sat on the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies – a 
neoliberal think-tank favouring pro-market reforms.50 Brian Lee Crowley, the institute’s 
founder, has written extensively on the works of Friedrich Hayek, the “morality” of the 
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market, and the importance of market-based solutions for the problems facing the region; 
the think tank was designed to bring these ideas to bear on Atlantic Canada.51 Deeply-
rooted cultural and attitudinal handicaps, Scott would later write, were a primary factors 
in preventing the island’s industrial communities – and, indeed, its First Nations residents 
– from achieving prosperity. She describes: 
[Some First Nations leaders] believe that ‘the government victimized us and, 
under the treaties, it owes us a living’ or that government should provide jobs 
through grants and subsidies to enterprises — a sentiment that is, indeed, shared 
by many non-aboriginals in Cape Breton’s industrial communities.52 
 
Throughout the decade, the university expanded its focus and partnered with more 
than 100 local tech-projects. It also reshaped its internal structure; on-campus programs 
now included the Bachelor of Technology in in Environmental Health, Nautical and 
Chemical Sciences, and Petroleum Studies. A program in Community Economic 
Development was unveiled in 1998. By this point, the university had become more than a 
go-between amongst federal development agencies and local business - it was positioned 
as a research and development incubator. In 1999, the University College established its 
Department of Economic and Technological Innovation to “facilitate the transfer of 
research and development to the private sector, for commercialization, and to promote 
economic diversification.53 Research clusters included: 
• The Computer-Assisted Design/Computer-Assisted Manufacturing Centre 
• The Geographical Information Systems/Global Positions Systems Centre 
• The Centre of Excellence in Information Technology 
• The Centre of Excellence in Petroleum Development and Education 
• The Centre for Excellence in Environmental Research 
• The Technology Enterprise Centre 
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Although many of these centres continued in the years immediately following the closure 
of Devco and Sysco, not a single one remains in operation today.  
 
Trying to Light a Candle With a Wet Piece of Paper: The Death of Sysco, 1999-2001 
 
In the fall of 1999, with UCCB ostensibly positioned as the agent of change that would 
help to guide Cape Breton into the post-industrial future, all that remained was for 
citizens to accept this change with open arms. This necessitated the closure of the two 
firms that had, by this point, become associated in popular imagination – on the mainland, 
at least - with the failure of industrial interventionism: Sysco and Devco.  
Recalling the decision to close Sydney Steel, Hamm asserts that it was not based 
on ideology; rather, he felt that the subsidization of Sysco did not fit within a program of 
targeted economic development. This position fits within the context of a development 
strategy that viewed the economic future of the province in terms of the nascent tech and 
knowledge industries. In fact, the former premier spoke highly of Stanfieldian economic 
interventionism – but geared towards the proper economic drivers:   
John Hamm: I am a believer in business incentives, but only the ones that work. 
And some of them worked very well, I mean, the best [historical] example we 
have in our province is Michelin. Michelin came [to Nova Scotia] with business 
incentives. They didn’t come here out of the goodness of their hearts.54 
 
Rather than continuing to support the steelworks in Sydney, increasingly seen as a 
drain on provincial coffers and portrayed as an industrial dinosaur in development 
literature, the PC’s focused their plan on the much-touted “new” economies of the 21st 
century. NovaKnowledge, a private company supported by provincial and federal grants, 
produced a report in 1999 in which they laud the decline of federal and provincial 
spending in Nova Scotia. This decline, including the closure of Sysco and Devco, would 
apparently provide opportunities for the private sector to create sustained, job-creating 
economic growth. Traditional government spending, on the other hand, would “retard the 
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development of the competitive, business-oriented mindset.”55 Instead, subsidy dollars 
could be redirected to other sectors; in October of 1999, for example, the province 
provided $3 million to Scotiabank Atlantic for the training of nearly 300 employees for 
positions at the company’s Halifax call centre.56  
Meanwhile, the Hamm administration continued to search for prospective buyers 
for Sydney Steel. Hoogovens Technical Services Technological & Operational 
Assistance Inc. had been commissioned by the Liberals in 1998 to bring the plant to a 
level of operation that would appeal to global steel firms.57 The firm continued in this 
capacity under the Tory government.  Some workers were sceptical of the company’s 
intentions, particularly surrounding the $700,000 per month fee for their services. The 
following exchange occurred in a group interview with former steelworkers in August 
2015: 
Gerry McCarron: They brought Hoogovens in before . . . when we were trying to 
sell it […] brought a group of about thirty of them in. And each guy went into 
different department and […] they’re going to correct our problems […] We lost 
more money under these guys then we did with our own guys running it […] 
They paid these guys . . .  
 
Sheldon Andrews: Top dollar  
 
 Gerry: Top dollar. To come in and try to run things.58 
 
Concerns over the remuneration of outside management firms reflect the worry that 
international firms were simply interested in Sysco as a means to profit from closure and 
liquidation. Even when a possible sale appeared on the horizon, employees wondered if a 
private owner would simply shutter the plant and sell off equipment after gaining control. 
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Manning MacDonald recalls these fears: “It’s the same old story. If something is 
vulnerable, there’s always somebody willing to come in the door and make you an offer 
you can’t refuse.”59  
The steelworkers knew that they were vulnerable. Several significant factors, 
which have been examined throughout this thesis, meant that their labour was no longer 
considered indispensible within their community, nor could they count on the sustained 
public support that had emerged during previous shutdown attempts. As a result, Local 
1064 soon had to engage in “effects bargaining.” To ensure that members would receive 
appropriate remuneration should closure occur, members began pressuring the provincial 
government on the issue of workers’ pensions.60  
They were right to be concerned. A number of firms expressed interest in 
purchasing Sydney Steel during the final months of 1999, but none moved beyond the 
initial bidding stage. Bill McNeil, the president of Local 1064, met with members of WCI 
Steel, a subsidiary of New York-based Renco Steel Holdings Inc. The steel executives 
indicated that they would only be interested in Sysco if higher production rates could be 
attained and lower man-hours negotiated; this would require significant layoffs.61 
Although this sale did not move beyond preliminary interest, WCI Steel declared 
bankruptcy just three years later and absconded with a $117 million shortfall in the 
pensions of its American employees. Had this company decided to take on the Sysco 
operations, a similar fate could easily have befallen Sydney steelworkers.  
On December 31, Hamm arrived in Nova Scotia with good news. The plant was 
to be sold to a consortium of companies under the Ohio-based “Research Group.” The 
workforce would be reduced through attrition, but the firm hoped to employ 
approximately 150 steelworkers. Following this press conference, steelworkers in the 
audience remained subdued. The collapse of the Minmetals sale in the 1990s had made 
steelworkers wary of pinning their hopes on a “fly-by-night” operation. After all, the 
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agreement specified an April 15 closing date – it was not yet a done deal. Local 1064 
now turned their attention towards bargaining for a government commitment to their 
pensions. As one worker remarked following the announcement, “where will the older 
workers be left if in three years or so the privatized steel company fails and the 
government declares itself free of obligation to them?”62 
By mid-January, 2000, this deal collapsed and liquidators from Ernst & Young 
began to prepare for the demolition of the plant.63 Roger Faulkner, a representative from 
the national chapter of the USWA, visited Sydney and revealed that the union had 
separately contracted out an American company, Locker Associates, to try and find other 
possible buyers for the plant.64 With no serious offers on the table, Sysco workers began 
to take more direct action in search of a solution to the ongoing pension issue. In the chill 
of late February, more than 500 steelworkers and their families crowded the doorway at 
the Provincial Building in Sydney. One expressed his thoughts in an open letter to the 
premier:  
I was hired at Sysco on March 12, 1979, and I’ve worked sporadically ever since. 
I am 47, with 21 years seniority and only 5 years of actual work time and credited 
pension service. While on layoff I began my own small business in Ingonish. I 
received a registered letter to return to work at Sysco in 1991 so I decided to do 
that, giving up on my business project. I worked eight weeks and was laid off 
again. And that’s the story of my life. I am living between welfare and 
Employment Insurance. […] At this point in my life I cannot leave the area to 
look for work. Who would spend the time and money to train me at my age? […] 
Now it’s time for [the Premier] to protect me and my family.65  
  
The provincial government set up a bidding process for potential buyers and began 
negotiating with the union regarding pensions. The union was sceptical of their 
assurances; Hamm, the executive believed, was stalling for time and making empty 
promises. The union revealed:  
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The executive met and decided to [begin protesting] John Hamm […] as the 
province is causing untold stress to steelworkers and their families. We agreed 
[…] to send a bus to opening of Legislature On Mar. 28 […] Also planning a trip 
to Hamm’s office in Pictou with support from Trenton Local 1231.66 
 
The response reveals how steelworkers in Sydney felt hamstrung by their uncertain future. 
One member spoke out about the abnormality of the situation; in usual contract 
negotiations, trade unionists would have the ability to withdraw their services in protest. 
This tactic would be useless as a protest mechanism against either the proposed closure of 
the plant or as part of pension negotiations. The member argued, “We cannot and must 
not do this, as it would look like we closed the plant. The government is looking for any 
excuse.”67 Nonetheless, Hamm remembers that the steelworkers’ protest in Pictou did 
have an impact:  
And to be perfectly honest, despite the fact that it was a very, very emotional 
issue. They did not treat me badly. I remember one time […] my MLA office was 
downtown, New Glasgow. Bus loads of them came to New Glasgow to protest 
outside my office […] But government played a role in [Sysco], so government 
can’t just suddenly say, ‘we don’t have a responsibility.’ […] I said to them on the 
picket line, I said ‘We will treat you fairly. Now, they might have had a different 
idea of what fairly . . . But what I meant was, you know, first of all the pension 
fund was in terrible shape, number two the benefits weren’t really adequate, and I 
didn’t think they were […] And number three, if we could arrange it, employment 
with a new employer.68 
 
Negotiations surrounding the Sysco pensions continued into May. The union sought 
clarification on a number of issues; notably, they pressed for an early retirement incentive 
package after 25 years of service, a drug plan for retirees, and $2,200 per month. The 
government, on the other hand, pushed for $1,500 per month for all employees with 30 
years of service in the event of a closure, a retirement window for those with 27-29 years, 
and severance packages for those with fewer than 27 years service.69 John Kingston, the 
Atlantic Provinces representative for the USWA, explained the union’s position: 
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Without fear of contradiction, the Steelworkers in Sydney were closer to and 
competitive with wages and benefits paid by the Industry prior to the Province 
assuming ownership in 1967. Thirty-three years later we are on an average $5.00 - 
$6.00 below that mark in wages; pensions are $10.00 - $20.00 per month times 
years of service behind the industry.70 
 
At the same time, two other companies expressed interest in organizing a purchase 
arrangement. North American Metals (NAM), a subsidiary that had been involved in the 
failed Research Group deal, and the Swiss-based Duferco both put forward operational 
proposals. Local 1064 favoured the NAM proposal, which included the maintenance of 
500 positions, while Duferco sought a “leaner” operation of only 200 employees.71  
In the midst of these discussions, the final rail was rolled at Sysco on May 22, 
2000. This brought a century of steelmaking to an end.72 This occurred without much 
fanfare. While the final order was completed, steelworkers and management continued to 
entertain the possibility of a private sale. Steven High describes how workers at the 
Weyerhauser paper mill in Sturgeon Falls, Ontario, remembered with great clarity the 
events of the last shift – as well as ongoing resistance to closure.73 In the documentary 
film Last Shift, which examines the final days of a Bowater mill in New Brunswick, 
workers’ memories of their final days at the mill are presented as a “bookend” for 
decades of work.74 This was not the case in Sydney; the overbearing possibility of a 
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private sale not only robbed steelworkers of the ability to actively resist closure through 
striking or walkouts, but it also ensured uncertainty surrounding whether or not there 
would be further work at the plant. Gerry McCarron and Dave Nalepa recalled: 
Dave Nalepa: Well, we knew when the last rail was rolled because I remember 
that night, it was the four to twelve shift, and as soon as the thing – they started 
working on dismantling right after that.  
 
Gerry: Well, we knew it was the last rail rolled – but there was always still that 
glimmer of hope that before they started pulling everything apart that maybe a 
sale could happen – but something would have had to fallen out of the sky.75 
 
Nearly 250 workers were laid-off the next day. Executives from Local 1064 continued to 
believe that a deal would be reached. Duferco and the NAM proposals were under 
consideration and members of the union executive met with Teresa MacNeil – chair of 
the Sysco board – to discuss the possibility of new rail orders. NAM planned to maintain 
operations at the rail mill, while the Duferco proposal was based solely on the production 
of slabs.76 Meanwhile, the scheduled protest in New Glasgow went ahead. 
Approximately 130 steelworkers picketed Hamm’s office, although attendees 
would later regret that there had not been more participation. Roddie Livingston, 
speaking at a 1064 membership meeting, said “people are not interested in taking part in 
rallies, this must change.” Others echoed these sentiments, with some remarking that 
pressuring the government would lead to a better pension agreement and continued 
interest in procuring a sale.77 
On Wednesday, June 22, Ernst & Young officially recommended that the 
province accept the Duferco offer. Matt Harris, speaking on behalf of the liquidators, 
argued that this purchase agreement was the only possible option; the sale would see the 
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buyer pay $7 million up-front and an additional $15 million in bonds.78 Before this could 
be finalized, however, the company demanded that a pension agreement be negotiated 
with the provincial government and that a contract be agreed upon with the plant’s 
unions.79  
Pension negotiations began immediately. In the first week of August, some 
steelworkers took matters into their own hands; a group of about 100 younger workers 
blocked the gates at Sysco for the first time since the provincial election. As steel 
production had already ceased, this only impacted a few remaining employees in 
management positions and scheduled deliveries of scrap metal – though it also delayed 
the shipment of the final rail order. These workers felt that they were being left out of the 
deal, and they demanded that the province drop the eligibility requirement from 27 to 25 
years of service.80 Steelworkers held another protest on September 11, this time 
disrupting a garden party held for Nova Scotia Lieutenant Governor Myra Freeman at 
UCCB.81 Bill McNeil reflects on the eventual agreement: 
So that’s the way it worked out. The guys hired on [after] ’75 [with less than 25 
years] never got anything […] The guys with 30 years service got the total, the 
full pension. And the guys with 30 years service down to 25 were prorated. And 
the guys after that got severance packages […] and the union agreed that these 
[younger] guys would get the work [at Duferco].82 
 
With the pension issue settled, Duferco began serious negotiations with employees from 
CUPE, the USWA locals, and salaried staff. This bargaining did not take long; by 
Halloween, CUPE workers, salaried employees, and the steelworkers had agreed to the 
terms of a 5-year Duferco contract. Under this contract, nearly 200 former Sysco workers 
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would have continuous employment; the union agreed that those men who were ineligible 
for pensions would receive the first opportunity for work. These jobs were categorized 
into five base wage groups, ranging from $15.50 per hour to $17.22 per hour.83 This offer, 
for many former employees, appeared to be a done deal; according to Gerry and Dave:  
Gerry: We all got together, the management, and we actually picked the 
workforce – we had it all lined up for when – 
 
Dave: Yeah. I had the HR side of it done. We probably had – 90 percent of the 
employees picked and a lot of people had signed up, and all the salaried people 
had all signed up, with letters and contracts.  
 
Gerry: Jackets ordered. Jackets with Duferco-Sydney.84  
 
But this deal, like so many before, would not come to pass. The final stage in the sale 
process required a contract between Duferco and Nova Scotia Power – a former 
provincial crown corporation that had been privatized in 1992. The inability of the two 
companies to reach an agreement on power rates caused the entire deal to collapse on 
January 18, 2001. John Hamm reflects: 
They came that close to buying it. And it was only afterwards that I found out 
why the deal fell through. And it wasn’t really their fault. They, in their business 
plan, had to negotiate the electricity rate with Nova Scotia Power. And they came 
within half a cent of bridging the gap. But they couldn’t bridge the gap. And that 
gave them the out.85 
 
“Steel Era Ends,” read the Post headline the next morning; “Sydney’s designation as a 
steel town ended Thursday.”86 It was this event, the collapse of the Duferco deal, which 
most respondents view as the final end of Sydney Steel; in 2015, very few interviewees 
expressed the belief that another serious buyer could have been found in time to maintain 
production at the plant.  
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A global downturn in the steel market was forecast at the end of 2000. Market uncertainly 
likely played a role in the decision by Duferco to halt the Sysco sale agreement. In 
Canada, crude steel production had already slowed by the end of the year, and a predicted 
slow down in the automotive sector indicated that steel prices would remain low. An 
inventory glut had depressed the global market, and forecasts for 2001 continued to 
predict a nearly 7 percent fall in demand. According to the OECD report on steel markets, 
“Canadian producers will be facing a difficult situation that was not seen since the early 
1990s and that is expected to result in layoffs.”88 It was a bad time for any company to 
consider purchasing a steel mill. Matt Harris announced, “There is no remaining credible 
option out there to operate Sysco.”89 As of June 1, 2001, all remaining employees of 
Sydney Steel were officially off the company’s books; the steel industry in Sydney had 
come to an end. 
Conclusion 
 
Ten years after the collapse of Communism, Perry Anderson reflected, the world had 
moved on. American capitalism re-asserted its primacy in all fields. Europe moved 
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towards the American model following the apparent discrediting of Marxism, and Asia – 
including the Indian subcontinent – had broadly adopted the prescriptions of the World 
Trade Organization. The dominant intellectualism was that of practical resignation; 
capitalism had won – or at least scored a major victory – and the left would have to 
contend with that hard reality.90 It was into this international environment that the 
“discourse” of neoliberalism became predominant; Pierre Bourdieu writes: 
It is so strong and so hard to combat only because it has on its side all of the 
forces of a world of relations of forces, a world that it contributes to making what 
it is. It does this most notably by orienting the economic choices of those who 
dominate economic relationships. It thus adds its own symbolic force to these 
relations of forces. In the name of this scientific programme, converted into a plan 
of political action, an immense political project is underway.91 
 
The ideological contours of this project are particularly relevant to the circumstances 
surrounding the final closure of Sydney Steel and the evolution of UCCB in the rapidly 
deindustrializing city. Both institutions represented poles of the changing landscape; 
Sysco is framed, within this discourse, as a symbol of the old economy – and old 
working-class ways of thinking that, like the landscape itself, must be “remediated.” As 
Jackie Clarke argues, “while this language of class death registers a process of social and 
economic restructuring that is real, it does little to get to grips with the fact that the 
people who populated the old industrial order still exist.”92 In contrast, UCCB was 
institutionally positioned to soothe the transition from a city dependent upon state 
employment towards a private sector economy. 
Sysco employees keenly felt their displacement; “trying to light a candle with a 
wet piece of paper,” is how Charles MacDonald describes attempts to get the community 
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involved in trying to keep the plant open.93 When asked why a sense of resignation 
permeated the plant’s final months, workers offered several answers. Fred James reveals: 
I think there were a number of factors […] Probably the biggest single factor was 
the fact that the number of employees had been reduced so much, I mean we were 
down under 800 people at that point in time […] So it didn’t have the economic 
impact […] The other thing, I think, is that people were in a position that they had 
come to terms with it. That it was inevitable. They had, for ’67, well – 30-some 
years – 33 years, I guess – watched millions and millions of dollars pumped into 
the steel plant, and still didn’t turn it around. I know you could write books and 
volumes on why, and what have you, but that’s the bottom line right there. After 
all those millions of dollars pumped into it, it was still losing money. And they 
couldn’t say that was going to stop. So I think the people were much more willing 
to accept . . . the demise of the steel plant in 2000 […] And [sighs] . . . I never 
experienced it myself, I mean face to face, but I was hearing that there were a lot 
of business people, even in Sydney . . . that were saying, you know, alright, 
enough’s enough.94 
 
Bill McNeil echoes many of these points: 
I was talking to John Hamm […] and he told me right out, he said, ‘Look, Bill,’ 
he said, ‘there’s organizations within the City of Sydney that want to see it closed.’ 
He said, ‘It’s not only Halifax that wants the plant closed […] Now he told me 
that himself. So, it became that – you know – the fight from 5,000 men, to 3,000 
men, down to 1,200 men, down to 700 men, down to 300 men! You know? The 
fight. The community was . . . At one time when you had 5,000 people working 
on the steel plant everybody that lived in Sydney […] they were related to them. 
But after awhile as the workforce dwindled down we just didn’t have the support. 
We tried, of course, it’s just . . . it wasn’t going to happen. But anyway, the 
feeling was ‘get a pension […] if somebody wants to work with Duferco, let them 
run it.’ 95 
 
A number of themes remain common to discussions of final closure at Sydney Steel. That 
Sysco suffered a “death by 1000 cuts” through frequent layoffs and the long-term failure 
to diversify and achieve profitability is frequently articulated. The age of the workforce is 
another; the majority of workers qualified under the pension arrangement, and those who 
did not were generally in their mid-to-late forties. Dave Nalepa explains: “[In 1967] you 
had young guys and old guys at the plant. You had the whole slew. When we closed, you 
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just had old guys. There were no young guys. There was no, you know, the son of so-
and-so, is 22, is working in the melt shop.” This lack of younger workers, who would 
perhaps have been more invested in the continued operation of the plant, is another 
reason frequently given to explain the inability to organize effectively against closure.                                                
In these answers, the absence of resistance is contingent upon the decline in 
employment at Sysco and the displacement of the plant from the economic and cultural 
centre of the community. Workers were fearful of acting as barriers to the market, they 
believed that traditional forms of resistance would scare off potential buyers. These 
attitudes did not simply spring from the period between 1999 and 2001, but developed 
alongside the global dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state and the ideological turn 
towards “flexibility” and “lean production” in North America and Europe.   
Marx wrote, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please […] but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the 
past.”96 As Sydney steelworkers responded to these global forces, the decision to close 
the plant was similarly circumscribed. That is not to say that such a decision was 
inevitable, but rather that the closure of Sysco had become a hugely appealing political 
option in a marketplace of ideas dominated by the voices of an ascendant neoliberalism.97 
John Hamm does not personally view the closure through the lens of neoliberal ideology. 
Rather, he positions himself as a neo-Stanfieldian – willing to use government to 
intervene in markets, but only in cases where it makes “economic sense.” Neoliberal 
economism, as outlined by Harvey, is not found in Hamm’s recollections of the Sysco 
closure. Instead, as he explained, the time for subsidizing heavy industry had passed – 
other sectors, such as technology, appeared more promising and a better investment for 
taxpayer dollars.98   
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If we consider G.I. Smith’s decision to nationalize the Sydney steel plant in 1967 
as the natural culmination of a regionalist/interventionist development strategy, Hamm’s 
resolution to close the plant in 1999 was framed within a set of popular ideological 
axioms about the market, production, and society that were nearly the polar opposite of 
those that surrounded the issue on Black Friday. Neoliberalism must be understood, as 
Philip Mirowski argues, as “a set of epistemic commitments” that hold as a primary 
ambition the redefinition of the form and function of the state – not its destruction.99 The 
closure decision was more than simply an impartial analysis of where public dollars 
would be better spent. It was developed as the result of a decades-long ideological 
construction whereby the employees of Sysco, the residents of industrial Cape Breton, 
and the citizens of deindustrializing regions throughout the world were castigated as 
symbols of a bygone era.  
Noam Chomsky describes policy prescriptions under modern capitalism as being 
chosen from within a particular spectrum of “acceptable opinions.”100 In Nova Scotia, 
alternative solutions to the problems of deindustrialization were either ignored or pre-
emptively dismissed as backwards-looking by a canon of development literature that 
presented the issue as a dichotomy. Cape Breton, in these narratives, must transition 
wholesale from dependence to entrepreneurship. This is why the language of the 
neoliberal project is so odious. As Oliver Schöller and Olaf Groh-Samburg write, it 
affirms Social Darwinist assumptions while lobbying for specific political/economic 
solutions.101 If the transition from coal and steel to the “restructured” capitalism of 
entrepreneurship, knowledge, and innovation were to fail, this could simply be blamed on 
the inability of the population to move beyond their industrial mindscape – the project 
itself could – and did - continue without question.  
                                                
99 Philip Mirowski, “Postface: Defining Neoliberalism,” in The Road from Mont Pelerin: 
The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, eds. Philip Mirowski and Dieter 
Plehwe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 417, 436. 
 
100 Noam Chomsky and David Barsamian, The Common Good (Berkeley, CA: Odonian 
Press, 1998), 43.  
 
101 Oliver Schöller and Olaf Groh-Samburg, “The education of neoliberalism,” in 
Neoliberal Hegemony: A Critique, eds. Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen and Gisela 
Neunhöffer (London: Routledge, 2006), 171-3. 
 261 
The importance of UCCB to this process cannot be overstated. The institution, 
following Mulroney’s re-envisioning of regional development during the mid-1980s, 
provided an in-community link between research dollars and the nascent private tech 
industry. A primary goal of these activities was to shrink the reliance of Cape Bretoners 
on federal and provincial expenditure, which would be accomplished not only with the 
establishment of private-public partnerships at the institution, but also through an effort at 
conditioning local students and community members to have a more “entrepreneurial” 
and “business-friendly” perspective. As one Cape Breton County Economic Development 
report from 1994 recommends, “UCCB [in conjunction with local schools] should 
develop a series of teacher/administrator inservices, teacher retraining programs, and 
information services for students based upon the new economy of Cape Breton.”102  
This lengthy process, culminating with the final closure of Sysco and the 
ascendency of UCCB as a prime-mover within the island’s much-lauded “new economy,” 
must be considered in terms of both top-down ideational constructions and bottom-up 
responses to the material circumstances of capitalist reproduction. As Hans-Jürgen 
Bieling argues, “It seems very alluring to adopt a view that emphasizes the prominent 
role of intellectual leadership in social and political struggles […] [However], the ideas 
and perceptions – the content of common sense – which emerge from the ‘bottom up’ in 
these processes [are by no means simply secondary].”103 Restructuring in two 
institutional “poles” of the community – the steel plant and the university – reveal how 
workers’ responses to the material economistic changes of neoliberalism can differ 
drastically depending upon their place in constructed discourse.  
If the goal of neoliberal restructuring in industrial Cape Breton was to produce 
significant private sector employment, it was an abject failure. In 2015, the island’s 
unemployment rate remained between 15 and 20 percent – far higher than anywhere else 
in the province. If, on the other hand, the goal was to implement an ideological project of 
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economic neoliberalism – using Harvey’s definition – then it has been an unmitigated 
success. Federal and provincial governments have since abdicated responsibility for 
Devco and Sysco, ECBC was closed by the federal government in 2014, and the Liberal 
government of Stephen MacNeil has recently enacted further austerity measures – 
including an attempted wage freeze imposed on 75,000 of the province’s public sector 
workers.104  
Perhaps, as a result, it should be no surprise that the language of economic 
development from the early 1990s remains so remarkably consistent today. The solutions 
proposed 25 years ago to the problems of regional deindustrialization are still described 
as bold and fresh ideas. Strategists bemoan the lack of an “entrepreneurial spirit” among 
residents of the Maritimes, while pushing for Nova Scotians “to endure major sacrifices – 
such as cuts to rural services, so that money can be invested elsewhere.” As University of 
Prince Edward Island political scientist Peter McKenna told John Ibbitson of the Globe 
and Mail in March 2015, “our region lacks the energy, entrepreneurial spirit, and the 
desire for a fresh start.”105 The reasons for this are clear; Forbes words remain prescient: 
Myths will endure as long as they are useful. 
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Making History from Sydney Steel, 2012-2016 
 
 
I had to go to the steel company site and look up these old personnel records. I 
went on the steel plant for the first time since being laid off. I got in that main 
gate and I turned right and the tracks weren’t ploughed – the railway tracks when 
you come in. From 1965 to that point I had never ever seen that. In my life. And I 
filled up. It just . . . it sounds like such a stupid little thing . . . it just struck me, all 
that history, all the families that fed their children and maybe put their kids 
through university and all the rest of it for almost 100 years. And it’s gone. Gone. 
Even today sometimes . . . a memory will be sparked and, and I’ll feel the 
sadness.1  
 
      - Fred James, 2013 
 
Demolition of the plant began almost immediately. By the end of July 2001, work crews 
staffed with former steelworkers began dismantling what remained of the Sydney Works. 
Re-usable assets were organized for auction, and the province sought private buyers to 
begin recouping some of the funds that had been spent on the Sydney Steel Corporation 
over the years.2 In 2003, Zoom Developers of India purchased several large pieces of 
equipment from the Sysco site; the company hired teams of former workers to dismantle 
and organize the universal mill to be shipped. During this process, the last fatality on the 
Sydney Steel site occurred; on September 23, 2004, Roy Marchand – a former 
steelworker – was killed when a falling steel beam struck him in the head.3  
Community divisions remained. Questions over the environmental and health 
impacts of the site again erupted as work was carried out. Throughout the early 2000s, 
local environmentalists and members from the Sierra Club continued pressuring 
government to resolve the issue. Some of these divisions were visible on August 30, 2001, 
when a crowd gathered outside the plant to watch the destruction of the smokestacks at 
the Open Hearth Department. After several quick explosions, three of the stacks had 
                                                
1 Fred James, interview with author, August 17, 2013.  
 
2 “Sydney Steel demolition has started, what’s next?” CBC, July 23, 2001.  
 
3 “Falling steel beam kills former Sysco worker,” CBC, September 24, 2004. 
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fallen – but two remained standing. Charles MacDonald reflected, “They just don’t want 
to lay down and die, it seems […] The worst part is that this shouldn’t have happened. 
The fact that Cape Bretoners let this happen is sickening.”4 Meanwhile, Elizabeth May 
and several others shouted for officials to stop the demolition; “What’s the urgency of 
blowing up the stacks?” May asked, “Even if [it’s] entirely benign, they’re treating the 
people with contempt.”5 
On May 12, 2004, representatives from the provincial and federal governments 
announced a renewed commitment to the clean up of the Sydney tar ponds and the 
remediation of the area surrounding the former steel plant. Adrienne Clarkson, in the 
2004 speech from the throne, revealed that the Canadian government would provide 
approximately $280 million to aid in these efforts. The Hamm administration agreed to 
fund the remaining $120 million. Stephen Owen, the Minister for Public Works and 
Government Services of Canada, told gathered reporters that the project would include a 
combination of high-temperature incineration and on site encapsulation.6 The demolition 
of Sydney Steel structures concluded in 2007, and by the end of the decade the 
remediation phase of the tar ponds and coke ovens sites was also drawing to a close.  
The Sydney Tar Ponds Agency, a federal crown corporation created to oversee 
the clean up, stated in 2011 that the planned end-use of the site was to take the form of a 
community green space. Envisioned as a “central park” for Sydney, the design would 
include trails, bike paths, and public art, and would act as a connection between Ashby, 
Whitney Pier, and downtown Sydney. Today, this green space bears the name “Open 
Hearth Park.”7 In this chapter, Open Hearth Park and a corresponding historical film 
about the Sydney steel plant, titled Heart of Steel (2012), are explored as public history 
                                                




6 “$1.48 million future-use design contract awarded,” Sydney Tar Ponds Agency, 
November 23, 2011, in author’s possession.  
 
7 “Park called Open Hearth to grace tar ponds site,” Chronicle Herald, June 14, 2013; 
Province approves $1M loan to Harbourside Commercial Park,” Cape Breton Post, 
November 6, 2009. 
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representations of the deindustrialization process more than 10 years after final closure.8 
James Rhodes describes the importance of critically analysing these cultural forms:  
The realm of popular culture becomes an important site within which claims to 
the industrial past and its related cultural forms are reasserted and reproduced; 
there, increased material and symbolic marginality is challenged, and attempts to 
relocate such cultural practices and identities at the symbolic center of place are 
advanced.9 
 
In the first section, the process of naming the park is examined for the tensions it reveals 
between labour history and public history on the site of the former mill. Additionally, the 
physical features of the present landscape reveal how place identities shift in response to 
existing social relationships. The second section focuses on Heart of Steel, which 
presents a “green” vision of the city that is politically disconnected from the concerns of 
the industrial past. Any recognition that Cape Breton’s current circumstances are related 
to its experience of deindustrialization is subsumed under a celebratory narrative that 
highlights the transition from dirty industry to green fields.  
 
What’s in a Name? A Commemorative Controversy at Open Hearth Park 
 
On Labour Day weekend, at the end of August in 2013, hundreds of Sydney residents 
gathered at the site of the former plant to hear a variety of local musicians, purchase food 
from a gourmet street fair, and participate in multi-cultural events organized by members 
of the Mi’kmaq, Acadian, Eastern European, and black communities of Cape Breton 
Island. The keystone event of the weekend took place at dusk on Saturday evening, when 
a procession of former steelworkers –some dressed in their Sysco work-clothes – walked 
through the park under a banner bearing the name of the event, “Stronger than Steel.” 
The title was meant to represent survival; the city had moved away from its industrial 
past, and the reclaimed land that now rests on nearly 100 hectares of the former mill 
property has come to signify re-use, remediation, and adaptation.  
The purpose of the Stronger than Steel event was twofold; it was a celebration of 
the conclusion of the $400 million tar ponds and coke ovens remediation project that had 
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been announced in 2004, and it served as the official opening of Open Hearth Park. 
Representatives from the federal and provincial governments were both on hand for the 
festivities. Diane Finley, the Canadian Minister of Public Works and Government 
Services, offered credit to her own government for its hand in the process. “Thanks to the 
leadership of the Harper Government,” she began, “This has been the most successful 
contaminated site remediation project in Canada's history and we're proud that it was 
completed on time and on budget.”10 Provincial NDP minister Maurice Smith spoke of 
remembering the industrial history of steel and coal on the island and honouring those 
who took part, but also of looking ahead “to a brighter future.” This is perhaps easier said 
than done. Open Hearth Park has memorialized the city’s industrial past in a number of 
ways. Some of these, as we shall see, remain contentious.   
Figure 8.1: Focus on the Future 
Source: Photo by author 
Before the park opened, the first commemorative efforts had already taken shape. 
In March 2013, a competition was announced for students from local elementary, junior 
       
10 Public Works and Government Services Canada website, 30 August 2013, “Stronger 
Than Steel Celebration Pays Tribute to Sydney's Past, Present and Future,” 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=768179.   
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high, and high schools. Students were invited to submit proposed names for the park, 
along with an attached essay, story, video, photograph, or song that explains their 
reasoning for their choice. Frank Corbett, Deputy Premier of Nova Scotia, explained, 
“Providing students with the opportunity to name the new park gave them a meaningful 
role and voice in helping to shape the community's future.”11 The Sydney Tar Ponds 
Agency described the criteria of the “Sydney Park Project” naming competition: “We're 
looking for upbeat and original name submissions that show pride in Cape Breton’s 
history and hope for the future. Names from all local cultures are welcome, but we won’t 
be considering peoples’ names for the overall park site.” The organizers preferred that the 
park have some form of collective significance beyond memorializing a single person.  
Figure 8.2: Open Hearth Park 
Source: Photo by author 
       
11 Government of Nova Scotia website, Sydney Tar Ponds Agency Press Release, 14 June 
2013, “Open Hearth Park Selected as Name of Reclaimed Tar Ponds Site,” 
http://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20130614002. 
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In public history, the act of naming is political. Meanings are contested, 
memorializations can include or exclude particular groups, and place-identities shift in 
response to present conditions.12 Toby Butler writes: 
The problem is that places are not static; people move, leave, visit, and pass 
through. Over time, places and populations change with the seasons, the markets, 
and the ages, yet the stories tend to come from those that have stayed a long time 
in one area and can give the impression that communities are far more stable than 
they actually are.13   
 
Steelworkers’ perceptions of the park reflect such a transition in place identity, and these 
processes are often uncomfortable. While almost everybody interviewed for this project 
initially expressed a positive attitude towards the park, this was often qualified through a 
discussion of mitigating factors. Some expressed the opinion that a steel plant should still 
be operating on the site, while others expressly took issue with the process by which the 
name was chosen. Fabian Smith describes: 
Well, they gave [the responsibility of naming the park] to the children. And that’s 
fine. But to me, with all the money they spent . . . they were taking away a steel 
plant. Dozens of guys got killed there . . . Why would you put Open Hearth Park? 
It’s only one of the dirtiest departments on the plant. Why is it not named 
Steelworkers’ Memorial Park? To me, that says it all. As I told you, I worked with 
this guy, one day, and 22 hours later he was dead. I mean to me, that’s still . . . 
things like that take a lot out of you, that’s something you never forget. It should 
be people like him that the park is named after. Steelworkers’ Memorial, you 
know? But anyway, it’s too late now. 
 
Naming controversies periodically emerge in response to the creation of public 
sites or commemorations. As Derek Alderman describes, they arise periodically in the 
American South in response to the re-naming of streets after Martin Luther King Jr. In 
these controversies, Alderman argues, larger struggles over social, political identity, and 
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racial identity – and the power to exert those identities – become visible.14 So, too, are 
some negative reactions to these processes a response to the perceived exercise of power. 
Although it was children who ultimately named the park in Sydney, some respondents 
felt that the site held such significant meaning that the decision should have been 
undertaken with more care. This is revealed through the frequency in which our 
conversations soon turned to the numbers of men who were killed at the plant, close calls 
on the job, or direct experiences of workplace injury.  
Perhaps more stinging is the realization that the input of steelworkers, their 
families, or their union held no more weight in the decision than did the general public. 
Submissions were posted to a website for the Sydney Park Project, and the top five were 
selected by a committee of project and community representatives. These included 
members from the municipal council, provincial and federal representatives, a 
representative from the African Nova Scotian community, a member from the First 
Nations community, and members of the tar ponds clean up committee. A short list was 
created, and online voting began in May 2013.  
Demographically, former steelworkers were unlikely to participate in this type of 
online selection. The democratization of commemorative sites represents another step in 
the displacement wrought by deindustrialization. Workers are displaced economically, 
first through decline, then by closure. As employment at the Sydney Works continued to 
decrease, so did its workers find themselves pushed further to the margins of the city’s 
social and cultural landscape. This process is visible both in the “toxic legacy” and the 
perceived place of Sysco workers within that narrative, and in the language of neoliberal 
economic development popularized during the 1980s and 1990s. Open Hearth Park, 
though named after one of the central departments in the steelmaking process, does not 
necessarily communicate the sense of collective experience that many former workers 
seem to prefer. 
 Students throughout Cape Breton submitted more than 200 proposals. These 
included options such as Heartfield Park, Sydney Pleasant Park, We Rise Again Park, and 
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more. The social media campaign that corresponded with the contest offered an 
opportunity for broader participation. Here, some contemporary concerns relating to 
memory and commemoration came to light. On April 12, 2013, James Duane Marchand – 
whose father Roy was the man killed during the demolition in 2004 – had the following 
online exchange with the Sydney Park Project social media co-ordinator:  
James Marchand: My Dad was the last man to fall on the job there. [I] think this 
[park] should be named after the men who gave their lives to feed their families. 
Keep in mind that we lost fathers, sons, brothers, friends - for this place to make 
steel.  
 
Sydney Park Project: Thanks, James many of the proposed ideas coming in 
absolutely commemorate the contributions, efforts, and incredible 
accomplishments of the men and women who worked in the Steel industry in 
Sydney […] Making steel was often a dangerous job and impacted the lives of 
many Cape Bretoners and their families over the years.15 
 
Michelle Gardiner, whose husband Kevin was employed at the plant, added: 
Remember, too, many of us are still young. My husband worked for 13 years in 
the "plant". I had a family member working in the steel plant from the day it 
opened […] Do us all proud by giving it a name that reflects respect do for those 
who lost their lives and the heart of steel that beat in everyone who lived through 
the good times and bad to keep the hot steel flowing for 100 years. Believe me it 
wasn't easy those last ten years when she was on the auction block and you didn't 
know your future from 1 day to the next.... [sic]16 
 
From the beginning of the competition, it is clear that those who were connected to the 
operations of Sydney Steel hoped that the memory of work at the plant would be 
prominent in whichever name was chosen.  
Others used the campaign to publicly express concerns over the tar ponds 
remediation. Shane Paul, commenting on a Cape Breton Post article about the naming 
competition, offers, “The ‘Just Cover it Up Park’ made possible by the federal 
government!” Anonymous posters offered sarcastic suggestions: “Tarpark,” “Carcinogen 
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Creek,” or “Mutation Legacy Park.”17 These refer to the fears among some within the 
community that the 2004 encapsulation and incineration plan has simply “covered up” 
the toxic site. Such fears have also been expressed in a number of oral history interviews; 
Debbie Ouellette, for example, mentions that she will not attend any community events 
held in the park.18 The toxic legacy is visible in these proposals; the site, for some, 
remains more firmly associated with the environmental and health costs than with the 
history of steelmaking.   
In early May, five finalists were revealed: Rob Sinclair’s Grade 6 classroom at 
MacDonald Elementary School in Dominion proposed Open Hearth Park; Piley 
Poqtamkiaq Park (trans. New Beginning Park) was submitted by Lori Anne Leroy’s 
Grade 9 class at We’koma’q Mi’kmaq School in Whycocmagh; S.P.A.R.C.K. Park was 
recommended by the Grade Primary class at Harbourview Montessori School in 
Westmount; and Phoenix Park was proposed by Katelyn McPherson, a Grade 10 student 
at Riverview High School in Coxheath. Few of these include descriptions of direct 
connections to the steel plant; indeed, the winning entry – Open Hearth Park – was 
submitted by students from a nearby former coal town.  
The conceptual renewal of the site was obviously an appealing notion for the 
selection committee. Three of the finalists explore themes related to re-birth and 
remediation. Katelyn McPherson, in her description of “Phoenix Park,” describes a site 
characterized by a Phoenix rising from the ashes. She writes, “A land that was devastated 
from a century of steel industry is given a new life and rises out of the ashes of the former 
– a beautiful new park is born.”19 Similarly, the students who proposed Piley Poqtamkiaq 
Park describe their submission “We picked this name because the tar pond project has 
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18 Debbie Ouellette, interview with author, June 20, 2016. 
 
19 Katelyn McPherson, “Sydney Park Project: Phoenix Park,” in the author’s possession.  
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given the Sydney/Pier area a new beginning and start to heal mother earth.”20 
S.P.A.R.C.K. Park stands for “Steel Park Renewal for the Community and Kids. In their 
video submission, these children included a musical motto for the new site: 
Our new park will be a sign 
That the past is the past 
And the future is mine 
It’s a place for recreation 
A symbol of hope for our generation21 
 
None of these refer explicitly to steelmaking or steelworkers; rather, they are based upon 
the remediation of the site and the tar ponds clean up.  
Two other finalists explore some connections between past and present with 
explicit reference to the site’s industrial history. History Heroes Park proposal 
commemorates coal miners and steelworkers, “whose labour is at the centre of Island 
history,” but also remediation workers, the animals that live in the park, and the Mi’kmaq 
“who hunted and fished there long ago.”22 “Open Hearth Park,” which won the 
competition with more than twice as many votes as the second-place finisher, refers most 
explicitly to the experiences of former steelworkers. But this choice, too, was lauded for 
its broader themes. An editorial in the Post describes, “From a contemporary ‘branding’ 
perspective, it is hard to find two more welcoming words than ‘open’ and ‘hearth.’”23 
Each of the final selections, including “Open Hearth Park,” reflects the tensions 
that Lucy Taksa identifies as existing between public history and labour history. Based 
upon state efforts at remediation through the Sydney Tar Ponds Agency, the desire to 
commemorate working-class history on the site is combined with efforts to celebrate the 
present and future of a community green space. Taksa is critical in her assessment of 
Australian industrial heritage sites, writing, “public history, at least in the context of 
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redeveloped industrial heritage, reflects an urge to create a collective memory that 
mythologizes the past and construes it as a foreign country in which workers’ collective 
struggles are concealed beneath the large machines that once enslaved them.”24 Open 
Hearth Park does not contain the same sort of exclusionary focus on industrial machinery 
that Taksa describes in Australian public history sites, but the selection of possible names 
does reflect a sense of disruption between the industrial past and the current problems 
found within the city.  
This disruption is a sensory recollection offered by several former steelworkers as 
they describe visiting Open Hearth Park. Fred James, in the quote that begins this chapter, 
explains his perception that something was very wrong upon his first seeing the un-
ploughed Sysco railway tracks. Similarly, Adrian Murphy discusses visiting the park and 
attempting to re-orient himself based upon buildings, departments, and gates that no 
longer exist:  
Adrian: I was there a couple of times with my brother who worked there for 
thirty-plus years, too. And trying to visualize. And the only thing we can base our 
point of origin is the tunnel going through five-gate. There’s a tunnel that was 
directly across between the Open Hearth and the Blooming Mill, and I just stop 
right there and to the left I’d see, well the little furnace was right there, then you’d 
have the Old Mill, then you’ d have the Open Hearth, and drive down a little place 
and this was where the Blast Furnace and . . . Yeah, it’s unbelievable. 
Unbelievable.  
 
These accounts expose a deep sense of place attachment, but an attachment that is rooted 
within a set of social and productive relations that have no referent in the present. This is 
why Adrian, and several other former Sysco workers who relayed similar stories, try to 
re-articulate themselves within the disappeared landscape of the plant. In the existing 
scenery, replete with green grass, walking tracks, and children’s play equipment, former 
workers confront a set of recognitions first articulated by Doreen Massey in 1994: that 
place and identity are constantly being radically unsettled, that the very notion of a static 
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place to call one’s own has always been a fiction, and that memory can promote the 
acceptance of new place-identities rather than congealing into nostalgia.25  
The former worksite is now organized around a series of walking paths. In 
addition to a playground and two sporting fields, there are several historical panels, a 
memorial site, and pieces of public art that refer to the site’s industrial history. The Coke 
Ovens Sculpture, a conceptual art installation that stands nearly 30 feet tall, was installed 
in Open Hearth Park just three days before the Stronger than Steel celebrations. Designed 
and constructed by Gordon Kennedy, a Cape Breton artist who spent the first years of his 
career in British Columbia, the sculpture consists of four central figures, each facing the 
cardinal compass points. This represents the distinct nationalities that made up the 
workforce in the Coke Ovens Department.26 A smaller memorial site, officially named 
Steelworkers’ Memorial Park, exists within Open Hearth Park. Here, a monument 
bearing the names of 308 steelworkers who were killed on the site rests alongside several 
benches.27 
Figure 8.3: Coke Ovens Sculpture 
Source: Photo by author 
       
25 Doreen Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1994), 122-3. 
26 “A Man of Steel: Gordon Kennedy’s Biggest Challenge,” Victoria Standard 3, 5 
(August-September 2013). 
27 See for a full examination of this monument, Lachlan MacKinnon, “Reading a Labour 




When historical material is present, as it is in the panels that crop up alongside the 
paved trails of the park, the site’s identity is positioned as part of a continuum. This 
history does not begin, as many would expect, with the founding of the mill in the late 
1800s; rather, the first panel describes the contours of the land as it existed under the 
proprietorship of the Mi’kmaq before their purposeful displacement in the early 20th 
century. The sparse text perhaps leaves room for further context, but the foundational 
notion – that the site existed prior to its industrial life – also gestures towards a 
multiplicity of identities that could come to characterize the site in the future. Other 
panels describe the former mills and departments, while some explain the steelmaking 
process, but the overall sentiment of transition is one that works. 
The site brings to mind a term coined by Sherry Lee Linkon, “the half-life of 
deindustrialization, ” which she described at the 2014 “Deindustrialization and its 
Aftermath” conference at Concordia University. Linkon revealed how the influence of 
industrial production remains within the culture and landscape of communities long after 
the industry has itself vacated. My research, in many ways, is based upon my experiences 
growing up not in the shadow of the mill, but in the shadow cast by its absence. For the 
children who now play on the equipment at Open Hearth Park, even that linkage between 
the plant and Sydney’s present will seem tenuous. Rather, their perceptions will be 
informed by the longer view visible within the public history narrative of Open Hearth 
Park; while the political circumstances surrounding absence are perhaps not examined 
within the landscape, for its purposes the site does a good job of connecting its past, the 
experiences of steelworkers who laboured there for a century, and its present iteration as 
a community green space.  
 
Deindustrialization on Film: Heart of Steel, 2012 
 
Another representation of the site’s industrial history, a 42-minute film that was released 
to correspond with Stronger than Steel, does not reflect these interconnections. Heart of 
Steel was funded through the Sydney Tar Ponds Agency as part of the remediation 
project. Its opening shots are an exercise in juxtaposition; immediately following scenes 
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depicting the integrated mill in full operation, the viewer is treated to the plush greenery 
and coiffed fields of the present-day. “Birds flock here now,” proclaims the narrator, 
“when the government funded clean up project finishes, the former Sydney Steel site will 
be a placid refuge.”28 Randy Vallis, the federal director for the remediation project, told 
the Chronicle Herald in 2012 that the film sought to “capture the story of steelmaking” 
because “the last vestiges of steelmaking are about to disappear.”29 In the film, the 
problems associated with the end of the steel industry are nowhere to be found; they, 
similar to the landscape, have apparently been remediated. So are the men and women 
who once worked at the plant represented simply as vestiges of the industrial past. 
“Ghosts linger,” reads a voice-over, as Gerry and several other former steelworkers are 
shown walking onto the site. “Once, on these vacant lands, the epic saga of the Sydney 
steel industry unfolded.30 
The film does incorporate significant testimony from workers at the plant, but 
when this begins to discuss present concerns the narrative quickly moves ahead. In the 
first five minutes of the film, several steelworkers are seen walking around the former 
plant site and brief excerpts describe women’s experience at the coke ovens during the 
Second World War. Ray Martheleur, a local photographer and Sysco employee, gestures 
towards some discomfort with how the mill came to an end. “I would definitely like to 
see the plant in operation now,” he says. This statement is not followed up on; instead, 
the film transitions to a discussion of the plant’s earliest years.  
Issues of ethnic conflict, racial prejudice, or discriminatory hiring strategies are 
also glazed over. Although, as Ron Crawley writes, “antagonism between the long-
established residents of the Sydney area and the incoming ‘foreigners’ was evident from 
the beginning,” the film deftly sidesteps these stories.31 The closest it comes to 
                                                
28 Heart of Steel, directed by Peter Giffin (Canada: Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, 2012), DVD, 00:01:30. 
 
29 “Heart of Steel enshrines part of Cape Breton,” Chronicle Herald, 3 February 2012.  
 
30 Heart of Steel, 00:02:58. 
 
31 Ron Crawley, “Class Conflict and the Establishment of the Sydney Steel Industry, 
1899-1904,” in The Island: New Perspectives on Cape Breton history, ed. Ken Donovan 
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identifying these divisions is when former steelworker Sid Slaven remarks upon the 
tradition of “Catholic” and “protestant” sections of the plant in its early years – although 
the reasons for this are not discussed. John Murphy, who was also interviewed for the 
film, reflects that “everybody got along,” and “there was none of this racism or . . . you’re 
this and you’re that, everybody was equal.” Garfield Moe, an African-Canadian 
steelworker, explains: “we had a United Nations long before it was ever thought of 
being.”32 
This representation of ethnicity and religion on the plant is particularly puzzling 
because it directly conflicts with workers’ oral testimony collected during the Steel 
Project in the 1990s. In a January 10, 1990 interview, for example, Murphy discussed the 
pattern of employment in the different departments of the plant: “It was called the 
patronage system,” he says, “Nepotism.”33 Similarly, Dan Yakimchuk described 
discriminatory hiring practices occurring at the plant in the 1950s: “I worked for about 
three years or so in the general yard because that is where you had to start, especially if 
you weren’t in the right either political or religious denomination […] In the mechanical, 
as an ethnic person or a black person you never got the opportunity.”34 These attitudes, 
writes Elizabeth Beaton, existed to some extent at the steel plant as late as the 1970s.35  
Deindustrialization, too, prompted the structural continuation of discriminatory 
hiring long after such practices were made illegal. The seniority system in a 
deindustrializing mill plays a role in this process. As workers are laid off, those who 
                                                                                                                                            
(Fredericton and Sydney: Acadiensis and University College of Cape Breton Press, 1990), 
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33 John Murphy, interview by Michael Earle, January 10, 1990, Steel Project, MG 14, 206, 
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34 Dan Yakimchuk, interview by Michael Earle, April 20, 1990, Steel Project, Box 5, File 
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35 Elizabeth Beaton, “Making Steel: Understanding the Lived Experience,” Scienta 
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maintain seniority are the first to be hired back should the opportunity arise. In the case 
of Sysco, with some workers maintaining seniority from periods when women, blacks, or 
Indigenous peoples would not have been considered for work in particular positions, the 
mill’s decline prompted an effective continuation of these practices. With the workforce 
having dropped from several thousand in the 1960s to less than 1000 by the 1990s, there 
were always enough people looking for work from the seniority lists that new hires were 
sparse.   
There were instances where this process was overcome. Alana MacNeil was one 
of the few women to work in steel production at the Sydney Works in the decades after 
the Second World War. Although other women were employed in the General Office and 
in administrative or managerial roles, it was rare that they would find work in steel 
production or quality control. Alana describes having come onto Sysco as a clerical 
worker, organized under the USWA clerical union Local 6537. In 1995, her union 
merged with Local 6516, the metallurgical lab union. As a result, she was able to keep 
her seniority and became available for work within the mill. She soon moved into the lab, 
where she worked inspecting the Sysco rails on the line. 
Alana: I was working shift work, but it was good work. I’ll tell you, it was a 
learning curve. It took while. I was the first female that came in, Denise [another 
woman in a similar circumstance] came after me, I was the very first one that 
went down there. And I was working and I could feel . . . not daggers, but you 
feel eyes on you there were people . . . There was people that wouldn’t trust me. I 
think some of the men, from old ways, thought that I was down there to spy and 
make sure everyone was working, not taking an extra break or . . . I really think 
they were. It took a few months before they got to know me, you know, I’m here 
working for a pay cheque, too. I’m just “one of the guys.” And once that turned 
around it was a whole different – I got respect, I was, you know . . . No harm ever 
came to me, don’t get me wrong, but at first it was just to break that barrier. You 
know, all of the sudden there was this female, you know?36 
 
In Heart of Steel, all issues relating to ethnicity, religion, or gender are wholly 
explained as concerns of the distant past, while more recent issues are downplayed. The 
film engages in what Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott call “smokestack nostalgia;” 
it presents a de-politicized view of life in and around the mill, which contains few direct 
                                                




connections to present conditions in the post-industrial city.37 As these conversations 
unfold, the viewer is left with the distinct sense that the industrial past and the post-
industrial present have been entirely divorced from one another.   
 Resistance and political agitation is visible in the film’s treatment of the Parade of 
Concern. The community’s participation in the event – “right from the old retirees right 
down to babes in arms,” in the words of former steelworker Syd Slaven – is discussed, as 
are the potential devastating economic consequences for the city’s residents.38 This does 
not extend to the continuing affects of the mill’s final closure. The Parade is framed as a 
successful, albeit temporary, moment of resistance. “Mistakes were made about 
modernizing the plant, strikes hurt productivity,” asserts the narrator, “even the millions 
of government dollars spent modernizing the plant couldn’t make it profitable in the face 
of cutthroat international competition.”39 Decline, in this view, was inevitable; 
international competition was too powerful for Sydney Steel to overcome – even under 
the control of the provincial state. The uncomplicated presentation of the mill’s eventual 
closure allows for further distancing from the present. Any suggestion that Sydney should 
have remained a steel city is rejected as a position at odds with the realities of the 
globalized 21st century market.   
Workers’ accounts of the final closure are the strongest portion of the film. 
Garfield Moe describes his feelings in 2000: 
Yeah. I made a living out of it. My father before me made a living out of it, and I 
think it should be there for the other guy to make a living […] To drive over the 
overpass now and see no fire, no smoke coming out of the stacks . . . it’ll make 
you wonder.40  
 
                                                
37 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, “Introduction: The Meanings of 
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In Moe’s account, there is both a sadness surrounding the loss of the mill and a question 
regarding the necessity of its erasure. Steven High explores these sentiments in his study 
of a mill closure in Sturgeon Falls, ON. He writes, “If place attachment is a symbolic 
bond between people and place, this bond is often severed in time of sudden social or 
economic crisis such as a mill closing. People then attempt to re-create these attachments 
by remembering and talking about these places.”41 Again, the film fails to connect these 
sentiments to the present. Instead, they are positioned as the final remnants of a distant 
past – one that holds no relevancy for the dire economic situation existing in Cape Breton 
today.42   
The final section of Heart of Steel examines the environmental legacy of 
industrial pollution and the tar ponds. The extensive pollution that characterized the site 
during the 1990s is briefly described, but this is relayed only as a set-up for the complete 
success of the remediation and solidification efforts. The contentious politics of the clean 
up, the remaining health effects that plague those who lived and worked around the site, 
and its unforgettable impacts – such as those that remain with Juanita McKenzie and 
Debbie Ouellette – are ignored.43 Contrarily, the entire clean up process is positioned as 
an unmitigated success; the ability of citizens and their government to work hand-in-hand 
to overcome the toxic legacy is entirely restorative.  
This intense focus on environmental and geographical remediation is not 
uncommon in state-driven representations of former industrial sites. Sherry Lee Linkon 
describes this approach as a “variation on smokestack nostalgia, one in which images of 
deindustrialization serve not only as representations of the past but also as a resource for 
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imagining the future.”44 Historian Kent Curtis, writing of a similar situation in Anaconda, 
Montana, reminds us that projects of “turning brown into green” can paper over 
legitimate social and political concerns in the aftermath of deindustrialization. In 
Anaconda, Curtis writes, much of the image-making has been “an elaborate show of 
smoke and mirrors.45 In these representations, “post-industrial” describes not the absence 
of industry, but an opposition to it altogether; residual aspects of industrial life are 
ignored, and – in some instances – are presented simply as backwards-looking reflections 
of practices, people, and events that are best left behind.  
In the final moments of Heart of Steel, John Murphy treats the viewer to an 
insightful commentary on the history of work, and the working-class identity that 
emerged from experiences at the plant. These will continue in Sydney – he believes – 
though they may exist in a changed form. “It’s history,” he says, “It’s all in a book. It’s 
on a DVD, somewhere. It’s in a song. The older people, generation, they remember. My 
daughter’s 17 years old and she knows nothing of the steel plant. She knows I was a 
former steelworker. She knows her grandfather, both grandfathers, were former 
steelworkers. And that’s it.”46 Murphy’s daughter, along with an entire generation of 
Cape Bretoners, occupies what has sometimes been called a “middle space” in the 
deindustrialization process. This generation, Linkon writes, “do not have their own 
memories of either industrial work or widespread job loss, but they were born and raised 
during the decades after major closings, and their families and communities experienced 
both industrial labour and the displacement and disorientation of deindustrializaton.”47 
While I, as another occupant of this middle space, might not have any direct 
connection to industrial work at Sydney Steel, its shadow has been influential. This 
                                                
44 Sherry Lee Linkon, “Narrating Past and Future: Deindustrialized Landscapes as 
Resources,” International Labor and Working-Class History 84 (Fall 2013): 40. 
 
45 Kent Curtis, “Greening Anaconda: EPA, ARCO, and the Politics of Space,” in Beyond 
the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization, eds. Jefferson Cowie and Joseph 
Heathcott (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 91-111.  
 
46 Heart of Steel, 00:40:15. 
 
47 Linkon, “Narrating Past and Future,” 39.  
 
 282 
dissertation is an attempt at understanding the aftermaths that remain visible within this 
space. More broadly, out-migration continues unabated among islanders of my generation. 
In 2012, almost 20 percent of Cape Breton’s population were more than 65 years of age. 
Underemployment, contingent work, and unemployment are significant factors in driving 
our youth away.48 The recent downturn in the Alberta oilfield has caused many to return 
home, though federal crisis allowances for EI claims have not been extended to Cape 
Breton. Our crisis, apparently, has already been normalized.49 Further attention to the 
creative output of this generation offers an opportunity for future research; Linkon’s 
recent work reflects this type of approach, and she concludes that “those who have 
inherited the economic struggles and blighted landscapes of deindustrialization have the 
opportunity to use the complicated past [as] a problematic resource that both shapes and 
highlights the contradictions of the present and future.”50 
Cultural representations of industry remain an important source for the historical 
examination of deindustrialization. In the introduction to a recent special issue of 
International Labor and Working-Class History, Tim Strangleman, James Rhodes, and 
Sherry Linkon describe how film, photography, or landscapes can reflect and influence 
forms of memory and perspective. Through this media, they write, “we can gain insight 
into the continuing struggle over the meaning of industrial work and its loss, for 
displaced workers, their families and communities, and outsiders.”51  
Open Hearth Park and Heart of Steel each reflect a particular view of 
deindustrialization. The Park presents the industrial past as but one iteration of the site’s 
changing identity. While the plant no longer exists, in this narrative, its impact cannot be 
separated from the site – or the city – in the present. Heart of Steel, contrastingly, 
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positions the industrial past as a foil for the post-industrial present; this perspective is 
rooted in Whig conceptions of history, where the site’s progression from industrial to 
post-industrial was as inevitable as it was apolitical. Any continuing concerns over how 
the decline of Sysco was handled, or how its closure is directly related to the political and 
economic problems on the island today, are themselves castigated as relics of the past. 
They, like the workers shown in the film, are “Ghosts” of a bygone era.  
 Each of these, when read as cultural products, reflects the limitations and 
continuities of working-class memory and industrial structures of feeling. According to 
John Kirk, Sylvie Contrepois, and Steve Jeffreys, “heritage practice in former industrial 
areas offers ‘versions of the past’ that imply new identities in contexts often marked by 
the ‘old’ […] The past is constituted for the purposes, primarily, of the present.52 In 
Sydney, these issues have by no means been decided. These memories remain contested. 
Another group of citizens – comprised largely of former steelworkers - has recently 
attempted to garner support for a brick-and-mortar Sydney Steel Museum at the Open 
Hearth Park. This group initially emerged immediately after the plant closure, and – 
although they were unable to muster enough support for the museum – their efforts 
resulted in a “Sydney Steel Museum Website,” which includes a series of photographs of 
the plant and demolition, prose by former employees of Sysco, and other information 
related to the mill’s history.53 In their efforts, and in existing representations of the city’s 
history of steelmaking, we see how “post-industrial Sydney” retains some aspects of an 
industrial structure of feeling, now residual, that ebbed and flowed throughout the 20th 
century history of industrial Cape Breton. 
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Conclusion 
 
The seeds of this project sprouted from anger that I felt towards what I perceived as an 
injustice committed against residents in my hometown. The plant did not just close, it had 
been closed - by the province, by John Hamm, by Halifax. I remember watching the 
Sysco demolition as it progressed day-by-day from my seat on the school bus into 
Whitney Pier. I remember, later, hearing the names of young people – my peers – from 
Sydney and the other towns in industrial Cape Breton who lost their lives to drug abuse, 
suicide, or violence. I remember my friends leaving to begin their lives elsewhere and 
having the Prime Minister wag his finger at those of us who stayed over our “culture of 
defeat.” 
If my anger has not dissipated, it has become more narrowly focused. Rather than 
a “Who Killed Sydney Steel?”-type assignment of blame, this dissertation has 
transformed into a far more nuanced assessment of working-class experience than was 
perhaps initially envisioned. My informants played an undeniable role in this shift. While 
the Sydney Works is a central character in my work, life continues for those who have 
been directly affected by both its operation and its closure. The loss of the plant has been 
a loss for the city and its residents, but so, too, has a century of steelmaking taken its toll. 
One need only look at the hundreds of names on the Sydney Steelworkers’ Memorial 
Monument or listen to the accounts of Joe Legge, Debbie Ouellette and Juanita 
McKenzie to recognize the full cost of industrial production. But the lives of those who 
remain are not fodder for anthropomorphic “ruin-gazing.” Their present concerns, 
struggles, hopes, and fears are related to life in a post-industrial city, but they are no 
longer rooted in Sydney Steel.  
Gerry McCarron’s work history reveals this continuum of industrial and post-
industrial life. Today, working for the provincial crown corporation Nova Scotia Lands, 
he oversees the Harbourside Commercial Park on the site of the former plant. In a 
December 2015 interview, another former employee joked that Gerry was the “last man 
standing” from Sysco. There is truth to this. After beginning at Sydney Steel in 1978 in 
the Blast Furnace Department, Gerry moved to the metallurgical lab in 1982. In 1993, he 
went on salary in production planning, where he remained until the liquidation began in 
2001. While some steelworkers began working on the demolition process under Zoom 
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Developers, Gerry and four other employees were transferred to Ernst and Young – the 
company that had been hired by the province to oversee the receivership of Sysco. After 
six years, they began working for Nova Scotia Lands out of an office that used to be part 
of Sydney Steel. Gerry remains the only Sysco worker to have been continuously 
employed on the site of the mill to this day.1 
Although he remains on site, the terms of Gerry’s current position could not be 
more different from his time as a steelworker. In overseeing Harbourside Commercial 
Park, he is involved with planning and organizing events on the remediated site and 
dealing with public and private inquiries. His experience reveals how the issues and 
concerns of industrial work end up giving way to an entirely different set of post-
industrial experiences. In this sense, industrialism is not all encompassing; Gerry is more 
than a “former steelworker,” just as all of the people involved in this project cannot be 
defined solely by their position vis-à-vis the steel plant. 
The larger focus of this dissertation has been to expose the ways in which 
deindustrialization in Sydney has resulted from the particularities of Canadian capitalism, 
how this process has been influenced from the bottom-up through worker and 
community-based action, and how its impacts continue to echo through to the present. 
The challenge, going forward, is to recognize the significant difficulties that continue to 
face residents in these communities and begin to move towards possible solutions. In 
assessing this need, Cathy Stanton problematizes the very notion of the “post-industrial.” 
She argues that in accepting a narrative trajectory – industrial/de-industrializing/post-
industrial – we risk masking “the continued elaboration of industrial capitalism in ways 
that may actually make it more difficult to understand its ongoing trajectories and to 
resist its most insidious and divisive effects.”2 Using the “post-industrial” experience of 
Boston, which saw a return to prosperity driven largely by the knowledge sector after 
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industrial exodus, Stanton outlines how the relationships engendered within this “new” 
economy are actually quite industrial in character.3 
Stanton’s critique of the post-industrial applies directly to cities and geographies 
that Andrew Hurley refers to as “Info-boom catch basins.” In de-industrialized cities that 
were geographically positioned to take advantage of the nascent tech, financial, and 
knowledge economies, we have seen the emergence of high-end suburban development, 
condo-ization of formerly working-class neighbourhoods, and greenfield office 
construction.4 This transformation has already found purchase within popular culture; 
British punk poet John Cooper Clarke, for example, writes of the shift from the dusty 
tenements and working-class pubs of 1980s Salford to the “noodle bars and poodle 
parlours” of the 2000s in his comparative poems “Beasley Street” and “Beasley 
Boulevard.”5 Rather than viewing this transformation as a dichotomy, Stanton asks that 
scholars become more holistic in our analysis. She writes: 
What if we entertained the possibility that while capital flight, plant closings, and 
economic restructuring have most certainly taken place in many parts of the world, 
something that can be identified definitively as “deindustrialization” never has? 
[…] It’s something we can and should do now, not because we and the places and 
people we study have “gotten over it” but precisely because we shouldn’t get over 
it—and because it isn’t actually over.6 
 
Based, as it is, upon a case study of Boston, her call for a vigorous re-analysis of our own 
terms of reference pre-supposes a popular conception of the “end” of 
deindustrialization’s impact that does not exist within many single-industry rural resource 
economies where re-vitalization has been conspicuously absent.  
This does not mean that we cannot re-assess these terms, simply that they – like 
the processes of capital mobility and industrial closure – must be geographically situated 
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and contextualized. In contrast with “Info-boom catch basins,” Hurley describes the 
conditions in what he terms “Plunder Zones” – cities where today, more than 20 years 
after collapse in some cases, there is little sign of economic recovery, poverty rates 
remain astronomical, and out-migration threatens their very existence.7 In Sydney, which 
corresponds more closely with this latter category, “post-industrial” can perhaps be 
considered as a place-holder. It describes an absence, not only in economic terms, but 
also of an entire way of life, personal and place-identities, and a working-class culture 
fixed in the particularities of the shop floor. The industrial structure of feeling that is 
described in Chapter Two has come irrevocably unspooled. Though it remains in residual 
forms, its decomposition can be usefully understood in “industrial” and “post-industrial” 
terms.  In this sense, though it casts a long shadow, the industrial character of 20th 
century Cape Breton cannot truly be re-constituted. That is neither to say that industrial 
work cannot occur, nor that new forms of class identities and cultures cannot take shape 
based upon other forms of production; however, the historical forms evidenced 
throughout this dissertation are unlikely to re-emerge.   
Nor would such a direct reconstitution be desirable. Efforts at “re-industrialization” 
often go hand-in-hand with anti-union and anti-regulatory attitudes. I am reminded of a 
recent flight back to Sydney, where I met a man affiliated with ongoing efforts to re-open 
the Donkin Mine between Glace Bay and Port Morien. In 2014, Kameron Collieries – a 
subsidiary of the American company The Cline Group – purchased the flooded mine and 
announced their intention to re-start production.8 My aisle-mate told me that Cline was 
flying him back and forth between Cape Breton and his home in Pennsylvania to work on 
managing the re-constitution of the mine. Apparently unaware of the island’s history, he 
mentioned that it was nice to work in an area without the headache of unions or Obama’s 
job-killing environmental regulations. Should the Donkin Mine re-open, barring a 
confrontation with the United Mineworkers (UMWA) in a province where the memory of 
Westray remains a dark cloud, the 120 non-union jobs it intends to provide will be a 
paltry salve for the problems facing the island’s residents.  
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Historian Ian McKay has articulated the anti-modernism endemic to tourist-driven 
representations of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton.9 So, too, do efforts at re-
industrialization exist as backwards-looking attempts to deny the gains – constrained as 
they were – of labour in the 20th century. In June 2016, I had the pleasure of hearing 
Bobby Burchell – the Canadian representative for the UMWA and a New Waterford local 
– speak to a gathered crowd at the Davis Day ceremony in Glace Bay. He described how, 
in recent decades, mining companies in Cape Breton would traditionally donate wreaths 
for the ceremony. With their purchase of the Donkin mine, the Cline Group became the 
first in decades to neither send a representative to the Davis Day gathering, nor donate a 
wreath.10 For the Cline Group, presumably, the ceremony represents a form of locally-
based working-class practice that does not fit with their desire for non-union operations 
and a contingent workforce; in this sense, Stanton’s critique rings true. There will always 
be new forms of resistance that respond to material conditions. While these may assume 
the shape of past struggles, the political, economic, and ideational circumstances of the 
present mean that they will unfold in a markedly different way. 
The state also suffers from this anti-modernist view of re-industrialization. Recent 
attempts to develop the Port of Sydney, driven largely by the municipal government and 
Mayor Cecil Clarke, envision the city as a significant North American seaport. As recent 
planning document describes, “The Port of Sydney is located on the east coast of Canada. 
The Port’s channel and sheltered inner harbour can handle the world’s largest vessels and 
the Port is positioned on direct shipping routes to Europe, the U.S., South America and 
Asia.”11 In a promotional video, created by a consulting firm hired to assess the project, 
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“West Coast labour disputes” are described as one major reason why such development is 
necessary – apparently the Sydney port will be free of such disruptions.12 In this view, it 
is not basic industry that belongs to the past, but the labour movement, class struggle, and 
workers’ agitation for better wages and conditions.  
 The mayor’s assuredness about the Sydney port development would not have 
been out-of-place 115 years ago, when an article in the Daily Post reported, “By and by, 
when Pittsburgh is a village and New York has got to be whistled for to stop a steamboat, 
Sydney will be the grand seaport of a continent.”13 In this rhetorical turning-back-of-the-
clock, the potential for re-industrialization is framed as existing outside-of and beyond 
the struggles of the 20th century. In his recent book, The Great Exception, Jefferson 
Cowie argues, “The political era between the 1930s and the 1970s marks what might be 
called a “great exception” – a sustained deviation, an extended detour – from some of the 
main contours of American political practice, economic structure, and cultural out-
look.”14 As Chapter Seven of my thesis describes, much of the language surrounding 
economic development in the Maritimes has, in recent years, been informed by the 
neoliberal notion that working-class cultures developed during this interregnum have 
resulted in anti-business attitudes that must be overcome. Sydney Steel, with its history of 
unionism and state ownership, is apparently representative of these attitudes; as one 
history-themed kiosk on the Sydney waterfront asserts, “100 years of steelmaking. Good-
bye to all of that!” 
 My research explores deindustrialization as a series of changes and conflicts that 
occur across time and space and have the ability to provoke both resistance and 
resignation. Rooted in the material relationships of capitalist production, 
deindustrialization is like a Russian nesting doll. Its impacts are fragmented, and each 
fragment reveals an aspect of its totality. At the individual level, the scars of industrial 
work, environmental degradation, and de-industrial remediation efforts continue to 
                                                
12 “Novaporte – Sydney, Nova Scotia,” Youtube Video, 2:37, posted by 4582 n11, May 
19, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjBdUMUqwxg.  
 
13  “The Steel Boom Comes to Sydney, 1899,” Cape Breton’s Magazine 39 (1985): 33.  
 
14 Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 9. 
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plague the bodies and minds of those who have been affected. Working-class cultures and 
voices are de-centred from their communities during these processes; the decline and 
closure of Sydney Steel reveals a slow unwinding of an industrial structure of feeling that 
emerged during the struggles of the early 20th century. State action also constrains and 
shapes how deindustrialization unfolds locally; the provincial response to Black Friday 
resulted in 33 years of further production at Sydney Steel, and it prevented some of the 
drastic effects of immediate closure that have occurred in many Rust Belt cities in the 
U.S. So, too, did federal policies relating to regional economic development promote an 
economic and philosophical turn towards a promised post-industrial knowledge economy 
that has failed to emerge in the aftermath of industry. With this broad focus, I express the 
multi-variable aspects of deindustrialization in the historically grounded experiences of 
people affiliated with Sydney Steel. 
 Looking forward, we must also examine our own historical position. Tim 
Strangleman writes that we are now able to “consider a range of social, cultural, and 
political factors and determine how they continue to shape and structure the lives of 
individuals, families, communities, and places long after the immediate event of 
shutdown and closure.”15 While this dissertation takes a step in this direction, there is 
much room for further research. If the industrial structure of feeling is now “residual” in 
post-industrial areas, what productive and cultural forms are now emergent? Such 
attention could take the shape of environmental histories that position the human 
experience of industry and deindustrialization within the broader context of climate and 
ecological change. Scholarship on the history of capitalism is also worth engaging; as 
Julia Ott writes, this field remains “deeply concerned with performativity, with the ways 
economic theories operate as ideology and shape the reality they purport to describe in a 
neutral fashion.”16 With this renewed focus, we will be better able to ensure that our 
scholarship responds to the present needs of our subjects and provides a link between 
20th century experiences of deindustrialization and 21st century politics of resistance.  
                                                
15 Tim Strangleman, “Deindustrialization and the Historical Sociological Imagination: 
Making Sense of Work and Industrial Change,” Sociology 50, 1 (2016): 1-17. 
 
16 Sven Beckert, et. al., “Interchange: The History of Capitalism,” Journal of American 
History 101, 2 (September 2014): 506. 
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Appendix A:  




I have been informed that the purpose of the research is as follows: 
 
- To examine the processes of deindustrialization at the Sydney steel plant.  
 
 
B.   PROCEDURES 
 
 
- I understand that this interview will take place at a location of my own 
choosing.  
 
- I understand that I will be asked to participate in a conversation regarding my 
involvement with the Sydney steel plant or my role in the community more 
broadly.  
 
- I understand that I have the right to end this conversation at any time, for any 
reason, or to refuse to answer any question that is posed.  
 
- I understand that I have the right to request that my full name not be used in 
any research that results from this interview. This includes the right to ask that 





C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
 
- I understand that there are no potential risks associated with my participation 
in this interview. 
 
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
 
- I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation at anytime without negative consequences. 
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- I understand that my participation is NON-CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., my identity 
will be revealed in study results) unless I request otherwise.   
 
- I understand that the data from this study may be published.  
 
I AGREE THAT THE RECORDING OF THIS INTERVIEW MIGHT BE DONATED 
TO THE BEATON INSTITUTE ARCHIVES AT CAPE BRETON UNIVERSITY AT 




NO  _______________ 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT.  I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 













Prof. Steven High 




e-mail: shigh@concordia.ca  
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact the Research Ethics and Compliance Advisor, Concordia University, 
514.848.2424 ex. 7481 ethics@alcor.concordia.ca 
 
